command.
B-ll kept flying, past the recovery zone and out to sea, until it ran out of fuel.
The third mission, of B-10 on September 3, had better luck. The only mishap was an engine flameout during the recovery sequence. It landed successfully with only minor damage. When processed, the photos were good.
On September 9, a pair of missions was attempted. Both ended in failure.
B-13 flew its mission, but as it descended through 30,000 feet toward Taiwan, the engine flamed out. The parachute was deployed, but the drone was lost at sea. The day's second mission never got started. B-6 was launched from the DC-130 and began its climb. Soon after, it crashed into the jungles of Laos.[226]
Thus, of the first five missions, only two had been successful. It was clear technical problems had to be resolved. Still, the Nationalist Chinese were very enthusiastic about the drones, due to the continuing U-2 losses to SA-2s over the mainland. A second U-2 had been shot down on November 1, 1963, and its pilot, Maj. Yei Chang Yi, was captured. A third U-2 loss occurred on July 7, 1964. Lieutenant Colonel Terry Lee died with his plane. The fourth Nationalist Chinese pilot lost was Maj. Jack Chang, who took off from Taiwan in the early evening of January 10, 1965. An SA-2 ended the mission forty-five minutes after he crossed the coast. Chang bailed out but landed so hard he broke both his legs. Medical attention saved his legs, but he and Yei would not be released until October 1983.
A Nationalist Chinese U-2 pilot was required to fly ten overflights. Very few survived a tour.[227]
Although none of the drones had yet been lost over China, they were being jumped by Chinese MiGs. On the September 25, 1964, flight, B-14 was followed by two pairs of MiGs about 10,000 feet below the drone. On September 29, a single MiG came within 5,000 feet of B-10. It was clear the Chinese were making an intense effort to down the drones. As yet, they were having no more luck than U.S. pilots had during the test missions.
In anticipation of the loss of a drone, thought was given to equipping the drones with a destruct system and removing the manufacturers' name plates. Finally, it was decided to do nothing. If a drone was lost, and the Communist Chinese announced it, the United States would say only 'no comment.' There would be no cover story or acknowledgment that it was a secret project.[228]
After two months of operation, it was clear the recovery zone on Taiwan was not working out. Winds dragged the drones after landing, causing major damage. Launch operations were moved to Bien Hoa Air Base, outside Saigon, South Vietnam. The landing zone was near Da Nang, on the coast.
The shift also marked a change in targeting. The early missions were directed against Communist China. Now North Vietnam was also to be covered.
The first drone flight from Bien Hoa was made on October 11, 1964, but B-14 was lost during recovery when it descended through a rainstorm and the parachute tore off. Despite the loss, the next several missions were successful. Launches were often made over Laos; in some cases, the DC-130 would nearly reach the Chinese border. Two more drone missions were flown over North Vietnam on October 22 and 27. No further drone missions were flown until November 7. It, too, was successful, bringing the total to five in a row.[229]
On November 15, 1964, 147B-19 was launched for a mission over China.
It climbed to its programmed altitude, then crossed the border. During this 'penetration phase' of the flight, MiGs jumped B-19. It was later reported that between sixteen and twenty MiGs went after the drone, making between thirty to fifty passes before it was shot down.[230]
The Chinese announced the incident the next day. The statement by the Hsinhua press agency said, 'A pilotless high-altitude reconnaissance military plane of U.S. imperialism, intruding into China's territorial airspace over the area of central south China on November 15, was shot down by the air force of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.' A separate report said that Marshal Lin Piao, minister of national defense, had commended the air unit responsible. He added, 'This major victory was scored' because the unit 'firmly carried out orders, maintained its combat readiness, seriously studied the enemy situation, did their best to master tactics and technique, overcame difficulties, and displayed a spirit of heroism in fighting.' Lin continued that he hoped the unit would 'be ready to deal blows at any invading enemy aircraft and win greater victories.' [231]
In Washington, according to a
The State Department said it had no information to support the Chinese claim. White House Press Secretary George E. Reedy said, 'I know nothing about it. This is the first I've heard of it.' The Defense Department said only, 'No comment.'[233] Defense Secretary Robert McNamara said he would not comment on the report and could add nothing to the statements issued by the State and Defense Departments.[234]
Despite the international publicity, the loss of B-19 seemed to have little impact. The stories were printed and forgotten. At Bien Hoa, operations halted for thirty days following B-19's loss, to allow things to cool off following the news reports. The first 147B mission after the loss of B-19 was made on December 15 and was called the best to date. About six more operational missions were flown before the end of the year. In all, twenty 147B missions were flown during 1964.[235]
The year 1965 began with another burst of publicity — on January 2, 147B-21 became the second drone shot down by the Chinese. Lin Piao called it a 'major victory.' The Chinese press stated that the drone had been shot down 'by the air force' over south central China. The U. S. Defense Department had no comment about the incident.[236] Press interest was also fading — the articles on the November 15 drone shoot down had been on the front page; B-21's loss made page 3 with no follow-up.
On March 31, B-20 was shot down over China. This time the news coverage was vanishingly small — the entire
On April 2, the Chinese put B-21 on display in a military museum in Peking. The aircraft was readily identifiable as a modified Firebee drone.
Some thirty thousand Chinese marched past the wreckage. The Hsinhua press agency said the shooting down of three of the drones was 'a serious warning to United States marauders who are now extending the flames of their aggressive war in Indochina and conducting constant military provocations against China.' The
The following day, April 3, the Chinese announced the fourth drone had been shot down. B-23, nicknamed 'Crazy Legs,' was lost over central south China. Hsinhua said it was 'the second espionage plane of the same type to be shot down within three days.' Again, the press took little notice.[239] The fifth 147B was lost over China on April 18, 1965.[240]
On April 20, the Chinese put three of the captured drones on display at the Chinese People's Revolutionary Museum in Peking. A photo of the drones was published on the front pages of American newspapers the next day. The
On August 21, a sixth 147B drone was shot down over Hainan Island by an air u n i t of the Chinese navy. Again, the U.S. press paid little attention.[242]
The Chinese issued their statements and photos and displays, but few took notice of those small, almost toylike airplanes. Within a few days, events pushed them aside, and the memory faded. The concept of using an unmanned drone for high-risk overflights, and simply not commenting on any losses, had proved valid. The Lightning
