310. IMG, xxxv.324, DoC.657-D; Friedlander, Prelude, 308.
311. TBJG, II/2, 468 (10 December 1941); 476 (11 December 1941).
312. TBJG, II/2, 476 (11 December 1941).
313. Domarus, 1793; TBJG, II.2, 463 (10 December 1941); Below, 295.
314. TBJG, II/2, 463–4 (10 December 1941). Halder had learned from Dr Hasso von Etzdorf, Ribbentrop’s liaison man at the OKH, on 7 December, the very day of Pearl Harbor, that Japanese conflict with the USA was ‘possibly imminent’ (‘Moglich, da? Konflikt mit Amerika bevorsteht’) (Halder KTB, iii.332 (7 December 1941); trans. Halder Diary, 582). Despite the growing awareness that war between Japan and the USA could be imminent, the Japanese had not revealed any operational plans. Ribbentrop was still hoping, two days before Pearl Harbor, that the Americans would instigate it with some act of aggression (Friedlander, Prelude, 307; and see Carr, Poland, 169).
315. TBJG, II/2, 469 (10 December 1941).
316. TBJG, II/2, 463,468 (10 December 1941).
317. TBJG, II/2, 476 (11 December 1941).
318. Weizsacker, Erinnerungen, 328.
319. Weinberg II, 262; Friedlander, Prelude, 308; TBJG, II/2, 464 (10 December 1941). According to Wolfgang Brocke, then an officer attached to FHQ, though commenting more than fifty years after the events, declaring war on the USA was Hitler’s immediate reaction on hearing the news of Pearl Harbor (Brocke, unpubl. notes (25 April 1997) and taped interview; see above n.287).
320. Jackel, ‘Kriegserklarung’, 136–7.
321. Friedlander, Prelude, 309.
322. Weizacker, Erinnerungen, 328.
323. TBJG, II/2, 485 (12 December 1941). Text in Domarus, 1794–2111.
324. TBJG, II/2, 485 (12 December 1941); Domarus, 1800 and n.533.
325. Halder gave figures for total losses on the eastern front by 30 November (not counting sick) as 743,112 men, including 156,475 dead. Halder KTB, iii.318 (30 November 1941) and (iii.319) mentions a shortage of 340,000 men for the eastern army. On 5 January 1942 (iii.374), he states that total losses in the east between 22 June and 31 December 1941 numbered 830,903 men (173,722 dead), 26 per cent of the eastern army complement of 3.2 million men.
326. Domarus, 1801ff., here 1804. See also 1803, 1808 for specific allegations of Jews behind Roosevelt.
327. Domarus, 1808–10.
328. TBJG, II/2, 504 (14 December 1941).
329. See Philipp Gassert, Amerika im Dritten Reich. Ideologie, Propaganda und Volksmeinung 1933–1945, Stuttgart, 1997, 316–22; and Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 176.
330. See, for example, his revealing remarks in TBJG, II/2, 477 (11 December 1941), and 482–3, 486 (12 December 1941).
331. TBJG, II/2, 465 (10 December 1941). Three days later, Hitler was voicing similar sentiments. Naturally, the events in the east were painful, was his assessment, but ‘nothing could be changed about that’, and he hoped to reach the prescribed line of defence without serious losses (TBJG, II/2, 493 (13 December 1941)).
332. TBJG, II/2, 466 (10 December 1941).
333. TBJG, II/2, 467 (10 December 1941).
334. TBJG, II/2, 468 (10 December 1941).
335. TBJG, II/2, 475–6 (11 December 1941).
336. See TBJG, II/2, 483 (12 December 1941).
337. TBJG, II/2, 475–6 (11 December 1941).
338. TBJG, II/2, 494 (13 December 1941).
339. TBJG, II/2, 494–5 (13 December 1941).
340. TBJG, II/2, 495–7 (13 December 1941).
341. TBJG, II/2, 497 (13 December 1941).
342. TBJG, II/2, 498 (13 December 1941).
343. TBJG, II/2, 499 (13 December 1941).
344. TBJG, II/2, 499–500 (13 December 1941).
345. TBJG, II/2, 500 (13 December 1941); Domarus, 1812. Goebbels was amused that Hitler, in presenting the award to Oshima, forgot its name (TBJG, II/2, 506 (14 December 1941)). Oshima told Hitler of Japan’s aims to strike at India after taking Singapore. Hitler, repeating in general terms much of what he had said to Goebbels and the Gauleiter about a spring offensive, spoke of a German advance to the Caucasus on account of oil, and then into Iraq and Iran, but did not commit himself to the synchronized attack on India which Oshima had hinted at. Hitler repeated that Moscow was for him of little significance. (Staatsmanner I, 337–43).
346. Below, 298, for Hitler’s arrival back in the Wolfsschanze.
347. Halder KTB, iii. 335 (8 December 1941).
348. Halder KTB, iii.336 (9 December 1941); DRZW, iv.606.
349. DRZW, iv.609.
350. DRZW, iv.609–10.
351. DRZW, iv. 610.
352. Halder KTB, iii.346 (15 December 1941); DRZW, iv.608.
353. DRZW, iv.608.
354. Halder KTB, iii.348 (15 December 1941); Warlimont, 212.
355. Halder KTB, iii.332 (7 December 1941).
356. Bock, 391 (13 December 1941); DRZW, iv.611. Bock’s diary entry suggests, however, that he was taken aback by Hitler’s order to prohibit a withdrawal, and regarded his exhortation to close gaps by use of reserves as illusory, since he had no reserves (Bock, 394–5 (16 December 1941)).
357. Bock, 395 (16 December 1941); DRZW, iv.610.
358. Guderian, 262–3.
359. DRZW, iv.612.
360. Halder KTB, iii.350 (16 December 1941).
361. DRZW, iv.607 n.592.
362. Bock, 396–9 (16–19 December 1941); Halder KTB, iii.354 (18 December 1941); Below, 298 (referring to 18 December 1941); DRZW, iv.612 and n.608. Within weeks Bock, evidently having made a remarkable recovery, was given the command of Army Group South (DRZW, iv.612 n.608, 646).
363. Engel, 115 (22 November 1941).
364. Halder KTB, iii.285 (10 November 1941).
365. Halder KTB, iii.322 (1 December 1941).
366. Engel, 115 (22 November 1941).
367. Engel, 117 (6 December 1941); Halder KTB, iii.332 (7 December 1941).
368. Engel, 117 (6 December 1941); Irving, HW, 351, 854.
369. Engel, 115 (22 November 1941); 117 (7 December 1941); Below, 297 (referring to 9 December 1941).
370. See Bock, 395 (16 December 1941). Three months later, speaking to Goebbels, Hitler attributed much of the blame for the winter crisis to Brauchitsch. He showed nothing but contempt for his former Army Commander- in-Chief, whom he described as a ‘coward’ and wholly incapable (TBJG, II/3, 510 (20 March 1942)). Why he had retained such an unsatisfactory army chief so long in post, Hitler did not explain.
