out of their bunkers.’
‘That’s a fair summary, sir,’ Sterling responded, ‘though we could certainly use the bombers out of Andersen to slow their advance. The Korean terrain means that any war in the peninsula is going to be won or lost on the ground. Air superiority helps, obviously, but it’s not the decisive factor that it would be in, say, a European or Middle Eastern conflict.
‘The timescale for our campaign in response to an invasion is a real flexible feast because the question of WMD adds a different dimension. The use of these weapons could radically affect the outcome of any campaign in Korea. Whether or not the Agency’s right in its belief’ – Sterling’s tone clearly suggested that he considered this a very remote possibility – ‘that Pyongyang
‘We’re not yet convinced,’ Hicks interjected, ‘that the missile they fired was actually carrying the weapon that exploded.’
‘Nor am I,’ Sterling agreed, ‘but I don’t believe we can dismiss the possibility. This is a difficult assessment, sir, but we do know the North Koreans have produced working chemical munitions small enough to be delivered by artillery pieces, so they clearly have some expertise in the field. And that’s another factor. Their chemical agents include adam-site, phosgene, prussic acid, sarin, tabun and several variants of the mustard gas used back in the First World War. We believe they’ve got at least five thousand tons of chemical munitions in storage, mainly in mountain tunnels that are invulnerable to attack except from something like a cruise missile. And we probably wouldn’t want to hit them because of the risk of spreading the very agent we’re trying to destroy.
‘They’ve done less work on biological weapons because of the danger to their own population if they deployed them, but we do know they’ve developed weaponized strains of anthrax, bubonic plague, cholera, smallpox and yellow fever. Because we don’t know exactly how they’ve engineered these bioweapons, we can’t develop vaccines or inoculate our forces against them, so we’d have to rely on full NBCD suits and masks for protection. And that would make the physical fighting of this war a lot more difficult – the suits are effective, but they’re very cumbersome, and the masks can cause problems with communication systems.’
‘Are you really saying we might not win a war against them, if it came to that?’ the President asked.
‘No, sir. We have the technology and the resources to defeat them, that’s not in doubt, but it won’t be easy. The North Korean conventional forces are imposing enough. Add their probable willingness to scatter chemical and biological munitions over the battlefield, or even use nuclear weapons, especially if they’re being forced to retreat, and you’ll appreciate that we could face a long, bloody and very costly campaign. If we do end up fighting another war in Korea, my personal belief is that we should be thinking at least in terms of months, not weeks, before we could bring it to a conclusion. And it could very easily turn into another Vietnam.’
The last sentence clearly hadn’t pleased the President. ‘So what do you suggest?’
‘I think we may have to consider the use of tactical nuclear weapons at an early stage in the conflict, preferably after the North Koreans have employed some kind of weapon of mass destruction, so that America will be seen as defending South Korea against an unprovoked attack, but we should also be prepared to use them in a first strike, as that should ensure the campaign will be finished quickly, with a minimum loss of American or South Korean lives.’
The President turned in his seat to look at the Secretary of Defense. ‘Do you agree with that assessment?’
‘I’ve no doubt the general’s right about Pyongyang’s chemical and biological arsenal, and I believe they’d resort to using any and all weapons at their disposal if they thought they were losing the war. I think we should be prepared to employ whatever force is necessary to stop a North Korean attack, and that should include tactical and possibly even strategic nuclear weapons.’
‘What about the first strike option?’
The Secretary of Defense shook his head firmly. ‘No, Mr President. On that subject I have to agree with the Agency’s recommendation. If we initiate a conflict, America will be reviled and there would be the most severe international repercussions. My view is that we should certainly be prepared to use whatever weapons we have, but only in response to an attack initiated by Pyongyang.’
‘So what do we do right now?’
‘I suggest, Mr President,’ said General Sterling, ‘we continue with our plans to reinforce the troops we already have stationed in South Korea. I also think we should ensure that Pyongyang is fully informed that we’re doing so. We should meanwhile keep our homeland ICBMs at a high alert state, and keep the bombers from Andersen airborne, with fighter support, and close enough to North Korea that they’re painting on their surveillance radars. And then we wait for the gooks to either finish this exercise they’re allegedly running, or begin whatever the hell else they’ve got in mind.’
As the alarm bell rang again in the missile control capsule, Major Richard Whitman reached out for the red telephone with some trepidation. The keys were inserted and turned to the ‘ready’ position, and the Emergency Action Message had been authenticated. The next logical step would be the launch itself.
Known as the ‘release’ message, the Nuclear Control Order is the last instruction given before actual firing of the missile, but is subject to additional verification. A second missile control crew in one of the squadron’s other four launch capsules must conduct the same sequence of checks on all the various messages received. Any crew in the squadron can thus delay the launch of a missile if they believe the order to be invalid.
This delay lasts only for a fairly short period, after which the veto is automatically cancelled, but it can be applied as many times as is desired, and a single crew could therefore effectively prevent the launch from taking place.
Finally, to release the missiles, the two officers have to turn their keys to the launch setting simultaneously and hold them there for at least five seconds. This is the reason for the wide separation of the two control positions, as the keys are simply too far apart for one man to turn them both at the same time.
‘Stand by for Nuclear Control Order,’ said the voice on the telephone. ‘Prepare to copy. Nuclear Control Order is code Foxtrot Lima Charlie Two Six Two Seven. Read back.’
‘Roger, Command,’ Whitman said. ‘I copy Nuclear Control Order code Foxtrot Lima Charlie Two Six Two Seven.’
‘Affirmative.’
Dave Fredericks already had the Emergency War Order folder open, and was running a stubby finger down the list of Nuclear Control Order codes – the so-called ‘Gold Codes’ – all of which have seven digits.
‘Here,’ he said. ‘Foxtrot Lima Charlie Two Six Two Seven decodes as “Bring all missiles to Alert Fifteen, and hold at fifteen minutes to launch”. At least we’re not at war yet,’ he added.
‘Not quite,’ Whitman replied, ‘but we’re sure as hell getting closer. OK, you heard the man. Start bringing them to the boil.’
The Secretary of Defense replaced the telephone handset and turned round. ‘Offutt reports our ICBMs are now at launch minus fifteen minutes, Mr President.’
‘Let’s hope they stay there, as I don’t much like this,’ the President said, to nobody in particular. ‘We seem to be waiting now on Pyongyang and, if the Agency’s right, when they do decide to jump, there might not be a lot we can do about it.’ He turned back to Walter Hicks, who was refilling his coffee cup from one of the silver pots the stewards had brought in fifteen minutes earlier. ‘We’ve looked at a nuclear blackmail attempt before, Walter, so how credible do you think this threat is against Japan? Does the Agency feel sure the North Koreans could possess warheads small enough to be carried by their short-range missiles?’
‘It’s credible enough to take seriously, Mr President. They’ve been working on their atomic weapons programme for a long time now. Back in the fall of ninety-eight two nuclear weapons were tested at Ras Koh and Wazir Khan Koh in the Kharan Desert in Pakistan. At that time, Pakistan couldn’t possibly have produced enough plutonium from its research reactor at Pinstech to create one nuclear device, let alone two. So we believe those
