charge of putting down the coup (Padfield, Himmler, 498–514). But he was prompt enough in addressing security issues at FHQ directly following the attempt, where he appeared with his entourage within an hour of the bomb exploding (Hoffmann, Widerstand, 503, 824). He was required to accompany Hitler at the visit of Mussolini later that afternoon, which delayed his departure for Berlin. Probably, too, he waited to confer with the head of the Security Police, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, at that very time en route to the Wolf’s Lair, before leaving for the Reich capital. On arrival in Berlin, some time would have been taken up with coordinating the crushing of a military uprising whose ramifications, at that time, were still uncertain.
106. Speer, 393.
107. See Remer’s account in: Hans Adolf Jacobsen (ed.), Spiegelbild einer Verschworung. Die Opposition gegen Hitler und der Staatsstreich vom 20.Juli 1944 in der SD-Berichterstattung. Geheime Dokumente aus dent ehemaligen Reichssicherheitshauptamt, 2 vols., Stuttgart, 1984, ii.637ff.; also Hoffmann, Widerstand, 528, 594–5.
108. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 528.
109. Otto Ernst Remer, 20.Juli 1944, Hamburg, 1951, 12; repeated with minor variations in Otto Ernst Remer, Verschworung und Verrat um Hitler. Urteil eines Frontsoldaten, Preu?isch-Oldendorf, 1981, 33. Similar wording is given by Linge, ‘Kronzeuge’, B1.84. Linge was, he said, in the room as Hitler spoke. See also Jacobsen, Spiegelbild, 639. It is unlikely that Hitler immediately promoted Remer to colonel, as Linge, ‘Kronzeuge’, B1.84, claimed. (See Hoffmann, Widerstand, 597 and 854 n.343.)
110. Speer, 394–5; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 594–8. See also Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 563–4; Remer, 20.Juli 1944, Hamburg, 1951, 12; Remer, Verschworung und Verrat um Hitler, 33–4; and Hagen’s report, Spiegelbild, 12–15.
111. 111. Germans against Hitler, 147, for the time.
112. Domarus, 2127 gives the time of the broadcast, at Hitler’s bidding, as 6.30p.m.; Speer, 395–6, recalls the broadcast as ‘towards seven o’clock in the evening’; Reuth, Goebbels, 550, gives the time of the broadcast as 6.45p.m..
113. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 599.
114. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 608, 613.
115. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 616.
116. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 620–26; Fest, Staatsstreich, 277–9.
117. Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 570.
118. IMG, xxxiii.417–18, D0C.3881–PS; Gisevius, To the Bitter End, 570–71 (with some textual variation); Zeller, 397–8; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 623–5; Fest, Staatsstreich, 279–80.
119. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 623ff.; Fest, Staatsstreich, 280–81; Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 276–7.
120. Schroeder, 148; Domarus, 2123.
121. Domarus, 2124; Schmidt, 595.
122. Schmidt, 593. Linge’s remark, Bis zum Untergang, 229, that Hitler had his right arm in a sling conflicts with Schmidt’s, 593, that he noticed nothing untoward in Hitler’s appearance before he used his left hand to shake hands with Mussolini and it became apparent that he had difficulty in raising his right arm. The photograph of Hitler inspecting the ruined barrack-room with Mussolini is taken at the wrong angle to be conclusive, but nevertheless does not suggest that Hitler had his arm in a sling. When he gave his radio address in the early hours of the following morning, his arm was not in a sling. (See the photographs in Fest, Staatsstreich, 265, 278.)
123. Schmidt, 594.
124. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 501–2.
125. Below, 383.
126. Schroeder, 149; Germans against Hitler, 180, has about 1a.m..
127. Domarus, 2127–9.
1. Schroeder, 148–9; Zoller, 186.
2. Speer, 399–400; trans., Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, Sphere Books edn, London, 1971, 525.
3. TBJG, II/13, 206 (3 August 1944).
4. LB Darmstadt, 246–8.
5. Schroeder, 148. The phrase is also used in Bormann’s telegram to the Gauleiter at 9.20p.m. on the evening of 20 July (The Bormann Letters. The Private Correspondence between Martin Bormann and his Wife from January 1943 to April 1945, ed. H. R. Trevor-Roper, London, 1954, 63).
6. Speer, 400; trans., Speer, Inside, 525.
7. Zeller, 538 n.11, cit. W. Scheidt, ‘Gesprache mit Hitler’, Echo der Woche, 7 October 1949, p.5: ‘Die mussen sofort hangen ohne jedes Erbarmen.’ Scheidt was on the staff of Major-General Walther Scherff, the official historian in Hitler’s Headquarters (who was injured in the explosion on 20 July 1944), and heard the words at one of the military briefings following the assassination attempt, when he was deputizing for Scherff.
8. Guderian, 345–7, indicates that he was ordered to attend, and did so reluctantly and as infrequently as possible.
9. TBJG, II/13, 212 (3 August 1944). The military ‘Court of Honour’ met for the first time on 4 August 1944. On this and three subsequent sittings (14 and 24 August, 14 September), a total of fifty-five officers were expelled from the army (Germans against Hitler, 196–8).
10. Speer, 399; Schroeder, 149.
11. TBJG, II/13, 141 (23 July 1944). Goebbels added the comment (142): ‘The Fuhrer is resolved to eradicate root and branch the entire clan of generals which has opposed us in order to break down the wall which has been artificially erected by this generals’ clique between the army on the one side and Party and people on the other.’
12. Below, 383; Linge, Bis zum Untergang, 232.
13. For a brief biographical summary, see Wei?, Biographisches Lexikon, 130– 31.
14. TBJG, II/13, 141 (23 July 1944).
15. Zeller, 538 n.11, cit. Scheidt, ‘Gesprache mit Hitler’ (see above n.7): ‘Und das wichtigste ist, da? sie keine Zeit zu langen Reden erhalten durfen. Aber der Freisler wird das schon machen. Das ist unser Wyschinski.’ Goebbels discussed with Hitler at the beginning of August, a few days before the trials before the People’s Court were to begin, how they should proceed. No lengthy speeches in defence would be permitted, it was determined. The sessions would not be public, but Goebbels would ensure that first-class journalists were present to cover the trials and produce reports on them for public consumption. He undertook to speak directly to Freisler to explain how the trials were to proceed. Hitler himself was keen that background details which cast negative light on the plotters should be brought out. He was also anxious that the fiction should be held to that the plotters had been no more than a small clique, and that there should be no sweeping attacks on the officer class as such, on the army, or on the aristocracy (which would be dealt with at a later date) (TBJG, II/13, 214 (3 August 1944)). Propaganda directives had emphasized in the immediate aftermath of the failed coup d’etat that the conspirators had been only a
