Politik, 430 and 699 n.45.
93. Koeppen, Fol.21 (Bericht Nr.34, Blatt 2–3, 20 September 1941). Koeppen was almost certainly uninformed at this point of the steps which had by then already been taken two days earlier. His entry probably, therefore, reflects his understanding of Hitler’s stance several days earlier. (See Longerich, Politik, 431.)
94. The emphasis placed on the Atlantic Charter as the cause of a fundamental shift in Hitler’s policy towards the Jews, allegedly bringing the decision for the ‘Final Solution’, by Jersak, 341ff., 349ff., (see above, n.75) seems exaggerated.
95. See Longerich, Politik, 431–2.
96. See Haider KTB, iii.226 (13 September 1941), for the OKW memorandum of 13 September 1941, approved by Hitler, indicating for the first time that the war was likely to last over the winter. The victory at Kiev temporarily restored Hitler’s confidence, a few days later, that an early end to the campaign was in prospect (TBJG, II/1, 481–2 (24 September 1941)).
97. Dienstkalender, 211.
98. Longerich, 430; Witte, ‘Two Decisions’, 330; Dienstkalender, 213 and n.57.
99. Longerich, Ermordung, 157. The figure of 60,000 Jews was the same as that mentioned in at least two earlier references to deportation — that of the Viennese Jews in the winter of 1940–41, and by Eichmann at a meeting in the Propaganda Ministry in March. It seems to have been plucked from thin air. The actual number agreed on, following hard bargaining between Eichmann and the regional authorities in the Warthegau, was 20,000 Jews and 5,000 Gypsies, whom Eichmann seems to have accommodated in the demands for deportation following pressure from the local Nazi authorities in the Burgenland. (Saffrian, 115–19; Michael Zimmermann, ‘Die nationalsozialistische Losung der Zigeunerfrage’, in Herbert, Vernichtungspolitik, 235–62, here 248–9.) As Zimmermann (237–8) points out, the murder of the Gypsies took place without Hitler ever showing notable interest in the ‘Gypsy question’; nor was a pre-existing programme for their persecution and extermination devised, either by Himmler or Heydrich. (Michael Zimmermann, Verfolgt, vertrieben, vernichtet. Die nationalsozialistische Vernichtungspolitik gegen Sinti und Roma, Essen, 1989, 82–3, where the numbers of Roma and Sinti murdered is estimated at between 220,000 and 500,000.)
100. The connections with genocide have been well brought out by Gerlach, Krieg, Ernahrung, Volker-mord, 167–257; and Christian Gerlach, ‘Deutsche Wirtschaftsinteressen, Besatzungspolitik und der Mord an den Juden in Weit?rut?land, 1941–1943’, in Herbert, Vernichtungspolitik, 263–91.
101. See Herbert, ‘Labour and Extermination’, 167ff., for the sensitivity of the labour question in the unfolding of anti–Jewish policy at this juncture.
102. TBJG, II/1, 481–2 (24 September 1941).
103. Burrin, 123–4, sees it as such. Eichmann, whose testimony while in Israeli custody many years later was shaky on chronology, claimed to have been told by Heydrich two to three months after the beginning of the Russian campaign of the Fuhrer’s order for the physical extermination of the Jews. (Lang, Eichmann- Protokoll, 69; see Browning, Fateful Months, 23–6.) Ho??, the Commandant of Auschwitz, recalled being told by Himmler in summer 1941 of Hitler’s decision. But his memory was as at least as fallible as Eichmann’s on detail and much, if not all, of what he said appears better to fit 1942 than 1941. {Kommandant in Auschwitz. Autobiographische Aufzeichnungen des Rudolf Ho?, (1963), Munich, 4th edn, 1978, 157. And see Browning, Fateful Months, 22–3; Burrin, 170 n.15.) Breitman, Architect, 189–90, accepts the testimony for the timing of Hitler’s decision, as does Graml, Reichskristallnacht, 228–9. The view that Ho?’s testimony referred to 1941 is, however, convincingly rejected by Karin Orth, ‘Rudolf Ho?? und die “Endlosung der Judenfrage”. Drei Argumente gegen deren Datierung auf den Sommer 1941’, Werkstattgeschichte, 18 (1997), 45– 57.
104. Longerich, Politik, 475.
105. John L. Heinemann, Hitler’s First Foreign Minister. Constantin Freiherr von Neurath, Diplomat and Statesman, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London, 1979, 209–11.
106. TBJG, II.i.480–81 (24 September 1941).
107. TBJG, II.i.485 (24 September 1941).
108. TBJG, II.ii.169 (24 October 1941). It was the first of nine batches of deportation from Berlin before a temporary halt at the end of January 1942 because of transport problems (Tb Reuth, 1710, n.209).
109. TBJG, II.ii. 194–5 (28 October 1941).
110. TBJG, II.ii.309 (18 November 1941).
111. Das Reich, 16 Nov. 1941: ‘Die Juden sind schuld! ’: ‘… Es bewahrheitet sich an ihnen [den Juden] auch die Prophezeihung, die der Fuhrer am 30. Januar 1939 im Deutschen Reichstag aussprach… Wir erleben eben den Vollzug dieser Prophezeihung, und es erfullt sich damit am Judentum ein Schicksal, das zwar hart, aber mehr als verdient ist. Mitleid oder Bedauern ist da ganzlich unangebracht…’ A lengthy extract from the article, including this passage, is printed in Hans–Heinrich Wilhelm, ‘Wie geheim war die “Endlosung”’, in Benz, Miscellanea, 131–48, here 137–8 (136 for Das Reich’s circulation figures); and see Reuth, Goebbels, 491. As the passage indicates, Goebbels, unlike Hitler, dated the ‘prophecy’ of 1939 correctly.
112. Irving, Goebbels, 379.
113. MadR, viii.3007 (20 November 1941).
114. TBJG, II/2, 352 (23 November 1941).
115. TBJG, II/2, 340–1 (22 November 1941). Hitler also recommended — obviously responding to a point close to the Propaganda Minister’s heart — Goebbels to tread carefully with regard to Jewish ‘mixed-marriages’, especially in artistic circles. He was of the opinion that such marriages were dying out anyway with the passage of time, and that it was not necessary to lose any sleep about them. Fifteen months later, Goebbels would ignore such a recommendation. But a week-long protest of hundreds of wives would eventually halt the planned deportation of their Jewish husbands. (See Nathan Stoltzfus, Resistance of the Heart, New York/London, 1996.)
116. See Martin Broszat, ‘Hitler und die Genesis der “Endlosung”. Aus Anla? der Thesen von David Irving’, VfZ, 25 (1977), 739–75, here especially 752–3, 755–6.
117. Raul Hilberg, ‘Die Aktion Reinhard’, in Eberhard Jackel and Jurgen Rohwer (eds.), Der Mord an den Juden im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Entschlu?bildung und Verwirklichung, Stuttgart, 1985, 125–36, here 126; Longerich, Politik, 457; Aly, 342–7; Christian Gerlach, ‘Failure of Plans for an SS Extermination Camp in Mogilev, Belorussia’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 11 (1997), 60–78.
118. For the significance of local and regional initiatives in the unfolding of genocide in Poland, see Dieter Pohl, Von der ‘Judenpolitik’ zum Judenmord. Der Distrikt Lublin des Generalgouvernements 1939–1944, Frankfurt am Main, 1993; Dieter Pohl, Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien. Organisation und Durchfuhrung eines staatlichen Massenverbrechens, Munich, 1996; Dieter Pohl, ‘Die Ermordung der Juden im Generalgouvernement’, in Herbert, Vernichtungspolitik, 98–121; Thomas Sandkuhler, ‘Endlosung’ in Galizien. Der Judenmord in Ostpolen, und die Rettungsinitiativen von Berthold Beitz, Bonn, 1996; Thomas Sandkuhler, ‘Judenpolitik und Judenmord im Distrikt Galizien, 1941–1942’, in Herbert, Vernichtungspolitik, 122–47; also Longerich, Politik, 457–8; Kershaw, ‘Improvised Genocide?’, especially 74ff.
119. See Browning, Fateful Months, ch.3 (‘The Development and Production of the Nazi Gas Van’).
120. Kommandant in Auschwitz, 159; Danuta Czech, Kalendarium der Ereignisse im Konzentrationslager Auschwitz–Birkenau 1939–1945, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1989, 117–
