points out that preliminary preparations for a preventive attack on Yugoslavia had been undertaken months earlier, so that the army was not caught as unawares as post-war accounts sometimes claimed.

116. Halder KTB. ii.330–31 (27 March 1941); Below, 265. Ribbentrop was also present.

117. IMG, xxviii.23, Doc.1746-PS; KTB OKW, i.368 (27 March 1941).

118. Keitel, 262.

119. Weisungen, 124–6; Below, 265.

120. Keitel, 262; DRZW, iii.44.8ff.

121. DRZW, iii.451. Initially, the attacks on Greece (‘Marita’) and Yugoslavia (‘Directive 25’) were foreseen as separate operations, starting at different dates in early April. On 29 March it was decided to link the operations. According to the new timetable, the bombing of Belgrade and beginning of ‘Marita’ were put back from 1 to 5 April then, on 3 April, postponed for twenty-four hours (Creveld, 154).

122. TBJG, I/9, 211 (29 March 1941). This was the first time that Goebbels had referred to ‘Barbarossa’ in his diary (Tb Reuth, 1546, n.46).

123. Schmidt, 539–40, 542.

124. Schmidt, 536–9.

125. Irving, HW, 220.

126. The thinking in Tokyo differed sharply on this point. It was presumed that an attack on Singapore would be precisely the step to bring the USA into the war in support of Britain (Staatsmanner, I, 255 and n.5). Hitler reckoned with conflict between Germany and the USA — but not before the conquest of the USSR had given him the basis to undertake such a contest (Staatsmanner, I, 256 n.7; and see Andreas Hillgruber, ‘Hitler und die USA’, in Otmar Franz (ed.), Europas Mitte, Gottingen/Zurich, 1987, 125–44, here 134).

127. Carr, Poland, 146.

128. Schmidt, 540–42; Staatsmanner, i., 244 n.16. According to Schmidt, Hitler himself gave a broad hint on Matsuoka’s departure following his return to Berlin that conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union could not be excluded (Schmidt, 548). By this date, American cryptanalysts had broken Japanese diplomatic codes and were able to read the increasing number of messages, following Matsuoka’s visit, passed to Tokyo by the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, General Oshima Hiroshi. By mid-April 1941, US intelligence had detailed information on the forthcoming German invasion of the USSR, and was passing the information to the Russians. (Carl Boyd, Hitler’s Japanese Confidant. General Oshima Hiroshi and MAGIC Intelligence, 1941–1945, Kansas, 1992, 18–21.)

129. Staatsmanner, I, 245 and n.18. At the lunch given for Matsuoka on 28 March, Hitler commented in an aside to the Japanese Ambassador Oshima that should the USSR attack Japan Germany would not hesitate to attack the Soviet Union (Andreas Hillgruber, ‘Japan und der Fall “Barbarossa”. Japanische Dokumente zu den Gesprachen Hitlers und Ribbentrops mit Botschafter Oshima von Februar bis Juni 1941’, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 18, 1968, 312–36, here 315–16).

130. Staatsmanner I, 240–47.

131. Staatsmanner I, 248.

132. Staatsmanner I, 262.

133. CP, 436 (20 April 1941).

134. Staatsmanner I, 256–7.

135. TBJG, I/9, 248 (15 April 1941). Stalin had made demonstrative gestures of friendship towards Germany immediately following Matsuoka’s departure from Moscow, embracing the German ambassador and military attache and declaring that Russia and Germany would march together to their goal (TBJG, I/9, 247 (14 April 1941); Schmidt, 548–9).

136. TBJG, I/9, 230 (6 April 1941).

137. TBJG, I/9, 229 (6 April 1941); Domarus, 1686.

138. Hitler had spoken extensively about this on his visit to Linz in mid-March (TBJG, I/9, 185 (13 March 1941). By mid-May, Goebbels was noting how much the transformation of Linz into a cultural capital was costing. ‘But the Fuhrer attaches so much value to it,’ he added (TBJG, I/9, 318 (17 May 1941). Hitler would often repeat in future his intention of making Linz a cultural centre, and his criticism of Vienna. (See TBJG, II/4, 407 (30 May 1942); Picker, 377 (29 May 1942) and 493–4 (10 June 1942).)

139. TBJG, I/9, 231 (6 April 1941).

140. TBJG, I/9, 231 (6 April 1941); text of the proclamation, Domarus, 1687– 9.

141. Domarus, 1689.

142. TBJG, I/9, 230 (6 April 1941); and in his speech to military leaders on 27 March 1941 (Domarus, 1677).

143. DRZW, iv.423.

144. Below, 268–9; Keitel, 263; Domarus, 1691 n.155 (where it is stated that the engine was kept under steam in case of air-attack, though without a source-reference).

145. Below, 268.

146. Below, 271; Keitel, 263–4; Domarus, 1692–3.

147. Domarus, 1692.

148. Keitel, 263.

149. Creveld, 158–66; DRZW, iii.458ff.

150. Creveld, 165–6; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 112.

151. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 112; Weinberg III, 221.

152. TBJG, I/9, 234 (8 April 1941). Hitler gushed about his admiration for the classical world, whereas he hated Christianity ‘because it had crippled everything noble about humanity’. He applauded the grandeur of classical architecture, ‘its clarity, brightness, and beauty’, and disliked the ‘gloominess and indistinct mysticism’ of Gothic architecture.

153. Creveld, 163. Jodl reported that the joint surrender had been grotesque (TBJG, I/9, Z79 (29 April 1941)).

154. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 113–14; Weinberg III, 222.

155. Keitel, 263, mistakenly says five weeks.

156. Creveld, 167.

157. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 115; Creveld, 170.

158. Creveld, 170; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 115.

159. Domarus, 1692, 1708; Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 158–60.

160. Weisungen, 97.

161. Halder KTB, ii.210, 214 (5 December 1940); and see Creveld, 151.

162. IMG, xxviii.23, Doc. 1746-PS.

163. KTB OKW, i.411–12 (28 May 1941); Halder KTB, 387 (30 April 1941); Hillgruber, Strategie, 507; Domarus, 1696.

164. Hitlers politisches Testament. Die Bormann-Diktate vom Februar und April 1945, Hamburg, 1981, 88 (17 February 1945). No authentic German text of the misnamed ‘Testament’ has ever come to light, though the comments certainly have the ring of Hitler about them.

165. See Hillgruber, Strategie, 506 n.26, who points out that Hitler’s comments served only the interests of his reputation for posterity.

166. Leach, 166; Hillgruber, Strategie, 506.

167. Hillgruber, Strategie, 506 and n.26.

168. Hillgruber, Strategie, 506–7.

169. Leach, 166.

170. Irving, HW, 233.

171. Domarus, 1709.

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