58. TBJG, II/13, 210 (3 August 1944); Warlimont, 442.
59. Zoller, 186.
60. Guderian, 342, and 339–40 for his appointment.
61. See TBJG, II/13, 207 (3 August 1944), where Goebbels writes that propaganda must play its part in preventing an inverted version of the 1918 stab-in-the-back. Then, in his view, the home-front had subverted the military effort; now, the military had threatened to undermine the home-front.
62. Schroeder, 149.
63. IMG, xvi. 541; Speer, 403.
64. KTBOKW, iv. 2, 1572–6.
65. LB Darmstadt, 275–7, 280; LB Stuttgart, 609– 20.
66. See above, Ch. 14, note 5.
67. Propaganda directives immediately after the putsch attempt referred specifically to it as a failed ‘stab- in-the-back’ (see Steinert, 475).
68. Steinert, 472–3.
69. BA, R55/614, R55/678, ‘“Treukundgebungen” nach den 20.7.44; insbes. Berichte uber einzelne Veranstaltungen und Stimmung nach dem Attentat’; Imperial War Museum, London (= IWM), ‘Aus deutschen Urkunden 1935–1945’, unpublished collection of captured documents, n.d., c.1945–6, 289–92 (instructions from the Reich Propaganda Ministry to Gauleiter and Gau Propaganda Offices, regarding ‘Treukundgebungen anla?lich des mi?lungenen Attentates auf den Fuhrer’); MadR, xvii.6684–6 (28 July 1944); Steinert, 476ff.; Michael Balfour, Propaganda in War, 1939–1945, London, 1979, 388.
70. Spiegelbild, 1–3. For the utterly contrasting reactions — based on newspaper reports and rumour — of remaining, anxiety-ridden Jews in Dresden, see the entries in Klemperer, ii.548–54 (21–28 July 1944).
71. In fact, British plans to assassinate Hitler had been formulated only a few weeks earlier than Stauffenberg’s attempt on the dictator’s life. Among the arguments used by staff officers within the British subversive agency, Special Operations Executive, to oppose a British assassination attempt — which, in any case, was almost a dead letter at the very time it was conceived — was the view that it would prove counter-productive in stirring up support for Hitler (and thereby making a post-war settlement more difficult). It was also felt ‘that, from the strictly military point of view, it was almost an advantage that Hitler should remain in control of German strategy, having regard to the blunders that he has made’ (Operation Foxley, 14–15, 30– 31).
72. Spiegelbild, 4–7.
73. Spiegelbild, 8–11.
74. M.I. Gurfein and Morris Janowitz, ‘Trends in Wehrmacht Morale’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 10 (1946), 78–84, here 81; Balfour, Propaganda, 389. See also Breloer, 334, for a letter sent from one German prisoner-of-war in Texas to Hitler, congratulating him on his survival, and a diary entry from 21 July 1944 stating: ‘I don’t think I’m wrong when I say in such a sad hour for all of us: “Germany stands or falls in this struggle with the person of Adolf Hitler…” If this attack on Adolf Hitler had been successful, I am convinced that our homeland would now be in chaos.’
75. Buchbender and Sterz, 21–2.
76. Spiegelbild, 8–11.
77. See, for example, Andreas-Friedrich, 103 (entry for 31 July 1944), where she was denounced to the Gestapo for a derogatory remark about Hitler by a Party member sitting close by in a Berlin cafe. ‘Since the 20 July all organs of the Nazis are inclined to sense a putschist in every German citizen,’ she wrote. She narrowly escaped recriminations following the denunciation.
78. Berlin Diaries, 203.
79. Breloer, 132–3.
80. Breloer, 69.
81. Elisabeth Hoemberg, Thy People, My People, London, 1950, 161.
82. GStA, Munich, MA 106695, report of the Regierungsprasident of Oberbayern, 7 August 1944: ‘… ein Teil der Bevolkerung das Gelingen des Attentats in erster Linie deshalb begru?t batte, weil er sich davon eine fruhere Beendigung des Krieges erhoffte.’
83. StA, Munich, LRA 29656, report of the SD-Au?enstelle Berchtesgaden, 3 August 1944: ‘Ja, wenn’s ihn nur erwischt hatte.’
84. Buchbender and Sterz, 146.
85. See Buchbender and Sterz, 24, 147–8. The censor’s report showed negative comments — on matters in general, not specifically on Hitler — in 25 per cent of the letters checked, an increase on the previous month. A statistic from the end of November 1944 indicates that 9,523 members of the Wehrmacht had been shot for offences including indiscipline, subversion, and sabotage following usually perfunctory court-martial proceedings. How many had been picked up by negative remarks in letters cannot be established. Comments related to the attempt on Hitler’s life, it can be safely surmised, would have been a minuscule proportion (Buchbender and Sterz, 20–25).
86. Steinert, 482.
87. Steinert, 479.
88. Jahrbucb der offentlichen Meinung 194J–1955, ed. Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, Allensbach, 1956, 138.
89. Michael Kater, The Nazi Party. A Social Profile of Members and Leaders, 1919– 1945, Oxford, 1983, 263 (Figure 1).
90. IWM, ‘Aus deutschen Urkunden 1935–1945’, 264, report of SD-Leitabschnitt Stuttgart, 8 August 1944: ‘Mit anderen Worten wurde das hei?en: Der Fuhrer gibt zu, daft die Zeit bisher nicht fur uns, sondern gegen uns gearbeitet hat. Wenn sich also ein Mann wie der Fuhrer einer solch gewaltigen Tauschung hingegeben bat,… so ware er entweder nicht das Genie, fur das er immer hingestellt wird, oder aber, er hatte in Kenntnis der Tatsache, da? Saboteurs am Werk sind, das deutsche Volk vorsatzlich belogen, was ebenso schlimm ware, denn mit solchen Feinden im eigenen Haus konnte die Kriegsproduktion niemals gesteigert werden, konnten wir niemals siegen…. Das Bedenklicbste an der ganzen Sache ist wohl, da? die meisten Volksgenossen, auch diejenigen, die bisher unerschutterlich glaubten, jeden Glauben an den Fuhrer verloren haben.’
91. IWM, ‘Aus deutschen Urkunden’, 276, report of SD-Leitabschnitt Stuttgart, 6 November 1944: ‘Es wird immer wieder behauptet, der Fuhrer sei uns von Gott gesandt worden. Ich bezweifle es nicht. Der Fuhrer wurde uns von Gott gesandt, aber nicht um Deutschland zu retten, sondern um Deutschland zu verderben. Die Vorsehung hat beschlossen, das deutsche Volk zu vernichten und Hitler ist der Vollstrecker dieses Willens.’
92. Breloer, 219–20.
93. Steinert, 498.
94. Manfred Messerschmidt, ‘Krieg in der Trummerlandschaft. “Pflichterfullung” wofur?’, in Ulrich Borsdorf and Mathilde Jamin (eds.), Uber Leben im Krieg. Kriegserfahrungen in einer Industrieregion 1939–1945, Reinbeck bei Hamburg, 1989, 169–78, here 173.
95. Matthias von Hellfeld, Edelwei?piraten in Koln, 2nd edn, Cologne, 1983, especially 9–14, 38–59; Detlev Peukert, Die Edelwei?piraten. Protestbewegungen jugendlicher Arbeiter im Dritten Reich, Cologne, 1980, 103–15; Widerstand und Verfolgung in Koln 1933–1945, ed. Historisches Archiv der Stadt Koln, Cologne, 1974, 394–7.
96. Widerstand und Verfolgung in Koln, 396.
97. See Peukert, Die KPD im Widerstand, 388–400; Merson, 293–5; Widerstand und Verfolgung in Koln, 394–7.
98. Cit. Steinert, 499–500, 515.
99. Oven, Mit Goebbels, ii.109, entry for 5 August 1944, and Goebbels’s speech to the Gauleiter in Posen two days earlier (Heiber, Goebbels Reden, ii.360–404, here 370,
