Foxbat

tests were joint ventures between North Korea and Pakistan, with Pyongyang – or rather Yongbyon – supplying the fissionable material and most of the technology. That’s why we believed they had a credible nuclear capability even before that Pacific explosion, and that’s why we should take them seriously now.’

‘And you think their intention is genuinely to target Japan?’

‘I don’t know, sir.’ Hicks shook his head in a helpless gesture. ‘All I can tell you is that we think they must certainly have a fairly small nuclear arsenal. If they were going to fire weapons across the DMZ into South Korea, we would expect them to use their southerly missile bases, and shorter-range weapons like the Scud B or Hwasong 5 and 6. All three of those can reach the southern tip of the Korean Peninsula, and they’ve got maybe seven or eight hundred altogether, easily enough to ensure some would get past our Patriot batteries. They’d probably launch non-nuclear missiles to overwhelm the Patriots, and then fire their missiles armed with nuclear warheads towards the end of the barrage. And, of course, there’d be no way of our telling what each missile was carrying until it detonated.

‘Preparing to launch nuclear-tipped No-dong missiles from places like Mayang and Ok’pyong only makes sense if they’re planning to fire them in an easterly or south-easterly direction. And the only target that’s out there is Japan.’

‘You seem to be forgetting something, Mr Hicks,’ the Secretary of Defense interrupted. ‘The No-dong has a fairly limited range, and the shortest straight-line distance from North Korea to Japan – or at least to Kyushu, on Japan’s south-west tip – is directly over the southern end of the Korean Peninsula. If Pyongyang was really trying to threaten Japan, they would be more likely to load the nuclear warheads on missiles at their southernmost bases, which lie just north of the DMZ.’

Hicks shook his head again. ‘I disagree, Mr Secretary. As I’ve just said, if they fired their missiles directly over South Korea, the Patriot batteries would certainly be able to take out some of them. Pyongyang knows we’ve got Patriots there, even if they don’t know their exact locations. To avoid that risk, if they are targeting Japan, launching their missiles on a south-easterly trajectory from bases well to the north of the DMZ is the only strategy that makes sense. That way they’d avoid the Patriots, and once they’re in the air we’ve got nothing that can stop them. I don’t have too much confidence in the effectiveness of the PAC-3 batteries on Okinawa, because the best time to intercept an ICBM is during the boost phase, not after the missile’s re-entry.’

‘And the reality of the situation is that if they do manage to detonate an atomic bomb, even a small one, on Japanese soil, we’re probably going to get involved in a nuclear exchange,’ the President said gloomily. ‘After all, we can hardly stand by and let them nuke one of our most important allies in the area. So how effective do you think these Russian aircraft – those Foxbats that the North Koreans have stolen – would be at intercepting our incoming missiles?’

Before Hicks could answer, General Sterling chimed in. ‘They wouldn’t be a particularly viable defence, Mr President. I know the Russians claim the aircraft was designed for that role, but it’s old, it doesn’t have particularly good serviceability, and it’s probably being flown by North Korean pilots with little real experience of either the aircraft or its weapon systems. They might score some successes against ICBMs, but those aircraft would be useless against nuclear-tipped cruise missiles or air-dropped weapons. If we deliver a nuclear strike, there’s no way a handful of near-obsolete interceptors could stop it.’

‘I quite agree, General,’ Hicks said, ‘but what worries the Agency is another aspect of the Foxbat’s design: its survivability in a post-nuclear strike environment. If I was a betting man, I’d suggest that the MiG-25’s alleged ability to intercept ICBMs is only half of the equation, and perhaps not even the most important half. I believe the main reason for them is because, if an airburst weapon is detonated over the Korean Peninsula, the Foxbat will remain operational because of its old-style valve technology. The EMP, or electromagnetic pulse, will fry everything else. That would give the North Koreans immediate and total air superiority, and don’t forget that the MiG-25 is still the fastest interceptor ever built. In the right hands it’s therefore a very potent weapon.’

‘And that,’ Richard Muldoon interjected, ‘could indeed be a part of their overall strategy. Target Japan with No-dong missiles tipped with nuclear warheads, and then detonate another weapon over Seoul, say, if we or the South Koreans resist their southern advance. That would virtually eliminate any opposition to their invasion.’

‘How dangerous is this EMP?’

‘To human beings, Mr President,’ Hicks replied, ‘it’s completely harmless. Obviously the detonation of any nuclear weapon could kill thousands as a result of the blast, burns and radiation, but the electromagnetic pulse just sends an instant power surge through all electronic equipment within range. That cooks solid-state circuitry, unless it’s very well shielded, so that would include telephones, computers, radar sets, and most communication devices.

‘Our pilots would find their aircraft impossible to fly, especially the new generation of air-superiority fighters. Even those that don’t rely on flight-control computers would still find their radars burnt out and their weapon control systems inoperative. Missile radars and infrared homing devices wouldn’t work. On the ground, most of our command and control systems would be destroyed, all the way down the line to the radios carried by individual soldiers. Vehicles with engine-management systems wouldn’t start or run. Targeting computers in tanks wouldn’t work. Even electronic devices like digital watches would fail.

‘In short, we’d be reduced to fighting the kind of battle last seen in the First World War – with no smart weapons, very few working vehicles, and poor or non-existent communications. And, worse still, the only aircraft flying overhead would be those operated by the North Korean Air Force.

‘It’s also possible that, if Pyongyang scheduled the nuclear detonation precisely – I mean, if they decided when they were going to trigger it rather than react to a counter-attack by us – their armed forces could power down their own electronic equipment and get their vulnerable assets into underground shelters for the duration. That wouldn’t guarantee everything would work when they hauled it out again, but almost certainly they’d be left with a better battlefield capability than we would.’

For a few moments the President sat in silence, sipping his coffee thoughtfully. Finally, he replaced his cup on the table and leant back in his chair. ‘I hear the Secretary of Defense’s opinion about the possible consequences of us initiating a first strike against North Korea, but I’m beginning to think that it might be the only way we could win this thing.’

‘Mr President, I must strongly advise—’

‘Hear me out, please. You people are my military and intelligence experts. What you’ve told me so far is that North Korea probably has missile-deliverable nuclear weapons and is most likely to target them on Japan, and even the USA, as nuclear blackmail to stop us resisting their invasion of South Korea. If we counter-attack, they could detonate a nuclear air-burst over the peninsula that will cripple our conventional forces. The implication is that we won’t be able to roll them back north of the DMZ the way Oplan 5027 envisages, and the only option we’ll be left with is surgical nuclear strikes with cruise missiles and the like. And even if we do that, they could still launch a nuclear attack on Japan, and that would generate an international political shit-storm like we’ve never seen before. And it’s still possible that we could lose South Korea to their invasion. Is that a fair summary?’

Heads nodded, but none of the men in the Oval Office responded verbally.

‘OK, so it seems to me that the only way we can avoid getting royally shafted by that little bastard in Pyongyang is to hit him first. I know they could still launch a massive assault on Seoul, but if we can take out their long-range missile sites – the ones with the No-dong weapons – we could at least prevent an attack on Japan. That seems to me to be our first priority. If we can keep this conflict within the Korean Peninsula, we’ll have a much better chance of coming out smiling. Anyone disagree with that?’

‘With the principle, no, Mr President,’ the Secretary of Defense said, ‘but I’m still very unhappy with the idea of America launching a first strike – especially a nuclear first strike – on a country that, as far as the rest of the world is concerned, is apparently just conducting a military exercise. Whichever way you look at it, and however you try to justify it, that would still be accounted an act of war.’

‘There might,’ Richard Muldoon said tentatively, ‘just might, be a way around that.’

‘What?’ the President demanded. ‘How?’

So Muldoon told him.

Hammersmith, London

Richard Simpson wasn’t normally to be found in his office at weekends, but the escalating crisis in Korea had changed all that. However, as it was a Sunday he’d forgone his usual grey pinstripe suit and Churchill brogues in favour of blue slacks, an open-neck shirt and loafers. He looked as if he should be out on a golf course