Master: the Controversial Life and Career of Wilhelm Furtwangler, New York, 1992.
96. CD, 461 (29 April 1942); Schmidt, 562.
97. Staatsmanner II, 65 (29 April 1942).
98. CP, 481–4 (29–30 April 1942); CD, 461–2 (29 April 1942); Schmidt, 562–3.
99. CD, 462–3 (dated 29 April 1942, though refers to both meetings, and here to the meeting on 30 April 1942).
100. CD, 463–4.
101. Andreas Hillgruber and Jurgen Forster (eds.), ‘Zwei neue Aufzeichnungen uber “Fuhrer–Besprechungen” aus dem Jahre 1942’, Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 11 (1972), 109–26, here 116.
102. Rommel’s offensive was launched on 26 May against the numerically superior British forces of the 8th Army at Gazala in Libya, on the Mediterranean coast between Benghazi and Tobruk (Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 183; Weinberg III, 350). The invasion of Malta was never to take place. The summer of 1942 proved to be the height of the siege of the island. (See Oxford Companion, 713–16.)
103. Staatsmanner II, 79 (30 April 1942); Hillgruber and Forster, 114–21.
104. Picker, 304 (1 May 1942).
105. Weisungen, 215.
106. Weisungen, 213–19; Haider KTB, iii.420 (28 March 1942).
107. IMG, vii.290 (Testimony of Field–Marshal Friedrich Paulus).
108. See the comments of Bernd Wegner, ‘Hitlers zweiter Feldzug gegen die Sowjetunion. Strategische Grundlagen und historische Bedeutung’, in Michalka, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 652–66, here 659.
109. Hartmann, 314–16; Wegner, ‘Hitlers zweiter Feldzug’, 657.
110. Wegner, ‘Hitlers zweiter Feldzug’, 660.
111. Wegner, ‘Hitlers zweiter Feldzug’, 658–9.
112. Hartmann, 313 (on the basis of figures compiled on 2 April 1942; see 314 n.14).
113. Wegner, ‘Hitlers zweiter Feldzug’, 654.
114. Halder KTB, iii.430–32 (21 April 1942).
115. Hartmann, 314.
116. Overy, Why the Allies Won, 66.
117. Halder KTB, iii.442–4 (15–19 May 1942).
118. Halder KTB, iii.449–50 (28 May 1942).
119. Hartmann, 320 (and see n.58 for criticism of Irving’s interpretation, giving all credit to Hitler, and claiming Halder had subsequently altered his diary entry); Below, 310.
120. Domarus, 1883; TBJG, II/4, 344 (23 May 1942).
121. TBJG, II/4, 354 (24 May 1942).
122. TBJG, II/4, 354, 360–61 (24 May 1942). At lunch the previous day, Hitler had already launched into further scathing attacks on the judiciary (Picker, 371–2 (22 May 1942)); TBJG, II/4, 343 (23 May 1942).
123. TBJG, II/4, 357 (24 May 1942).
124. TBJG, II/4, 358–9, 362 (24 May 1942).
125. TBJG, II/4, 360 (24 May 1942).
126. TBJG, II/4, 361 (24 May 1942).
127. TBJG, II/4, 355 (24 May 1942).
128. TBJG, II/4, 355–7 (24 May 1942).
129. TBJG, II/4, 358–9, 361 (24 May 1942).
130. TBJG, II/4, 362–4 (24 May 1942).
131. Domarus, 1887–8; see also Picker, 493–504.
132. TBJG, II/4, 401 (30 May 1942).
133. TBJG, II/4, 402 (30 May 1942).
134. TBJG, II/4, 406 (30 May 1942). At his meeting with Mussert on 10 December 1942, Hitler would make plain that he envisaged, in the future new European order, the Netherlands, like Belgium, while not being treated as a conquered country, having no independence and being incorporated into a ‘Greater German Reich’ (‘gro?-germanisches Reich’). Hitler explicitly mentioned the incorporation of Austria as an indicator of what he had in mind. (Hillgruber and Forster, 121–6, here 125.)
135. Charles Wighton, Heydrich. Hitler’s Most Evil Henchman, London, 1962, 268ff.; Charles Whiting, Heydrich. Henchman of Death, London, 1999, 141–7; M. R. D. Foot, Resistance. European Resistance to Nazism 1940–45, London, 1976, 204–6; Oxford Companion, 1018–22.
136. Foot, Resistance, 206, puts the death-toll of the reprisals at 2,000; Whiting, 159ff.; Tb Reuth, 1800, n.66.
137. TBJG, II/4, 405 (30 May 1942). Baum and his colleagues were arrested, tortured, sentenced to death, and executed. On the attempt, see Merson, 243; Arnold Paucker, Deutsche Juden im Widerstand 1933–1945. Tatsachen und Probleme, Beitrage zum Widerstand 1933– 1945, ed. Gedenk-statte Deutscher Widerstand, Berlin, 1999, 21; Wolfgang Benz and Walter H. Pehle (eds.), Lexikon des deutschen Widerstandes, Frankfurt am Main, 1994, 225–7. Hitler had given Goebbels permission to have 500 Jewish ‘hostages’ arrested, and to respond to any further attempts by shootings. (Goebbels let the leaders of the Jewish community in Berlin know that 100–150 Jews would be shot for any new attempt. He also had a number of Jews in Sachsenhausen concentration camp shot. TBJG, 4, 432 (2 June 1942).) At the same time, Hitler had commissioned Goebbels — probably at the Propaganda Minister’s own prompting — to ‘see to it as quickly as possible that the Berlin Jews are evacuated’. But Speer had objected that replacements needed first to be found for the Jews working in the armaments industry (351 (24 May 1942)). See also 386 (28 May 1942), where Goebbels referred to the list of Jewish hostages he had had drawn up, and numerous arrests he had caused to be made, after the sabotage attempt at the exhibition.
138. TBJG, II/4, 393 (29 May 1942).
139. TBJG, II/4, 405 (30 May 1942). Goebbels repeated at the end of his summary of Hitler’s remarks that he had been practically in total agreement with what the Fuhrer had said {TBJG, II/4, 410 (30 May 1942)).
140. TBJG, II/4, 361 (24 May 1942).
141. TBJG, II/4, 405 (30 May 1942).
142. TBJG, II/4, 406 (30 May 1942). For another version of Hitler’s comments on the Jews that lunchtime, claiming they were indeed Asiatic, not European, see Picker, 378 (29 May 1942). In speaking over supper to his entourage in his headquarters near Vinnitsa in late July of the removal of the Jews, Hitler, describing them as ‘enemy number one’, once more mentioned the prospect of removing them to Madagascar ‘or some other Jewish national state’ — plans which had been abandoned in 1940 (Picker, 471 (24 July 1942)).
143. IMG, xxix.582, Doc. 2233-PS (‘Die Weisungder Judenvernichtung kommt von hoherer Stelle’). Goebbels noted, after speaking to Frank on 23 May about Jewish policy in the General Government, that it was ‘no trifling matter (nicht von Pappe)’, but that Frank could take little credit for it because the Fuhrer had appointed an SS-State Secretary (Kruger) at his side who took his orders from Himmler. This was necessary since ‘Jewish and ethnic policy must above all follow unified guidelines’. (TBJG, II/4, 352 (24 May 1942).) In his post-war memoirs, Frank was adamant that Hitler was responsible for the order to murder the Jews. See Frank, 391–2.
144. BDC, SS-HO, 933: RFSS to Berger, 28 July 1942: ‘Verbot einer Verordnung uber den Begriff “Jude”’. ‘Die besetzten Ostgebiete werden judenfrei. Die Durchfuhrung dieses sehr schweren Befehls hat der Fuhrer auf meine Schultern gelegt.’ For frequent recourse by those connected with the ‘Final Solution’ to an
