196. TBJG, II/1, 239 (15 August 1941). Goebbels referred to the possibility of linking the ‘debate’ to the film justifying ‘euthanasia’, Ich klage an (I Accuse), which he had commissioned and was now almost ready for release. See Welch, Propaganda and the German Cinema, 1 21ff. for the content of the film, first shown in Berlin on 29 August 1941.
197. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 339; Eugen Kogon et al. (eds.), Nationalsozialistische Massentotungen durch Giftgas. Eine Dokumentation, Frankfurt am Main, 1983, 62.
198. Aly, 314–15.
199. The above based on Aly, 313, 316.
200. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 340–41.
201. TBJG, I/9, 119 (31 January 1941).
202. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 340–41.
203. Klee, ‘Euthanasie’, 345ff., 417ff.
204. TBJG, II/1, 484 (24 September 1941).
205. The aim was to destroy the Soviet Army Group of Marshal Timoschenko before the onset of winter and, only once that was achieved, to advance on Moscow. (Weisungen, 174–8. For the military developments, see DRZW, iv.568ff.)
206. TBJG, II/2, 44 (3 October 1941).
207. Domarus, 1756.
208. Domarus, 1757.
209. TBJG, II/2, 50 (4 October 1941).
210. TBJG, II/2, 50–1 (4 October 1941).
211. TBJG, II/2, 51 (4 October 1941).
212. TBJG, II/2, 52 (4 October 1941). During the coming fortnight, Stalin would come close to fleeing from Moscow and, according to one piece of anecdotal evidence, did contemplate — if this is accurate, for a second time, following such considerations in July — putting feelers out to Germany for peace-terms (Rees, War of the Century, 55–6).
213. TBJG, II/2, 54 (4 October 1941).
214. Hewel’s diary entry notes for the afternoon of 3 October: ‘… With the Fuhrer to the Sportpalast. Great speech — impromptu. Tremendously rapt. Directly afterwards to the train and back to Headquarters.’ (‘… mit dem F[uhrer] zum Sportpalast. Ganz gro?e Rede — aus dem Stehgreif. Unerhort andachtsvoll. Direkt anschlie?end zum Zug und zuruck ins Hauptquartier.’ (IfZ, ED 100. And see Irving, HW, 319.)
215. TBJG, II/2, 55 (4 October 1941).
216. Domarus, 1759.
217. Domarus, 1763.
218. TBJG, II/2, 55–6 (4 October 1941).
219. Koeppen, Fol.36 (Midday, 4 October 1941); TBJG, II/2, 56 (4 October 1941).
220. TBJG, II/2, 53, 56 (4 October 1941).
221. TBJG, II/2, 56 (4 October 1941).
222. TBJG, II/2, 55 (4 October 1941).
223. TBJG, II/2, 56 (4 October 1941).
224. See Irving, HW, 318.
225. Halder KTB, iii.266 (4 October 1941), 268 (5 October 1941).
226. DRZW, iv.574, where it is pointed out that the fighting-power, with many of the units scarcely rested and having suffered serious losses, was not up to that of the force of 22 June. See also Koeppen, 32 (2 October 1941).
227. DRZW, iv.765; see also 575ff.; Below, 292, has over 660,000 prisoners.
228. IfZ, ED 100 (Hewel diary), entry for 7 October 1941: ‘Viaz’ma taken. Ring round Timoschenko army closed. Jodl: Most decisive day of the Russian war. Comparison with Koniggratz’. (‘Wiasma genommen. Ring um Timoschenko-Armee geschlossen. Jodl: Entscheidenster Tag des Russenkrieges. Vergleich mit Koniggratz’.) For the confidence of Army Group Centre and of Halder, see DRZW, iv.576.
229. Wagner, Der Generalquartiermeister, 204.
230. Koeppen, Fols.45–6 (8–9 October 1941).
231. Monologe, 77 (10–11 October 1941). By early December, Hitler was admitting that the Wehrmacht had no satisfactory defence against the heavy Soviet tanks (TBJG, II.2, 467 (10 December 1941); Below, 297.)
232. Koeppen, Fol. 48 (16 October 1941).
233. Koeppen, Fol. 37 (4 October 1941).
234. Koeppen, Fol. 40 (5 October 1941).
235. Monologe, 78 (13 October 1941).
236. Koeppen, Fols. 51–2 (17 October 1941).
237. Bock, 337 (21 October 1941).
238. Koeppen, Fol. 57 (19 October 1941).
239. See Koeppen, Fols. 53, 57, 62 (18 October 1941, 19 October 1941, 23 October 1941). Goebbels comments several times on the bad weather: e.g. TBJG, II/2, 96 (11 October 1941); 152 (21 October 1941); 204 (30 October 1941), where he remarks that ‘the weather situation has made almost our entire operations in the east impossible’. See also DRZW, iv.578–82 for deterioration in the weather and the growing transport and supplies crisis; and for the suggestion that the bad weather was not unseasonally early, Domarus, 1770, n.439.
240. Koeppen, Fol. 72 (26 October 1941).
241. Below, 294.
242. TBJG, II/2, 215 (1 November 1941).
243. Halder KTB, iii.58 (9 July 1941), 142 (2 August 1941); E. Wagner, 206–7 (letters of 12 and 20 October). Trains with winter equipment had been standing in sidings near Breslau and Cracow since the end of August, but frozen engines and shortage of wagons were among the reasons why supplies to the front could not be sustained. (E. Wagner, 206n., 266–7. See also Irving, HW, 333, 851; Leach, 212.)
244. TBJG, II/2, 213 (1 November 1941).
245. TBJG, II/2, 214–18 (1 November 1941).
246. DRZW, iv.578 for military optimism in mid-October, 584–5 for unrealistic expectations. See also Irving, HW, 339.
247. DRZW, iv.585.
248. Domarus, 1771–81 for the text of the speech. The Burgerbraukeller had still not been repaired since the attack on Hitler’s life there two years earlier (Domarus, 1771 n.446).
249. TBJG, II/2, 259 (10 November 1941).
250. Domarus, 1775.
251. Domarus, 1776.
252. Domarus, 1778.
253. TBJG, II/2, 261–2 (10 November 1941); Orlow, ii.270–71; Johannes Volker Wagner, Hakenkreuz uber Bochum, Bochum, 1983, 206.
254. Hitler had declared in his speech the previous day that ‘a November 1918 will never repeat itself in Germany! It cannot repeat itself. Everything is possible except one thing: that Germany will ever capitulate!’ (Domarus, 1778).
255. TBJG, II/2, 262 (10 November 1941).
256. TBJG, II/2, 262–3 (10 November 1941), quotation 263.
257. The journey took so long because the Special Train did not travel at night (Koeppen, Fol. 80 (6
