ii.204–11).
28. DRZW, ii.202.
29. TBJG, 1/8, 41–2 (9 April 1940). Two days later, Hitler was talking of the aim being a ‘nordgermanischer Staatenbund’ — effectively with Denmark and Norway as German puppet states under military ‘protection’ (TBJG, 1/8, 47 (11 April 1940)).
30. Churchill, i.524 for the Swedish reports.
31. Lothar Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg. Kriegfuhrung und Politik, (1967), 4th edn, Munich, 1975, 56.
32. Based on: DRZW, ii.212–25; Weinberg III, 116–19; Lukacs, Duel, 32–5; Gruchmann, Zweiter Weltkrieg, pt.I, Ch.4; R. A. C. Parker, Struggle for Survival. The History of the Second World War, Oxford, 1990, 25; Churchill, i.528–92.
33. Warlimont, 75–8.
34. Warlimont, 76, 79–80.
35. DRZW, ii.247–8.
36. A point made by Lukacs, Duel, 22.
37. DRZW, ii.248. The following rests above all on Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, ‘Hitlers Gedanken zur Kriegfuhrung im Westen’, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 5 (1955), 433–46; and Jacobsen, Fall Gelb, 66ff., 107ff, esp.112ff.
38. This version was, in fact, captured after a German officer’s plane was forced to land in Belgium. See Jacobsen, Fall Gelb, 93–9.
39. DRZW, ii.250–51.
40. IfZ, MA 444/3, ‘Grundsatzlicher Befehl’, 11 January 1940; Domarus, 1446.
41. Engel, 75.
42. DRZW, ii.252.
43. DRZW, ii.254. Francois Delpla, La ruse nazi. Dunkerque — 24 mai 1940, Paris, 1997, 120 and nn.30–31, could find no reference to the term in contemporary documents. He attributed it to Churchill, who wrote after the war of ‘the German scythe-cut’ (Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol.ii, Their Finest Hour, London etc., 1949, 74). Its first usage in scholarly literature, he suggested, was by Jacobsen in Fall Gelb, published in 1957.
44. Weisungen, 53; Jacobsen, Vorgeschichte, 64–8; DRZW, ii.253 (map).
45. Schmidt, 488–9; CD, 223.
46. Staatsmanner, i.47.
47. Staatsmanner, i.48.
48. Above based on Staatsmanner, i.37–59; Schmidt, 488–91; CD, 223–5; CP, 361–5.
49. CD, 224–5.
50. TBJG, 1/7, 356 (19 March 1940), 357 (20 March 1940).
51. TBJG, 1/7, 358 (20 March 1940).
52. As pointed out by Lukacs, 221.
53. TBJG, 1/8, 66 (21 April 1940).
54. TBJG, 1/8, 73 (25 April 1940).
55. Hillgruber, Strategie, 58.
56. DRZW, ii.283–4; Below, 228.
57. Below, 228–9.
58. DRZW, ii.282.
59. DRZW, ii.266–7.
60. Schroeder, 101–2, 349–50, n. 196; Below, 229–30.
61. Below, 231.
62. DRZW, ii.284–96; Weinberg III, 125–30; Gruchmann, Zweiter Weltkrieg, pt.I, ch.5; Parker, Struggle, 27ff.; Churchill, ii.66–104.
63. See DRZW, ii.296 for Rundstedt’s post-war self-exculpatory view. See also Guenther Blumen-tritt, Von Rundstedt. The Soldier and the Man, London, 1952, 74–8. Churchill recognized, even writing in the late 1940s, the misleading nature of the German generals’ accounts (Churchill, ii.68–70). See also, on the ‘halt order’, Gruchmann, Zweiter Weltkrieg, 63; Weinberg III, 130–31; Parker, Struggle, 35–6; Irving, HW, 120–22; Charles Messenger, The Last Prussian. A Biography of Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, 1875–1953, London etc., 1991,113–20; Lukacs, Duel, 90–97. Delpla, La ruse, here especially 290–92 (also Francois Delpla, Hitler, Paris, 1999, 326–7) is alone in interpeting the ‘halt order’ as part of a complex diplomatic manoeuvre, involving Goring and Dahlerus, to hold the British to ransom and force them to end the war on German terms.
64. Schroeder, 105–6 (where Hitler’s comment is dated to the day that he learned of the French armistice offer — 17 June).
65. Below, 232.
66. IMG, xxviii.433, Doc.1809-PS (Jodl-Tagebuch); Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (ed.), Dokumente zum Westfeldzug 1940, Gottingen/Berlin/Frankfurt, 1960, 73–86; Jacobsen, 1939–1945. Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 146; Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Dunkirchen. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Westfeldzuges 1940, Neckargemund, 1958, 70–122, especially 94–5. Jodl repeated after the war that the notion that Hitler refused to send the tanks on to Dunkirk was a ‘legend’. Hitler, he stated, had hesitated to adopt Brauchitsch’s recommendation to do this because the terrain was not suitable for tanks and the risk was too great that the tanks would not be available for the thrust to the south. However, he left the decision to the local commanders, who chose not to deploy the tanks against Dunkirk (IfZ, ZS 678 (Generaloberst Alfred Jodl), ‘Hitler, eine militarische Fuhrerpersonlichkeit. Ein Gesprach mit Generaloberst Jodl von Freg.Kapt. Meckel’, May-July 1946, Fol.3).
67. Below, 232–3.
68. Halder KTB, i.319 (25 May 1940).
69. IMG, xxviii.434, D0C.1809-PS (Jodl-Tagebuch); Jacobsen, 1939–45, 146–7; Below, 233.
70. Halder KTB, i.318–19 (24 May 1940, 25 May 1940).
71. DRZW, ii.297.
72. Halder KTB, i.318 (24 May 1940); Below, 232.
73. DGFP, D, 9, 484, N0.357.
74. DRZW, ii.296; Weinberg III, 130–31.
75. Halder KTB, i.320–21 (26 May 1940).
76. In fact, General Sir John Gort, the commander of the British Expeditionary Force, had ordered the evacuation only at 7 p.m. on 26 May, and as few as 8,000 troops were evacuated during the following twenty-four hours (Lukacs, Duel, 96–7). The evacuation continued for another week. Dunkirk fell only on 4 June.
77. See Lukacs, Duel, 97ff., for Churchill’s political isolation during the days of the evacuation, and the pressure of those wanting to sue for terms, articulated above all by Lord Halifax.
78. Below, 233; Schroeder, 102.
79. See Eugen Weber, The Hollow Years. France in the 1930s, New York/London, 1996, 272–9.
80. Weinberg III, 131; Below, 233–4.
81. DRZW, ii.307; Oxford Companion, 414.
82. Schroeder, 106. Trick photography later turned Hitler’s characteristic gesture of raising his leg and slapping his thigh into a jig for joy (Lukacs, Duel, 142).
