172. Schmidt, 549.
173. Schmidt, 549; and see TBJG, I/9, 309 (13 May 1941).
174. Rainer F. Schmidt, ‘Der He?-Flug und das Kabinett Churchill’, VfZ, 42 (1994), 1–38, here 12–13.
175. James Douglas-Hamilton, Motive for a Mission. The Story behind Hess’s Flight to Britain, 2nd edn, Edinburgh, 1979, 172–6; James Douglas-Hamilton, The Truth about Rudolf Hess, Edinburgh, 1993, 141–5; Peter Padfield, Hess. The Fuhrer’s Disciple, London, 1991, 193–211.
176. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. Vol.III: The Grand Alliance, London etc., 1950, 43; Douglas-Hamilton, Motive for a Mission, 174ff, quotation 180; Colville, 306–7; John Costello, Ten Days that Saved the West, London, 1991, 417–19; Padfield, Hess, 213–17, quotation 217; James Leasor, Rudolf Hess: the Uninvited Envoy, London, 1962, ch.1–2, 7; J. Bernard Hutton, Hess: the Man and his Mission, London, 1970, 1ff., 49–52.
177. Padfield, Hess, 218–19, 225; Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 377. Cadogan was hugely irritated by what he saw as an unwelcome distraction caused by He?. ‘He? is the bane of my life and all my time is wasted,’ he noted on 14 May (Diaries, 378). ‘If only the parachute had failed to open, he would be a happier and more efficient man,’ he told close colleagues; ‘the handling of the whole business is difficult but very important psychologically’ (Colville, 388 (14 May 1941).
178. According to some versions, Hitler was still in bed when Pintsch arrived, though he dressed remarkably quickly (Heinz Linge, ‘Kronzeuge Linge. Der Kammerdiener des “Fuhrers”’, Revue, Munich, November 1955-March 1956, 60; Below, 273). Linge later, however, contradicted his first account, indicating that, though not wanting to be wakened before midday, Hitler was already dressed when Pintsch arrived (Heinz Linge, Bis zum Untergang. Als Chef des personlichen Dienstes bei Hitler, hrsg. von W. Maser, Munich/Berlin, 1980, 141–2). According to Engel, he was present — something disputed by Linge, Bis zum Untergang, 142 n. — while the Fuhrer was discussing military matters when Pintsch was ushered into the Berghof. Angry at being disturbed, Hitler initially refused to see Pintsch, but eventually, with a bad grace, agreed to do so (Engel, 103 (11 May 1941)). General Karl Bodenschatz, Goring’s representative, claimed after the war to have been alone with Hitler when Pintsch handed over the missive from He? around 11a.m. (lfZ, ZS 10, Karl Bodenschatz, Fol.32 (Interview with David Irving, 3oNovember 1970)); Irving, HW, 244; Schmidt, ‘Der He?-Flug’, 5 n.20. Hitler himself apparently recalled, mistakenly, in April 1942 that he had received the news from Heinz Lorenz, Press Chief Dietrich’s representative at Fuhrer HQ, while taking tea by the fireside (Picker, 282 (19–20 April 1942)).
179. Engel, 103 (11 May 1941). Linge, ‘Kronzeuge’, 60, in a scene he claimed he would never forget, has Hitler apparently calm as he read the letter, and only on Bormann’s arrival falling into a rage and thumping his fist on the table.
180. Speer, 189. Speer’s details are, however, not always accurate. He has Pietsch instead of Pintsch for Hess’s adjutant, and Leitgen also being present, which he was not. He has Goebbels and Himmler being summoned, and Bormann doing the telephoning. Neither Himmler nor Goebbels were there in the first round. Goebbels was not informed until the following day.
181. A package from He? had, in fact, so Hitler told his military chiefs a few days later, been delivered to the Berghof the previous evening, but, presuming it was no more than routine Party administrative material from the Deputy Fuhrer, he had simply not bothered to open it (Halder KTB, ii.414 (15 May 1941)). See also Irving, HW, 144. There is no obvious reason why Hitler would have made this up. But, since the letters have not survived, the precise content and how the Saturday evening package (left unopened until the Sunday) and the Sunday letter which came via Pintsch related to each other is unclear. The longer letter, which Hitler had not bothered to open, appears to have been a fourteen-page memorandum with the suggestions for peace that he intended to put to the British. The shorter letter, which so appalled Hitler when he read it, apparently began by saying that by the time the letter was received, its author would be in England. (According to Bodenschatz, who claimed to have read it, this letter was only about two pages long. — IfZ, ZS 10, Fol.32.) He? handed this letter over to Pintsch immediately before taking off from the airfield at Haunstetten (David Irving, Rudolf He? — ein gescheiterter Friedensbote? Die Wahrheit uber die unbekannten Jahre 1941–1945, Graz/Stuttgart, 1987, 89–90, 100). He? told the Duke of Hamilton that he had made three previous attempts, but bad weather had intervened. It was, however, also the case that he needed far greater navigational detail than he had initially thought (Irving, He?, 91– 2).
182. Domarus, 1711; Irving, He?, 90, both resting on the post-war testimony at Nuremberg of Hildegard Fath, one of He?’s secretaries: Eidesstattliche Erklarung, undatiert, ND Beweisstuck, He?- 13, IWM FO 645, Box Nr.31, Nr.3 — cit. Irving, He?, 444, note to p.89.
183. Engel, 103–4 (11 May 1941).
184. Below, 273.
185. Hewel’s diary entry speaks of ‘great agitation (Gro?e Erregung)’ when Pintsch delivered the letter. Ribbentrop and Goring were summoned. Hitler broke off his talks with Darian. When Goring arrived that evening and was put in the picture by Bodenschatz, he was also ‘very agitated (sehr erregt)’. Hewel also described the atmosphere of the lengthy discussion in the hall between Hitler, Ribbentrop, Goring, and Bormann as ‘very agitated (sehr erregt).’ ‘Many combinations (Viele Kombinationen)’, the diary-entry ends (IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hewel-Tagebuch (entry for 11 May 1941)).
186. Martin Moll (ed.), ‘Fuhrer-Erlasse’ 1939–1945, Stuttgart, 1997,172; Domarus, 1716; Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter, 149–50.
187. See Orlow, ii.334.
188. See Longerich, Hitlers Stellvertreter, 1 54ff., especially 178–9.
189. IfZ, ED 100, Hewel-Tagebuch, Irving-Sammlung, entry for 12 May 1941; Use He?, England-Nurnberg-Spandau. Ein Schicksal in Bildern, Leoni am Starnberger See, 1952,130; Irving, HW, 246; Domarus, 1713 n.215,1714. Halder KTB, ii.414 (15 May 1941), conveys the mistaken impression that Goring and Udet had thought it probable that He? would reach his target. According to Hewel, their initial view was that he would not; but Hitler overrode them.
190. Below, 273–4; IfZ, ED 100, Hewel-Tagebuch, Irving-Sammlung, entry for 12 May 1941: ‘Day full of agitation. Inquiries about He?’s flight. The Fuhrer decides on publishing. Section that it was an act of madness pushed through by Fuhrer.’ (‘Sehr erregter Tag. Untersuchungen uber Hess’s Flug. Der Fuhrer entschlie?t sich zur Veroffentlichung. Passus, da? es sich um eine Wahnsinnstat handelt, wird von F[uhrer] durchgesetzt.’)
191. Domarus, 1714.
192. TBJG, I/9, 309 (13 May 1941).
193. TBJG, I/9, 311 (14 May 1941).
194. Domarus, 1716.
195. TBJG, I/9, 309 (13 May 1941).
196. TBJG, I/9, 309–10 (13 May 1941). And see Below, 274. The following day — after he had seen Hitler — he wrote that it had been necessary to bring out the communique of 12 May and to attribute the affair to He?’s delusions. ‘How else could it have been explained?’ he asked (TBJG, I/9, 311 (14 May 1941)).
197. TBJG, I/9, 311 (14 May 1941).
198. Kriegspropaganda 1939–1941. Geheime Ministerkonferenzen im Reichspropagandaministerium, ed. Willi A. Boelcke, Stuttgart, 1966, 728–36 (13,14,15 May 1941); Rudolf Semmler, Goebbels — the Man Next to Hitler, London, 1941, 32–3 (14 May 1941); Orlow, ii.332.
199. TBJG, I/9, 311 (14 May 1941). He? was, in fact, officially the third man in the Reich, having been designated in September 1939 as Hitler’s successor after Goring in the event of his death
