November 1941)).
258. Guderian, 245–8.
259. DRZW, iv.586, gives losses of 277,000 men by 16 October, with a replacement available of 151,000 men.
260. Guderian, 247.
261. DRZW, iv.586–7, 591–2.
262. DRZW, iv.587–8. See also Hartmann, 292–3.
263. See Engel, 113–16 (12 November 1941, 16 November 1941, 22 November 1941, 24 November 1941) for Hitler’s uncertainty.
264. DRZW, iv.590–91.
265. Engel, 116 (25 November 1941).
266. TBJG, II/2, 336–7 (22 November 1941). The British Army had begun its counter-offensive on 18 November.
267. TBJG, II/2, 337 (22 November 1941).
268. TBJG, II/2, 338 (22 November 1941).
269. TBJG, II/2, 364 (25 November 1941).
270. MadR, ix.3120 (5 January 1942).
271. TBJG, II/2, 403 (30 November 1941).
272. Halder KTB, iii.315 (28 November 1941); KTB OKW, i.781 (28 November 1941); Irving, HW, 342.
273. TBJG, II/2, 398–9 (30 November 1941).
274. TBJG, II/2, 399–401 (30 November 1941).
275. TBJG, II/2, 401 (30 November 1941).
276. TBJG, II/2, 403 (30 November 1941).
277. Seidler, Fritz Todt, 356. This contrasted with Hitler’s view, as expressed to Goebbels on 21 November, that the entry of the USA into the war posed no acute threat and could not alter the situation on the Continent (TBJG, II/2, 339 (22 November 1941)).
278. Walter Rohland, Bewegte Zeiten. Erinnerungen eines Eisenhuttenmannes, Stuttgart, 1978, 78; Seidler, 356–7.
279. TBJG, II/2, 404 (30 November 1941). By this time, the casualties — dead, wounded, missing — on the eastern front had risen sharply, now amounting since the starting of ‘Barbarossa’ to 743,112 persons, or 23 per cent of the eastern army (Halder KTB, iii.318 (30 November 1941)).
280. Halder KTB, iii.319 (30 November 1941).
281. Halder KTB, iii.322 (1 December 1941).
282. Halder KTB, iii.322 (1 December 1941).
283. Halder KTB, iii.325 (3 December 1941); Domarus, 1787.
284. Irving, HW, 349–50.
285. Guderian, 258–60.
286. Irving, HW, 350.
287. Irving, HW, 352, has (without source) Heinz Lorenz, a press officer in FHQ, bursting in with the news — just announced on an American radio station — towards midnight. The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor took place in the early morning of Sunday, 7 December, local time, and was over by 9.45a.m. — evening in central Europe. Churchill heard of the attack shortly after 9p.m. (Churchill, iii.537). A junior officer in FHQ at the time stated from memory many years later that an orderly had brought a telegram from Berlin with the news during the evening meal, shortly before 8p.m. (though the date given, 9 December, is plainly erroneous). (Unpublished notes (25 April 1997) and taped interview with Hans Mommsen of Wolfgang Brocke, a Leutnant in the Technischer Kriegsverwaltungsrat who had served on the staff of the Fuhrer-Begleitbataillon in FHQ since 22 June 1941. I am grateful to Hans Mommsen for giving me access to this material.
288. TBJG, II.2, 455 (9 December 1941). The Japanese Embassy in Berlin had initially reported the sinking of two battleships (Virginia and Oklahoma) and two cruisers (KTB OKW, i.803). In fact, the attack proved less of a military disaster in the long run than imagined at the time. The battleship Arizona was blown up, seven others grounded, and ten other ships sunk or damaged. Over 2,400 American servicemen were killed and a further 1,100 wounded. But the two aircraft carriers with the Pacific fleet were not in the harbour at the time and escaped. Most of the ships could be repaired. All the battleships except the Arizona returned to service (and contributed to later American naval victories). Most of the crew members survived and continued in service (Weinberg III, 260–61).
289. Weinberg III, 261.
290. Churchill, iii. 537–43 (quotation 538).
291. IfZ, ED 100, Hewel-Tagebuch, entry for 8 December 1941: ‘Wir konnen den Krieg garnicht verlieren. Wir haben jetzt einen Bundesgenossen, der in 3 000 Jahren nicht besiegt worden ist…’ Hitler remarked, a few days later (entry for 16 December 1941): ‘Strange, that with the help of Japan we will destroy the positions of the white race in East Asia and that England fights against Europe with the Bolshevik swine.’ (‘Seltsam, da? wir mit Hilfe Japans die Positionen der wei?en Rasse in Ostasien vernichten und da? England mit den bolshewistischen Schweinen gegen Europa kampft.’)
292. See Eberhard Jackel, ‘Die deutsche Kriegserklarung an die Vereinigten Staaten von 1941’, in Friedrich J. Kroneck and Thomas Oppermann (eds.), Im Dienste Deutschlands und des Rechts: Festschrift fur Wilhelm G. Grewe, Baden-Baden, 1981, 117–37, here 137.
293. TBJG, II.2, 457 (9 December 1941).
294. Saul Friedlander, Prelude to Downfall: Hitler and the United States, 1939– 1941, New York, 1967,285.
295. Friedlander, Prelude, 304.
296. Friedlander, Prelude, 304–5.
297. TBJG, II/2, 339 (22 November 1941).
298. Jackel, ‘Kriegserklarung’, 126.
299. DGFP, D, 13, 806, N0.487.
300. DGFP, D, 13, 813–14, No.492.
301. IMG, xxxv. 320–23, Doc. D-656; Friedlander, Prelude, 306; Jackel, ‘Kriegserklarung’, 127–8. Oshima concluded, from his discussion with Ribbentrop, that ‘there are indications at present that Germany would not refuse to fight the United States if necessary’ (Boyd, 35).
302. Friedlander, Prelude, 306.
303. Staatsmanner I, 256–7 and n.9; and see CP, 436 (20 April 1941). Hitler had commented in May that Japan held the key to the USA (IfZ, ED 100, Hewel diary, entry for 22 May 1941).
304. Eberhard Jackel, Hitler in History, Hanover/London, 1984, 80. In the original German version of the essay, Jackel dates Ribbentrop’s comment to Oshima to 2 December (‘Kriegserklarung’, 30). Ribbentrop again expressed the willingness of the German government to fight the USA (Boyd, 36).
305. Jackel, ‘Kriegserklarung’, 130–31; Domarus, 1788–9.
306. DGFP, D, 13, 958–9, No.546; Jackel, ‘Kriegserklarung’, 131–2; Jackel, Hitler in History, 81.
307. Jackel, ‘Kriegserklarung’, 132–4.
308. TBJG, II/2, 346 (22 November 1941). He intended to follow it with a few weeks of recuperation at the Berghof. Given the situation on the eastern front, he evidently abandoned all thoughts of this.
309. TBJG, II/2, 453 (8 December 1941). See Below’s comment, after speaking with Hitler on 9 December: ‘He trusted that America in the foreseeable future, also compelled by the conflict with Japan, would not be able to intervene in the European theatre of war’ (Below, 296).
