Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, without any commands from the B-57 chase plane or the ground station. In all, three flights of 147A-1 were made to prove out the navigation system. This was followed by four test flights of the 147A-2 drone in late April and early May. When the film from the scorer was developed, it showed very good resolution. The Fire Fly had an adequate range, an altitude and resolution better than required, and the ability to fly the desired track.
With this, the 147A reconnaissance drones were considered operational.
Two drones and their DC-130 launch aircraft were placed on seventy-two-hour alert at Holloman. This very limited capability was operated by the Strategic Air Command (SAC).[203]
In the summer of 1962, it was decided to run a simulated deployment to test the drones under operational conditions. The operational test and evaluation would involve two reconnaissance flights over the Atlantic Missile Range at Cape Canaveral and three 'live-fire' tests at MacDill Air Force Base. During the two reconnaissance flights, fighters swarmed aloft in simulated interceptions; they ended up chasing each other. The radar blankets around the drone were effective, and ground radar never picked it up.
The live-fire tests at MacDill also showed the 147A's low radar return, small size, high altitude, and subsonic speed combined to make it highly survivable. The drone's main problem was the contrail — a giant banner that gave away the drone's location. (Neither of the two successful shoot downs would have been possible without the contrail as guide.) A 'no-con' (no contrail) program was quickly started to find means to suppress it. It was eventually decided that a chemical agent would be added to the exhaust.[204]
As the no-con program began at Tyndall Air Force Base, events were unfolding that would bring the world to the brink of nuclear war, and Fire Fly to within moments of making an operational mission.
THE MISSILES OF OCTOBER
For several years, CIA U-2s had been directed against Communist Cuba. The missions of August 29 and September 5, 1962, revealed a major change — the Soviets had introduced SA-2 SAMs. Eleven sites, which covered most of the island, were found. The risks of Cuban overflights had increased. [205]
The dangers were underlined four days later. Nationalist Chinese U-2 pilots had been conducting overflights of mainland China since late 1960, making as many as three overflights per month. On September 9, Radio Peking announced: 'A U.S.-made U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance plane of the Chiang Kai-shek gang was shot down this morning by an Air Force unit of the Chinese People's Liberation Army when it intruded over east China.'
The pilot, Col. Chen Huai Sheng, was severely injured when his U-2 was hit by an SA-2. He was captured and taken to a hospital but died that night.[206]
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and presidential adviser McGeorge Bundy were worried about the political effects of a U-2 being shot down over Cuba. Rusk seemed obsessed with the idea that continued U-2 overflights would increase tensions to the point of war.[207] At a September 20 meeting, the air force proposed that the Fire Fly drones be used over Cuba. No interest was expressed in their use. At that time, there were only two drones and they were still in the test phase.
By early October, there had been no U-2 coverage of the interior of Cuba for a month. Finally, a single U-2 overflight of western Cuba was authorized. Unlike previous U-2 missions, it would be flown by an air force pilot. Two SAC U-2 pilots, Majors Richard S. Heyser and Rudolf Anderson, were checked out in the CIA's U-2F version.
At 8:30 P.M. PST on October 13, Heyser took off from North Base at Edwards and headed toward Cuba. He started his run over Cuba at 7:31 A.M. EST, October 14. The overflight was made at 72,500 feet, with a flight path that went south to north across the island. At 7:43 A.M., he left Cuban airspace and turned toward McCoy Air Force Base. After landing, the film was removed and flown to Washington, D.C., for analysis at the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC).[208]
The following day, interpreters noticed six long canvas-covered objects in the San Cristobal area. They were about seventy feet long — too large to be SA-2s. They were identified as SS-4 Sandal medium range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). Three MRBM sites under construction were discovered — at San Cristobal, Los Palacios, and San Diego de los Banos. The Cuban Missile Crisis had begun.[209]
On the morning of October 16, President Kennedy learned about the missiles. At the same time, three U-2As of the air force's 4080th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing were alerted. Over the next week, some twenty U-2 missions were flown. These spotted two more SS-4 MRBM sites at Sagua la Grande. Two SS-5 Skean intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) sites were found at Guanajay and a third SS-5 site was discovered at Remedies.[210]
On October 22, Kennedy announced the existence of the missiles and the imposition of a blockade. He also warned that any nuclear attack from Cuba would be met with a full retaliatory response by the United States.[211]
In the following days, as U-2s flew on high and air force RF-101s and navy RF-8s went in at 200 to 500 feet, work continued on the missile sites.
On October 27, all twenty-four SS-4 pads were considered operational. In anticipation of a U.S. invasion, the nuclear warheads for a Soviet Frog short-range missile battery, IL 28 light bombers, and the SSC-2B Samlet coastal defense missiles were readied. They would have caused tens of thousands of casualties among U.S. troops hitting the beaches. At Key West Airport, four Pershing missiles stood ready. Upon a presidential order, their nuclear warheads would be launched to destroy Havana. Around the world, some 1,200 U.S. bombers and nearly 400 missiles were prepared to hit their targets in the Soviet Union.'The Soviet's own smaller nuclear force, 180 bombers, some 20 ICBMs, 100 submarine-launched missiles, and the 24 Cuban sites were on alert. For the first time, Soviet ICBMs were fueled and made ready to fire. Armageddon loomed. [212]
At 8:10 A.M. on October 27, Major Anderson took off from McCoy Air Force Base. As he flew over the Banes naval base, a salvo of SA-2s was fired. One of the missiles exploded above and behind his U-2.[213] One or more fragments penetrated the cockpit and hit Anderson at shoulder level.
The cockpit depressurized and his damaged suit failed to inflate. Anderson lost consciousness within seconds and died.[214]
When word reached Washington that Anderson's plane was overdue, most feared it was a direct Soviet escalation. The pressure to take military action — either striking the SAM sites, or an invasion — was growing. The situation seemed ready to explode with little or no warning. October 27 later became known as 'Black Saturday.' That evening Robert Kennedy met with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and delivered an ultimatum. If the Soviets were unwilling to remove the missiles, the United States would attack within a day or two. This was coupled with a deal — the United States would promise not to invade Cuba if the missiles were removed. And, once the crisis was over, the United States would remove the Jupiter IRBMs based in Turkey.[215]
The death of Anderson had a similar impact in Moscow. There had been strict orders not to fire on the U-2s. The attack had been ordered, without authorization, by Gen. Igor D. Statsenko, a senior Soviet commander in Cuba.[216] Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev realized that if SAMs could be launched without authorization, so could other missiles. Robert Kennedy's ultimatum also made it clear he had very little time.[217] Then he received a report that President Kennedy would address the nation 'at 5 o'clock.'
The Soviets believed it would be an announcement of an air strike or invasion. To forestall this, a message was hurriedly drafted and rushed to a radio station. At 9:04 A.M. EST, October 28, Radio Moscow broadcast a statement announcing the Soviets would remove the missiles. The crisis had ended.[218]
U-2 overflights had been halted following Anderson's death, and there were no guarantees they would not be fired on again when operations resumed, or even if they could resume.[219] The uncertainty caused Undersecretary of the Air Force Dr. Joseph Charyk to reverse the earlier decisions not to use the Fire Fly drones over Cuba. The unit was alerted to prepare for a two-drone mission on short notice.
The Fire Fly's planned mission was different from that envisioned by the test flights. The 147A would fly at a medium altitude, 30,000 feet, rather than 50,000-pIus feet. The drones' autopilot was reprogrammed, and the
