Hitler. 1936-1945: Nemesis

sad (unendlich traurig)’, and had ‘immeasurable anger at the navy leadership (Ma?lose Wut auf Seekriegsleitung)’ for failure to adopt the correct tactics and unnecessary exposure of the Bismarck. (IfZ, ED 100, Irving- Sammlung, Hewel-Tagebuch, entries for 26 May, especially, 27 May, and 31 May 1941. See also Raeder, Mein Leben, ii.269–71; Lagevortrage, 239 (6 June 1941); Irving, HW, 254, 258.)

236. Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men. Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland, New York, 1992, 11.

237. Anatomie, ii. 176–82, 2o6ff.

238. Krausnick/Wilhelm, 141–50; Hohne, Death’s Head, 328–30.

239. Hohne, Death’s Head, 328.

240. Krausnick/Wilhelm, 148.

241. Ulrich Herbert, ’ “Generation der Sachlichkeit”. Die volkische Studentenbewegung der fruhen zwanziger Jahre in Deutschland’, in Frank Bajohr, Werner Johe and Uwe Lohalm (eds.), Zivilisation und Barbarei, Hamburg, 1991, 115–44, especially 137–8.

242. Krausnick/Wilhelm, 148–9.

243. Hohne, Death’s Head, 330.

244. TBJG, I/9, 346 (31 May 1941).

245. Domarus, 1722.

246. CD, 352 (1 June 1941).

247. IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hewel-Tagebuch, entry for 2 June 1941; Irving, HW, 262. Hitler told Goebbels just before the invasion that Mussolini had been broadly orientated during their Brenner meeting (TBJG, I/9, 395 (22 June 1941)).

248. CD, 352 (2 June 1941).

249. Hitler, noted Goebbels on the day that ‘Barbarossabegan, had nothing but contempt for He?, who had caused the Party and the Wehrmacht enormous damage and ought to have been shot, had he not been mad (TBJG, I/9, 395–6 (22 June 1941)).

250. CP, 442.

251. Staatsmanner I, 260–76.

252. CD, 352 (1 June 1941); CP, 441; Staatsmanner I, 262–3.

253. Staatsmanner I, 264–6, 269–72, 276.

254. See Schmidt, 550.

255. Domarus, 1722.

256. CD, 352 (2 June 1941).

257. IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hewel-Tagebuch, entry for 3 June 1941; Irving, HW, 262; Bernd Martin, Deutschland und Japan im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Gottingen, 1969, 97 n.13; Boyd, 21.

258. Staatsmanner I, 277–91.

259. Staatsmanner I, 279, 285, 289 and n.39.

260. Staatsmanner I, 280 n.14, 288 n.36, 289 n.39.

261. Staatsmanner I, 284–90.

262. Staatsmanner I, 291.

263. Below, 277.

264. Halder KTB, 455 (14 June 1941). Despite this apparent confidence, he had, in fact, only three days earlier issued Directive 32, laying out operational plans for continuing the struggle against the British position in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Middle East (Weisungen, 151ff.).

265. Below, 277.

266. Below, 278.

267. The following from TBJG, I/9, 377–80 (16 June 1941).

268. Below, 272–3. Goebbels was himself aware of accurate rumours and a good deal of tension both at home and abroad about the impending ‘action’ (TBJG, I/9, 372 (14 June 1941), 387 (19 June I941)).

269. BA/MA, RW 20–13/9, ‘Geschichte der Rustungs-Inspektion XII’, Fol.156: ‘Die Konzentration zahlreicher Truppen in den Ostgebieten batte zwar die Vermutung aufkommen lassen, als bereiten sich dort bedeutungsvolle Ereignisse vor, jedoch glaubte wobl der uberwiegende Teil des deutschen Volkes an keine kriegerische Auseinandersetzung mit der Sow jet-Union.’

270. TBJG, I/9, 380 (16 June 1941).

271. TBJG, I/9, 387 (19 June 1941); Tb Reuth, 1606 has 800,000. Goebbels had noted some days earlier that 30 million leaflets had been prepared in the Propaganda Ministry for distribution about the war in the east (TBJG, I/9, 366–7 (12 June 1941)).

272. Below, 278; TBJG, I/9, 395 (22 June 1941). Goebbels suggested a few alterations.

273. Below, 178–9; TBJG, I/9, 395 (22 June 1941).

274. TBJG, I/9, 395–6 (22 June 1941).

275. According to KTB OKW, i.408 (22 June 1941), the attack began at 3a.m. Domarus, 1733, has it beginning at 3.05a.m.; DRZW, iv.451, states that it began between 3.00 and 3.30, noting (n.1) that the variations in time arose from the differing point of sunrise along such a lengthy front. TBJG, I/9, 396 (22 June 1941), has ‘3.30. Now the guns are thundering.’

276. TBJG, I/9, 396 (22 June 1941); Tb Reuth, 1611 n.128.

277. Domarus, 1727.

278. Domarus, 1731.

279. Domarus, 1732.

280. Domarus, 1735–6.

281. DGFP, D, XII, 1066–9, No.660, quotation 1069.

CHAPTER 9: SHOWDOWN

1. TBJG, II/1, 36–7 (9 July 1941); Domarus, 1732. Hitler was by summer 1942 sufficiently aware that the parallel was being drawn that he had ‘experts’ counter the talk by declaring that Napoleon really only commenced his march into Russia on 23 June (Picker, 462 (19 July 1942)).

2. DRZW, iv.72, 75; Leach, 192; Omer Bartov, ‘From Blitzkrieg to Total War: Controversial Links between Image and Reality’, in Kershaw and Lewin, 158–84, here 165 (who points out that the Luftwaffe deployed significantly fewer aircraft than in the Western campaign); Hartmut Schustereit, Vabanque: Hitler’s Angriff auf die Sowjetunion 1941 als Versuch, durcb den Sieg im Osten den Westen zu bezwingen, Herford, 1988, 30–41. A detailed evaluation of the rival forces and the early military operations is provided by David M. Glantz (ed.), The Initial Period of War on the Eastern Front, 22 June-August 1941, London, 1993; see 29–31 for Soviet troop dispositions and deployment on 22 June 1941.

3. DRZW, iv.Beiheft, maps 5, 7; Domarus, 1744 for the fall of Minsk, reported on 10 July.

4. See above all Gerd R. Ueberschar and Lev A. Bezymenskij (eds.), Der deutsche Uberfall auf die Sowjetunion. Die Kontroverse um die Praventivkriegsthese, Darmstadt, 1988, here especially VIII-