July 1941).
46. Monologe, 39 (5–6 July 1941).
47. ‘Aufzeichnungen des personlichen Referenten Rosenbergs Dr Koeppen uber Hitlers Tischgespra-che 1941’(= Koeppen), Fol. 15 (19 September 1941). In fact, as the hopes of the Volkswagenwerk of returning to production of cars for civilian use dimmed over the summer and autumn of 1941, the campaign in the east demanded the production of more and more tanks. (See Hans Mommsen and Manfred Grieger, Das Volkswagenwerk und seine Arbeiter im Dritten Reich, Dusseldorf, 1996, 453, 46off.)
48. Monologe, 39 (5–6 July 1941).
49. Koeppen, Fol.9 (10 September 1941).
50. Koeppen, Fol.12 (19 September 1941). Goebbels reported Hitler’s intention on 18 August as the starvation of St Petersburg (Leningrad) and Kiev. Once Leningrad had been put under siege and the bombardment had taken place, ran Hitler’s plan, ‘there would probably not be much left of this city’ (TBJG, II/1, 260–61 (19 August 1941)).
51. Monologe, 48 (27 July 1941).
52. Koeppen, Fol.28 (23 September 1941).
53. Monologe, 38 (5 July 1941).
54. Koeppen, Fol.12 (19 September 1941).
55. Koeppen, Fol.28 (24 September 1941).
56. Monologe, 42 (11–12 July 1941).
57. In September, Hitler commented that it would be a mistake to educate the native population. All this would achieve would be the sort of semi-knowledge that leads to revolution. (Monologe, 63 (17–18 September 1941); Koeppen, Fol.12 (18 September 1941).
58. Monologe, 48 (27 July 1941).
59. Monologe, 54–5 (8–11 August 1941).
60. Monologe, 51 (1–2 August 1941).
61. Monologe, 54 (8–11 August 1941).
62. Monologe, 55 (8–11 August 1941). He repeated the sentiments in similar words a month later. ‘The Russian territory (Raum) is our India,’ he stated, ‘and just as the English rule it with a handful of people, so we will govern this, our colonial territory’ (Monologe, 62–3 (17–18 September 1941)); Koeppen, Fol.12 (18 September 1941).
63. A month after these comments in mid–August, Hitler enthused about the capture of the iron-ore district of Kriwoi-Rog, whose productive capacity, he claimed, removed all worries about covering demand (Koeppen, Fol 10 (17 September 1941)).
64. Monologe, 58 (19–20 August 1941).
65. Monologe, 63 (17–18 September 1941).
66. Monologe, 62 (17–18 September 1941).
67. Monologe, 69–71 (25 September 1941).
68. Monologe, 66 (23 September 1941).
69. Monologe, 67 (23 September 1941); Koeppen, Fol.29 (23 September 1941).
70. Monologe, 68 (25 September 1941). On 27–28 September, he spoke of the aim of fighting war ‘on the edges’ of German territory (Monologe, 72). Hitler had referred earlier to a ‘living wall’ to protect the new east ‘against the mid-Asian masses’ (Monologe, 55 (8–11 August 1941)). See also Rolf-Dieter Muller, Hitlers Ostkrieg und die deutsche Siedlungspolitik, Frankfurt am Main, 1991, 23–4.
71. Monologe, 71 (25–6 September 1941).
72. Monologe, 71 (25–6 September 1941).
73. Monologe, 58 (19–20 August 1941).
74. Monologe, 72 (27–8 September 1941).
75. Monologe, 65 (22–3 September 1941).
76. Monologe, 65 (22–3 September 1941).
77. An overemphasis on Hitler’s ‘modernity’ runs through the interpretation of Rainer Zitelmann, Hitler. Selbstverstandnis eines Revolutionars, Hamburg/Leamington Spa/New York, 1987. See also Rainer Zitelmann, Adolf Hitler. Eine politische Biographie, Gottingen, 1989, and his essay ‘Die totalitare Seite der Moderne’, in Michael Prinz and Rainer Zitelmann (eds.), Nationalsozialismus und Modernisierung, Darmstadt, 1991, 1–20. For strong criticism of such an emphasis, see Hans Mommsen, ‘Nationalsozialismus als vorgetauschte Modernisierung’, in Walter H. Pehle (ed.), Der historische Ort des Nationalsozialismus. Annaherungen, Frankfurt am Main, 1990,11–46; Norbert Frei, ‘Wie modern war der Nationalsozialismus?’, GG, 19 (1993), 367–87, here especially 374ff.; Axel Schildt, ‘NS-Regime, Modernisierung und Moderne. Anmerkungen zur Hochkonjunktur einer andauernden Diskussion’, Tel Aviver Jahrbuch fur deutsche Geschichte, 23 (1994), 3–22, here especially 11ff.
78. Monologe, 57 (8–11 August 1941).
79. Monologe, 64 (17–18 September 1941).
80. IMG, xxxviii, 86–94, quotation 87–8, Doc. 221-L; DGFP, 3, 13, 149–56, No.114; extracts in Klee and Dre?en, Gott mit uns, 22–3. See also Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia 1941–1945. A Study of Occupation Policies, (1957), 2nd edn, Basingstoke/London, 1981, 84, 123, 204; and Eberhard Jackel, ‘Hitlers doppeltes Kernstuck’, in Roland G. Foerster (ed.), ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’. Zum historischen Ort der deutsch-sowjetischen Beziehungen von 1933 bis Herbst 1941, Munich, 1993, 14–22, here 14– 18.
81. IMG, xxix, 235–7, 1997-PS.
82. CP, 465 (24–7 November 1941); Klee and Dre?en, Gott mit uns, 23; Halder KTB, ii.335–8 (30 March 1941); IMG, xxxi.135–7, 126-EC. The plans for mass deportation were in the process of being worked out for the ‘General Plan for the East’. See Helmut Heiber (ed.), ‘Der Generalplan Ost’, VfZ, 6 (1958), 281–325; Czeslaw Madajczyk (ed.), Vom Generalplan Ost zum Generalsiedlungsplan, Munich etc., 1994; Mechtild Ro?ler and Sabine Schleiermacher (eds.), Der ‘Generalplan Ost’. Hauptlinien der nationalsozialistischen Planungs- und Vernichtungspolitik, Berlin, 1993.
83. Dallin, ch.3, especially 56ff.
84. Dallin, 84, 123–4. Civilian rule was established in the occupied territories in August and September 1941 (Dallin, 85).
85. Koeppen, Fols.12–13 (18 September 1941).
86. Dallin, 185ff.
87. Dallin, 203ff.
88. Halder KTB, iii.10 (24 June 1941).
89. Halder KTB, iii.15 (25 June 1941); trans. Halder Diary, 424.
90. Halder KTB, iii.20 (27 June 1941), 25 (29 June 1941), 29 (30 June 1941), 34–5 (2 July 1941), 39 (3 July 1941).
91. Halder KTB, iii.39 (3 July 1941); trans. Halder Diary, 448.
92. DRZW, iv.212–13; Leach, 53, 99; Dirks/Jan?en, 137ff.
93. DRZW, iv.219–42; Leach, 99–118,250–69. See above, Chapter 7, n.157, for Lo?berg’s post-war claim to have begun work on the strategic study already in early July 1940, and without any formal request to do so. In his post-war memoirs, Bernhard von Lo?berg, Im Wehrmachtfuhrungsstab. Bericht eines Generalstabsoffiziers, Hamburg, 1950, 104–8, Lo?berg makes no mention of this.
94. See Halder KTB, ii.463–9, ‘Aufmarschanweisung OKH vom 31.1.1941 “Barbarossa”’ (Leach, 263–9 (OKH Deployment Directive, ‘Barbarossa’, 31 January 1941). The Directive was
