IX, 59, 100–101, and, for the plan of Timoshenko and Zhukov, 186–93. See also Gabriel Gorodetsky, ‘Stalin und Hitlers Angriff auf die Sowjetunion. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit der Legende vom deutschen Praventivschlag’, VfZ, 37 (1989), 645–72; and Bianka Pietrow, ‘Deutschland im Juni 1941 — ein Opfer sowjetischer Aggression? Zur Kontroverse uber die Praventivkriegsthese’, GG, 14 (1988), 116–35. Stalin had in a speech on 5 May warned a large audience of graduates from Soviet military academies that war was imminent. But the belated discovery of a text of the speech, of which all copies were thought lost, has disproved those reports suggesting that Stalin was advocating a preventive war against Germany. See Lev A. Bezymenskij, ‘Stalins Rede vom 5. Mai 1941 — neu dokumentiert’, in Ueberschar and Bezymenskij, 131–44; also DGFP, D, XII, 964–5, No.593; Alexander Werth, Russia at War 1941– 1945, New York (1964), 1984,122–3; John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad. Stalin’s War with Germany, London, (1975), Phoenix paperback edn, 1998, 82; Falin, 194—7; Weinberg III, 203—4, Bullock, Hitler and Stalin, 791, 798—9, 807.
5. Bullock, Hitler and Stalin, 791–3.
6. Volkogonov, 411–13.
7. Bernd Bonwetsch, ‘Stalin, the Red Army, and the “Great Patriotic War” ’, in Kershaw and Lewin, 185–207, here 188, 193–5; and see Glantz, Initial Period, 31.
8. Soviet captives numbered some 3.8 million by the end of 1941, and 5.25 million by the end of the war (DRZW, iv.727 (586 n.523 for slightly different figures for the numbers captured by late 1941)). At least 2? million died in German captivity, apart from a minimum of 140,000 liquidated immediately on capture (DRZW, iv.730; Streit, ch.VII). Goebbels spoke in mid-December of 900,000 already dead of hunger, exhaustion, and illness, with many more certain to die in the next weeks and months (TBJG, II.2, 484 (12 December 1941)). Shortly before this, Going had spoken to Ciano of cannibalism in the Russian prison-of-war camps (CP, 464–5 (24–27 November 1941)).
9. Bonwetsch, 189.
10. See Streit, ch.VI; DRZW, iv.Teil II, Kap.VII; Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941–45, German Troops, and the Barbarisation of Warfare, New York, 1986, Ch.4.
11. Volkogonov, 413; Irving, HW, 286–7.
12. IMG, xxxviii. 86–94, Doc. 221 — L; Klee and Dre?en, ‘Gott mit uns’, 23 (meeting of 16 July 1941). For the Wehrmacht’s brutal struggle against the partisans, see Hannes Heer, ‘Die Logik des Vernichtungskriegs. Wehrmacht und Partisanenkampf’, in Hannes Heer and Klaus Naumann (eds.), Vernichtungskrieg. Verbrechen der Wehrmacht 1941 bis 1944, Hamburg, 1995, 104–38; Hannes Heer, ‘Killing Fields: the Wehrmacht and the Holocaust in Belorussia, 1941–1942’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 11 (1997), 79—101; Lutz Klinkhammer, ‘Der Partisanenkrieg der Wehrmacht 1941 — 1944’ and Timm C. Richter, ‘Die Wehrmacht und der Partisanenkrieg in den besetzten Gebieten der Sowjetunion’, both in Mullier and Volkmann, Die Wehrmacht, 815–36, 837–57.
13. TBJG, I/9, 398 (23 June 1941).
14. Below, 253, 281.
15. Domarus, 1743 for the name ‘Wolf; Schroeder, 111.
16. Below, 281–2; Warlimont, 172–3; Alfons Schulz, Drei Jahre in der Nachrichtenzentrale des Fuhrerhauptquartiers, Stein am Rhein, 1996, 30—31, 39ff.; Hitler’s succession decree relating to Goring in Domarus, 1741.
17. Schroeder, 116, 120–21; Below, 282–3. Schroeder implies that the second briefing of the day, as later in the war, was late in the evening. But Below is precise in stipulating that it took place during the early weeks of the campaign at 6 p.m.
18. Schroeder, 115.
19. Schroeder, 120–21.
20. Schroeder, 113.
21. Below, 282–3, 285.
22. IMG, xv, 325. See also Picker, 374 (28 May 1942), where life at FHQ was referred to by Picker as a ‘monastic existence (Klosterdasein)’.
23. Schroeder, 119, 121–2.
24. Schroeder, 111–12. Goebbels remarked on the swarms of midges in the area when he first visited FHQ on 8 July 1941 (TBJG, II/1, 30 (9 July 1941)).
25. Schroeder, 112.
26. Schroeder, 125.
27. Below, 283.
28. Schroeder, 113–14. For similarly optimistic notions from the OKW and Ribbentrop around this time, see Irving, HW, 282. In the earlier version of her memoirs, noted by Zoller, Hitler allegedly added that he would build a reservoir (Staubecken) on the site of Moscow (Zoller, 143).
29. Schroeder, 120.
30. TBJG, II/1, 30 (9 July 1941).
31. TBJG, II/1, 35 (9 July 1941).
32. TBJG, II/1, 32–5 (9 July 1941).
33. Schroeder, 113.
34. Staatsmanner I, 293. Oshima was impressed by what he heard of German progress in the war and recommended to his government that Japan quickly strike against the Soviet Union in the east (Boyd, 27).
35. Schroeder, 114.
36. Below, 283; Domarus, 1740.
37. TBJG, I/9, 412 (30 June 1941). Domarus, 1740 n.323 mistakenly suggests that the ‘Russian Fanfare’ was based upon Liszt’s ‘Hungarian Rhapsody’ instead of his Symphonic Poem No. 3, ‘Les Preludes’.
38. TBJG, I/9, 412, 415–16 (30 July 1941), 415–16 (1 July 1941), 426 (5 July 1941).
39. Willi A. Boelcke (ed.), Wollt Ihr den totalen Krieg? Die geheimen Goebbels-Konferenzen 1939–1943, Munich, 1969, 235–7; Tb Reuth, 1623 n.144. And see Wolfram Wette, ‘Die propagandistische Begleitmusik zum deutschen Uberfall auf die Sowjetunion am 22. Juni 1941’, in Gerd R. Ueberschar and Wolfram Wette (eds.), ‘Unternehmen Barbarossa’. Der deutsche Uberfall auf die Sowjetunion 1941. Berichte, Analysen, Dokumente, Paderborn, 1984, 111– 29, here especially 118–19.
40. See TBJG, II/1, 30–9 (9 July 1941): ‘The Fuhrer is blazing about the Bolshevik leadership clique which intended to invade Germany, and thus Europe, and at the last moment, with the Reich weakened, to carry out the attempt to bolshevize the continent that had been planned since 1917’ (31). ‘The preventive war is always still the surest and mildest, if there is certainty that the enemy will in any case attack at the first best opportunity; and that was the case with Bolshevism’ (33). ‘Without doubt [the Kremlin] wanted this autumn, when we had no further possibility of aggressive action against Russia on account of the weather, to occupy Romania. Through this the Kremlin would have cut off our petroleum supply’ (38). Hitler told his entourage in mid-September: ‘It needed the greatest strength to take the decision last year for the attack on Bolshevism. I had to reckon that Stalin would go over to the attack in the course of this year. It was necessary to move as soon as at all possible. The earliest date was June 1941.’ (Monologe, 60–61 (17–18 September 1941).)
41. DRZW, iv.461.
42. Leach, 200.
43. Leach, 202.
44. KTB OKW, i.1021; DRZW, iv.487; Leach, 201.
45. Halder KTB, iii, 38; trans. Halder Diary, 446–7 (3
