started. The small-scale, wind-tunnel model did not adequately predict the internal airflow. As an interim measure, an inlet access panel was removed during ground tests. Holes were later drilled in the nacelles to cure the problem. Article 121 made its initial flights with one J58 and one J75. On January 15, 1963, the first A-12 flight with two J58s was made. By the end of January, ten J58 engines had been delivered and were being installed in the A-12s.
Recruitment of the CIA pilots had begun even before the first A-12 flight.
The Oxcart pilots would need remarkable skill, due both to the performance characteristics of the A-12 and the demands of flying secret intelligence missions. Air Force Brig. Gen. Don Flickinger was picked to establish the requirements. He received advice from both Johnson and CIA Headquarters.
The initial criteria included experience in high-performance aircraft, emotional stability, and good self- motivation. The pilots also had to be between twenty-five and forty years of age. The small size of the A-12's cockpit meant that the pilots had to be under six feet tall and weigh less than 175 pounds.
Air force files were screened for possible candidates. The initial list was further reduced by psychological assessments, medical exams, and refine-ment of the criteria. The final evaluation resulted in sixteen potential pilots, who were then subjected to intensive security and medical checks by the CIA. Those still remaining were approached to work 'on a highly classified project involving a very advanced aircraft.'[142] In November 1961, five pilots agreed: William L. Skliar, Kenneth S. Collins, Walter L. Ray, Dennis B. Sullivan, and Alonzo J. Walter. They were a mixed group — Skliar was an Air Force Test Pilot School graduate (Class 56D) and was assigned to the Armament Development Center at Eglin Air Force Base.[143] The others had operational backgrounds. Like the CIA U-2 pilots, they were sheep dipped, leaving the air force to become civilians. Their time with the CIA would be counted toward their rank and retirement. The pay and insurance arrangements were similar to those of CIA U-2 pilots.[144]
The CIAA-12 pilots arrived at Groom Lake in February 1963. Like their U-2 counterparts in the 1950s, the men found Area 51 'desert, windy and hot, windy and cold, isolated, basic.' They made several flights in the A-12T trainer (also called the 'Titanium Goose'), then began making training and test flights in the single-seat A-12s. Each pilot had a personal call sign — 'Dutch' followed by a two-digit number. The unit was designated the 1129th Special Activities Squadron, nicknamed 'the Roadrunners.'[145]
With the deliveries of the J58 engines, and the arrival of the CIA pilots, the program began a three-shift schedule. This required a large number of engineers, who were also recruited in a clandestine manner. One Lockheed engineer was asked if he wanted to work on a 'special job.' He would be flown to a site, work there all week, then be flown back to Burbank on Friday. In some cases, the engineers were not told what they would be doing until they actually saw the A-12 for the first time.
The A-12 was a large, loud, and distinctive-looking aircraft. Keeping it a secret would be a problem. During the early test flights, the CIA tried to limit the number of people who saw the aircraft. All those at Groom Lake not connected with the Oxcart program were herded into the mess hall before the plane took off. This was soon dropped as it disrupted activities and was impractical with the large number of flights.
As the flights could range across the southwest United States, sightings away from Groom Lake were also a problem. As the A-12 climbed and accelerated, its sonic boom was heard by 'the inhabitants of a small village some 30 miles from the test site.' A change in the flight path removed this problem.
Although the airspace above Groom Lake was closed, it was near busy Nellis Air Force Base. So, inevitably, there were sightings. In one case, an air force pilot was flying to a gunnery range in the northwest area of the base. He saw an A-12 climbing through his altitude off in the distance. He could see the shape and realized it was some type of experimental aircraft.
In another incident, several pilots in a formation saw an A-12. After they landed, a general told all of them that they were to say nothing. Some Nellis pilots saw the A-12 several times. It was common knowledge that something 'weird' was going on out in the desert.[146]
To the southwest of Groom Lake was Edwards Air Force Base. NASA test pilots flew numerous X-15 training and support flights to tracking sites and dry lake beds across California and Nevada. The only areas they avoided were the nuclear test site and the Ranch.[147] At least one NASA test pilot saw an A-12. He radioed the Edwards tower and asked what it was. He was curtly told to halt transmissions. After landing, he was told what he had seen was vital to U.S. security. He also signed a secrecy agreement.[148]
Sightings were even made from the ground. At 5:30 A.M., an air force captain was checking the main runway at Edwards for any debris before flight operations began for the day. Suddenly, an A-12 made a low pass and then climbed away. Its shape was so unusual that he first thought it was two planes in close formation. The captain called the tower and asked, 'What was that airplane?' The tower radioed back, 'What airplane?'
The major source of A-12 sightings was airline pilots. It is believed that twenty to thirty airline sightings were made. One American Airlines pilot saw an A-12 twice. During one sighting, a pilot saw an A-12 and two chase planes; he radioed, 'I see a goose and two goslings.'[149] Word of these sightings spread among the aerospace community.
The security problem became greater on May 24, 1963. Kenneth Collins was flying a subsonic training-test flight in Article 123. As he descended into clouds, the pilot-static tube became plugged with ice, which caused the instruments to display an incorrect airspeed. The A-12 stalled and pitched up. Collins was unable to control the plane, and he ejected. He landed safely, while Article 123 crashed fourteen miles south of Wendover, Utah.[150]
The Nellis Air Force Base base commander was called. 'One of your F-105's has just crashed,' he was told. He responded, 'But that's impossible. They're all here, out on the field.' He was curtly told, 'Don't argue.
If anyone asks about a plane crash, you just report that one of your 105's crashed on a routine training flight north of Nellis.'[151]
The F-105 cover story was issued to the press. It took two days to recover the debris. Persons at the scene were requested to sign security agreements. All A-12 aircraft were grounded for a week following the crash. The grounding order was raised once the cause was traced to icing.
The secrecy held despite the crash. The A-12 was ready to begin its quest for Mach 3.
The years 1963 and 1964 were spent bringing the A-12 to Mach 3-plus speeds and operational status. At times, Lockheed and the CIA despaired of ever succeeding. The problem was with the nacelle system and inlet spike.
As the A-12 flew faster, the spike moved back; this regulated the airflow into the engine.[152] The flight-test program had to develop the 'inlet schedule,' which would be programmed into the pneumatic system. This controlled the spike's position, according to the plane's speed.[153]
The A-12's test speed was increased at one-tenth Mach increments. The plane would take off from Groom Lake, then fly north to Wendover, Utah, and onward to the Canadian border. It would then make a 180-degree turn (with a diameter of 128 nautical miles) and head back to Nevada at 65,000 to 72,000 feet. The flight path was called 'Copper Bravo.' As the A-12 flew back, it would accelerate to the test speed, then decelerate and land. If trouble appeared, at least the plane would be flying toward home at thirty-five miles per minute, rather than away.[154]
The test flights soon showed that the pneumatic system could not compensate for atmospheric changes. The result was an 'unstart.' The out-of-position spike disrupted the airflow to the engine, which stopped producing thrust and began overheating. The loss of all thrust on one side caused the A-12 to violently yaw toward the dead engine. This literally bounced the pilot's helmet against the canopy. The pilot had to manually open the bypass doors to break the unstart. As with the U-2's early flameout problems, the unstart would have to be solved before the A-12 could fly in hostile airspace.
Lockheed engineers tried everything they could think of to cure the problem. The inlet geometry and schedules were changed. The manual trim of the fuel flow, spike position, and bypass door position were speeded up.
