discussed by Halder and Brauchitsch with the three Army Group Commanders on 31 January 1941, then issued on 19 February 1941 (Halder KTB, ii.264 n.1, 266 (31 January 1941, 2 February 1941). Mention of Moscow was confined to a single sentence: ‘In the event of a sudden unexpected collapse of enemy resistance in northern Russia, the abandonment of the turning movement and an immediate thrust towards Moscow could be considered’ (Halder KTB, ii.465; trans. Leach, 264).
95. Weisungen, 98–9 (No.21, 18 December 1940). Hitler’s significant amendment to the original plan of attack had been conveyed to Jodl on 17 December 1940, the day before the issuing of Directive No.21 for ‘Barbarossa’ (KTB OKW, i.233).
96. Halder KTB, iii.24–5 (29 June 1941).
97. KTB OKW, i.1020; DRZW, iv.486–7; and see Warlimont, 182.
98. DRZW, iv.487.
99. Leach, 197.
100. DRZW, iv.487; Leach, 216.
101. KTB OKW, 1.1030 (during Hitler’s visit to Leeb in Army Group North on 21 July). See also Warlimont, 186; DRZW, iv.495.
102. Weisungen, 166 (23 July 1941); DRZW, iv.490; Leach, 198.
103. KTB OKW, i.1030; Halder KTB, iii.103–7 (23 July 1941), especially 104 and n.1, 106 (quotation); DRZW, iv.491.
104. Weisungen, 165; DRZW, iv.689–93; Leach, 204. Hitler’s Directive No.33 of 19 July 1941, ‘Continuation of the War in the East’, had, however, indicated that air-raids supporting the army on the south-eastern front, not on Moscow, were the first priority (Weisungen, 164–5). Goring later described the raids on Moscow as ‘prestige attacks’, prompted by sarcastic remarks by Hitler casting doubt on whether the Luftwaffe had a single squadron with the courage to raid Moscow (DRZW, iv.693).
105. Leach, 205.
106. Halder KTB, iii.151 (4 August 1941). Under ‘Losses (Verluste)’ Halder noted 46,470 officers and men dead, 11,758 missing, and 155,073 injured.
107. Leach, 205–7, 210.
108. Leach, 207.
109. KTB OKW, 1.1033.
110. DRZW, iv.493.
111. 111. KTB OKW, i.1037, 1040.
112. Warlimont, 185; Leach, 208.
113. KTB OKW, i.1040; DRZW, iv.495–6; Leach, 209.
114. Halder KTB, iii. 134 (30 July 1941); trans. Halder Diary, 490.
115. Weisungen, 168–9; DRZW, iv.495; Leach, 209.
116. DRZW, iv.495–6.
117. DRZW, iv. 499–500.
118. Halder KTB, iii.170 (11 August 1941); trans. Halder Diary, 506.
119. Weisungen, 173; and see DRZW, iv.503; Warlimont, 187.
120. DRZW, iv.504.
121. TBJG, II/1, 258 (19 August 1941). Hitler’s own — exaggerated — view was that he had not been ill since he was sixteen years old (Monologe, 190 (9–10 January 1942)).
122. Irving, Doctor, 87–8; Irving, HW, 293–5.
123. TBJG, II/i, 260–3 (19 August 1941).
124. Laurence Rees, War of the Century. When Hitler Fought Stalin, London, 1999, 52–6; Volko-gonov, 412–13.
125. TBJG, II/1, 266 (19 August 1941).
126. KTB OKW, 11.1055–9; DRZW, iv.505.
127. Adolf Heusinger, Befehl im Widerstreit. Schicksalsstunden der deutschen Armee 1923– 1945, Tubingen/Stuttgart, 1950, 132–5; Warlimont, 189 (whose translation has been used).
128. KTB OKW, i.1061–3 (Halder’s memorandum, and Hitler’s order); Halder KTB, iii.192 (22 August 1941), trans. Halder Diary, 514; Warlimont, 190.
129. KTB OKW, i.1065; Halder KTB, iii.193 (22 August 1941); DRZW, iv.506; Warlimont, 190–91.
130. KTB OKW, ii.1063–8 (Hitler’s ‘Study’); DRZW, iv.505–6.
131. Halder KTB, iii.193 (22 August 1941); trans. Halder Diary, 515; and see Bock, 290–91 (23 August 1941), and Hartmann, 283.
132. Above from Guderian, 198–202.
133. Hartmann, 283–4; Halder’s reaction to Guderian’s change of mind in Halder KTB, iii.194–5 (24 August 1941).
134. Bock, 291 (24 August 1941); Hartmann, 284 n.57.
135. A point made by Warlimont, 191.
136. DRZW, iv.514, 516, 516 n.252; Leach, 222 (slightly different figures).
137. Leach, 222.
138. DRZW, iv.516; Warlimont, 193, on agreement now on the necessity of reaching Moscow before the winter.
139. In fact, once the German blockade set in, around 2.5 million civilians would be practically trapped — apart from a path over the iced Lake Ladoga — in the city over an exceptionally icy winter and beyond. (The siege would finally be raised only at the end of January 1944.) With supply routes cut off, famine conditions quickly took hold. Horses and stray dogs were rapidly consumed. Bread and gruel were in exceedingly short supply. Most people had to resort to root vegetables and, when they dried up, an unholy concoction made from peat and paper. An estimated 850–950,000 are estimated to have succumbed to starvation, cold, and illness. (Osobyi Arkhiv (Sonderarchiv), Moscow, 500–1–25, ‘Ereignismeldung UdSSR Nr.191’, 10 April 1942, Fols.264–70; Oxford Companion, 683–6; Richard Overy, Russia’s War, London, 1997, 105–11.)
140. TBJG, II/1, 481–3 (24 September 1941).
141. TBJG, II.1, 486 (24 September 1941).
142. TBJG, II/1, 482 (24 September 1941). In fact, Hitler was hoping to be able to withdraw a good number of divisions after attaining the next military goals. Halder had decided as early as 8 July to make winter arrangements for an occupying rather than a combat force in the Soviet Union (Halder KTB, iii.53 (8 July 1941); Dallin, 62).
143. An attached cover-note by Keitel of 1 September states that Hitler had approved the Memorandum. Its circulation was restricted on Hitler’s orders to the Commanders-in-Chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht, and the Reich Foreign Minister (Ribbentrop). Chief of Staff Halder presumably saw it only several days after its initial distribution, since he noted extracts in his diary entry for 13 September. (ADAP, D, XIII, 345–53, quotation 352, No. 265; DGFP, D, 13, 422–33, quotation 431, No.265; Halder KTB, iii.226–9; DRZW, iv.507; Warlimont, 192–3.)
144. Halder KTB, iii.205 (29 August 1941).
145. DRZW, IV. 571.
