Barbarossa’, Heidelberg/Karlsruhe, 1981, 89 n.333.
10. Krausnick/Wilhelm, 163; Klee, Dre?en, and Rie?, ‘Schone Zeiten’, 52.
11. Osobyi Arkhiv, Moscow, 500–1–25, Fols.119–20: ‘Gesamtaufstellung der im Bereich des EK.3 bis zum 1.Dez.1941 durchgefuhrten Exekutionen’. Of the total of 138,272 persons ‘executed’ by the same Einsatzkommando (including 55,556 women, and 34,464 children), registered by the same Einsatzkommando in a handwritten summary (in the same file, Fol.128) of 9 February 1942, no fewer than 136, 421 were Jews.
12. See Krausnick/Wilhelm, 627; Streim, 88–9.
13. Burrin, 106–7.
14. Krausnick/Wilhelm, 196.
15. Christoph Dieckmann, ‘Der Krieg und die Ermordung der litauischen Juden’, in Ulrich Herbert (ed.), Nationalsozialistische Vernichtungspolitik 1939–1945. Neue Forschungen und Kontroversen, Frankfurt am Main, 1998, 292–329, here 292–3, and 295–306. See also Dina Porat, ‘The Holocaust in Lithuania. Some Unique Aspects’, in David Cesarani (ed.), The Final Solution. Origins and Implementation, London, 1996, 159–74.
16. The encouragement of ‘self-cleansing efforts of anti-Communist and anti-Jewish circles (Selbstreinigungsbestrebungen antikommunistischer oder antijudischer Kreise)’ had been verbally stipulated by Heydrich in his briefing in Berlin on 17 June, then laid down in writing in written orders to the chiefs of the four Einsatzgruppen on 29 June, and incorporated in the instructions to the Higher SS and Police Leaders on 2 July. (Osobyi Arkhiv, Moscow, 500–1–25, Fols.387, 391, 393.)
17. Klee, Dre?en, and Rie?, ‘Schone Zeiten’, 32–41. And see Laurence Rees, The Nazis. A Warning from History, London, 1997, 179–81. At the end of August, instructions went to the chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen to prevent gatherings of spectators, including Wehrmacht officers, to view the ‘executions’. (Osobyi Arkhiv, Moscow, 500–1–25, Fol.424 (RSHA IV — Muller — to Einsatzgruppen A-D, 30 August 1941).)
18. Klee, Dre?en, and Rie?, ‘Schone Zeiten’, 36, 38.
19. Gerald Fleming, Hitler und die Endlosung. ‘Es ist des Fuhrers Wunsch…’, Wiesbaden/Munich, 1982, 86. For the reporting system of the Einsatzgruppen, using Enigma codes, see Richard Breitman, Official Secrets. What the Nazis Planned. What the British and Americans Knew, London, 1998, Ch.4.
20. TBJG, II/1, 213 (11 August 1941).
21. TBJG, II/2, 221–2 (2 November 1941).
22. Klee and Dre?en, ‘Gott mit uns’, 101 ff.
23. See Krausnick/Wilhelm, Ch.IVB, 205–78, especially 223–43; DRZW, iv.1044ft; Streit, 109–27; and see Omer Bartov, ‘Operation Barbarossa and the Origins of the Final Solution’, in Cesarani, Final Solution, 119–36.
24. Klee and Dre?en, ‘Gott mit uns’, 102–3.
25. Klee and Dre?en, ‘Gott mit uns’, 106.
26. IMG, xxxv.85–6, D0C.411-D; Klee and Dre?en, ‘Gott mit uns’, 39–40. And see DRZW, iv. 1050–2; Krausnick/Wilhelm, 258–61 and Gerd Ueberschar and Wolfgang Wette (eds.), ‘Unterneh-men Barbarossa’. Der deutsche Uberfall auf die Sowjetunion, Paderborn, 1984, 373–4.
27. DRZW, iv.1052–3.
28. IMG, xxxiv.129–32 (quotation, 130–31), D0C.4064-PS; Klee and Dre?en, ‘Gott mit uns’, 41–2.
29. Heer, ‘Killing Fields’, 87–90; Richter, 844–6; and see Theo J. Schulte, The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia, Oxford/New York/Munich, 1989, esp. ch.6,9.
30. Stalin had called for partisan warfare in his speech of 3 July (Volkogonov, 413). But organized partisan units did not take shape before autumn 1941. The ruthless German attempts to combat the spread of partisan warfare intensified from then on.
31. DRZW, iv.1044 (and see 1041–4).
32. See DRZW, iv.1054.
33. DRZW, iv.1047.
34. DRZW, iv.1048.
35. See Bartov, Hitler’s Army, ch.4; Bartov, Barbarisation, ch.3–4; Bartov, ‘Operation Barbarossa’, 124–31.
36. Buchbender and Sterz, 73, letter 101; Bartov, Hitler’s Army, 153.
37. Bartov, Hitler’s Army, 155. German text in Omer Bartov, Hitlers Wehrmacht. Soldaten, Fanatismus und die Brutalisierung des Krieges, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1995, 232: ‘Jeder hier, selbst der Zweifler, wei? heute, da? der Kampf gegen diese Untermenschen, die von den Juden bis zur Raserei aufgehetzt wurden, nicht nur notwendig war, sondern auch gerade zum rechten Zeitpunkt kam. Unser Fuhrer hat Europa vor dem sicheren Untergang bewahrt.’
38. Bartov, Barbarisation, 1 2off.
39. Burrin, 110.
40. Osobyi Arkhiv, Moscow, 500–1–25, Fol.94: ‘Tatigkeits — und Lagebericht Nr.6 der Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in der UdSSR (Berichtszeit vom 1.–31 October 1941)’: ‘Als Vergeltungsma?nahme fur die Brandstiftungen in Kiew wurden samtliche Juden verhaftete und am 29. und 30.9 insgesamt 33 771 Juden exekutiert.’
41. Klee, Dre?en, and Rie?, ‘Schone Zeiten’ 66–70; Klee and Dre?en, ‘Gott mit uns’ 117–36; Mayer, Why Did the Heavens Not Darken?, 267–8.
42. Burrin, 104–5, 110–13; Christopher Browning, ‘Hitler and the Euphoria of Victory. The Path to the Final Solution’, in Cesarani, Final Solution, 137–47, here 140–43. The instructions were interpreted differently by the leaders of the various killing squads. Plainly they did not amount to a blanket order to kill all Jews without discrimination. (Christian Gerlach, Krieg, Ernahrung, Volkermord. Forschungen zur deutschen Vernichtungspolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Hamburg, 1998, 63ff., 261.)
43. Burrin, 110.
44. Burrin, 113. For the extension of the killing, see Peter Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung. Eine Gesamtdarstellung der nationalsozialistischen Judenverfolgung, Munich/Zurich, 1998, 352– 410.
45. Burrin, 104.
46. Krausnick/Wilhelm, 160; Streim, 74–80.
47. See Burrin, 102ff.; Streim, 83–4; Longerich, Politik, 310–51.
48. Browning, Path, 106. For the composition of the Einsatzgruppen, see Krausnick/Wilhelm, 141–50, 281–93; Longerich, Politik, 302–10. A good proportion of the leaders were SS men with university backgrounds, some with doctorates in law (Krausnick-Wilhelm, 282–3). The members of the battalions of the Ordnungspolizei, an organization whose leadership, like that of the Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police), was dominated by the SS, were in the main young career-policemen, and ideologically trained. (See Longerich, Politik, 305–10 (with criticism of Goldhagen, Ch.6, for the latter’s emphasis on randomly selected, non-ideologically trained, recruits who were ‘ordinary Germans’; and indicating, too, that they were less ‘ordinary men’ than Browning, Ordinary Men, 45–8 and ch.18, claimed).)
49. Browning, Path, 106: by June 1942 there were 165,000 members of the units, and by January 1943 the number had risen to a staggering 300,000. See also Browning, ‘Hitler and the Euphoria of Victory’, 138ff.; and, especially, Yehoshua Buchler, ‘Kommandostab Reichsfuhrer-SS: Himmler’s Personal Murder Brigades in 1941’, Holocaust and Genocide Studies, I/1 (1986), 11–26.
50. Der Dienstkalender Heinrich Himmlers 1941/42, ed. Peter Witte et al., Hamburg, 1999, 195 and n.14; Justiz und NS-Verbrechen. Sammlung deutscher
