Plotting Hitler's Death

that an offensive was impossible at that time, not only for technical reasons but also because of the failings and lack of disci­pline that the troops had demonstrated in Poland-particularly while on the attack-Hitler flew into a rage. He hurled accusations at Brauchitsch, demanded to see proof of his allegations, wanted to know what had been done about them and whether death sentences had been imposed on soldiers guilty of cowardice. Hitler loudly sum­moned Keitel into the room, and as Brauchitsch fumbled for words and became entangled in contradictions, he raged against “the spirit of Zossen,” which he knew all about and would soon destroy. Then he abruptly left the room, “slamming the door” and leaving the com­mander in chief standing there.³⁷

Brauchitsch, who had turned “chalky-white… his face twisted,” according to one observer, found his way back to Halder.³⁸ Together they set out for Zossen, Brauchitsch exhausted and in a state of col­ lapse, Halder apparently composed. When Brauchitsch casually men­tioned Hitler’s threat about the “spirit of Zossen,” however-he had not really made much of it-Halder’s ears pricked up and he, too, was seized by panic. Just a few days earlier, he had been warned by the chief signal officer, General Erich Fellgiebel, that Hitler suspected something, or at any rate was making increasingly suspicious-sounding comments about the army high command. This, coupled with Brauchitsch’s revelation, made Halder fear that the plans for a coup had been betrayed or been uncovered by Hitler in some way. As soon as he was back at headquarters, therefore, Halder ordered all coup-related documents destroyed immediately. Not long afterwards, the order to launch an offensive in the West arrived.

* * *

By late afternoon Brauchitsch had regained his composure. Hitler, he said, had simply caught him completely by surprise. Although the order to launch an offensive had once again created precisely the situation that was supposed to spark the coup, Brauchitsch now declared that the attack in the West could no longer be stopped. He added, “I myself won’t do anything, but I won’t stop anyone else from acting.”

Halder, alternating between resignation and apprehension, expressed similar sentiments. He told Groscurth that now that their undertaking had been abandoned, “the forces that were counting on us are no longer bound to us.” Halder felt that there was no one who could succeed Hitler and that the younger officers were not yet ready for a putsch. Groscurth insisted that they act, arguing that the factors cited by Halder had been just as true before the scene in the Chancel­lery and reminding him that Beck, Goerdeler, and Schacht were still on board, not to mention the determined Canaris. Halder responded angrily, “If they’re so sure at Military Intelligence that they want an assassination, then let the admiral take care of it himself!”³⁹

Groscurth immediately carried this challenge back to Military Intelligence on Tirpitzufer, infuriating Canaris. At this point the opposition forces began falling apart at a pace so rapid it was almost visible. Canaris took Halder’s message, which was possibly exaggerated in the retelling, to mean that the OKH was foisting the assassination attempt off on him because it could no longer do it. One of the questions that remains unanswered to this day is why Oster, who witnessed Canaris’s outburst, failed to point out that an assassin was now available in the person of Erich Kordt, who had relatively easy access to the Chancel­lery and Hitler, was prepared to put his life on the line, and awaited only the necessary explosives, which a section head named Erwin von Lahousen had promised to procure. Most likely Oster was all too aware of Canaris’s long-standing antipathy toward political assassinations of any kind. But Oster’s silence also highlights how contradic­tory and uncoordinated the plans of even the innermost core of conspirators remained until the very last moment.

Soon Oster and Gisevius received further evidence that the resistance was unraveling. For encouragement, they went to see Witzleben, who had heretofore been steadfast in his determination, at his headquarters in Bad Kreuznach. But even he expressed strong doubts that Hitler could still be stopped from launching the offensive. Witzleben believed that the only remaining possibility would be for the three army group commanders in the West-Leeb, Rundstedt, and Bock-to refuse to transmit the order to attack when the time came. On the way back from Bad Kreuznach, Oster stopped in Frankfurt am Main to see Leeb and explore the potential for such a step. How­ever, when Oster not only mentioned the names of many of the con­spirators but also drew from his pocket two proclamations, both written by Beck, to be read during the military takeover, Leeb’s first general staff officer, Colonel Vincenz Muller, responded with outrage. Muller castigated Oster for his recklessness and eventually per­ suaded him to “burn the two documents in my big ashtray.” Witzleben, too, was indignant when he heard about Oster’s indiscre­tion and announced that he would not see Oster anymore.⁴⁰

Shortly before their departure on the evening of November 8, Oster and Gisevius heard news that Hitler had narrowly escaped an assassination attempt in the Burgerbraukeller in Munich by unexpect­edly cutting short a speech that was scheduled to last several hours. Gisevius immediately conceived the idea of blaming the assassination attempt on Himmler and using it to justify a coup, in much the same way as the fictitious attempt on the Fuhrer’s life discussed by several of the plotters in September, 1938. But the main consequence of the assassination attempt was the immediate tightening of security mea­sures, which heightened the already considerable difficulties that Lahousen was experiencing in procuring explosives for Erich Kordt. Nevertheless, Kordt was assured once more on November 10 that everything would be ready the next day. There was a catch, however. Under the new restrictions, Lahousen was only able to acquire an extremely complicated detonator that required special training to op­erate. Kordt declared that he was still prepared to proceed, but now Oster got cold feet and backed out. Thus was Hitler spared thanks to the first of many “providential” events that would henceforth occur regularly, preserving him for the “Herculean tasks” that he believed himself destined to carry out.

In the meantime, Hitler postponed the launching of the offensive from November 12 until the fifteenth, then the nineteenth, and fi­nally the twenty-second. The sense of relief produced by these post­ponements further weakened the conspiracy. Returning from a visit to the western border, Stulpnagel remarked to Halder, “You’re right. It won’t work. The commanders and troops would not obey your call.” Halder himself commented spontaneously to General Thomas that a coup d’ etat would fly in the face of all tradition and that “it is quite intolerable that the Germans should come to be the slaves of the English.” The helplessness of the opposition at this point is re­vealed by Halder’s suggestion to Secretary of State Weizsacker that a soothsayer be bribed to influence Hitler and by his offer to provide a million marks for this purpose. Meanwhile, the commanders in chief of the army groups held a meeting at which they agreed unanimously about the perils of a western offensive but rejected Leeb’s suggestion that they resign en masse. At that, Leeb resolved to banish all thoughts of resistance from his mind.⁴¹

In Berlin, Schacht continued for a time to search out new conspirators who had not yet become cynical and weary, but he, too, eventu­ally grew resigned. Beck continued to write “papers for his daughter,” as one observer scoffed. Gisevius was sent as vice-consul and military intelligence officer to the German consulate in Zurich, Goerdeler returned to his bizarre schemes, and Canaris finally succumbed to his revulsion for the world.⁴² He forbade Oster to engage in any further conspiratorial activities and demanded that he recall “Herr X,” Mu­nich lawyer Josef Muller, whom Oster had dispatched to Rome in an attempt to discover through the British ambassador to the Holy See how London would react to a coup and what peace conditions it might offer should Germany rid itself of Hitler. An embittered Groscurth wrote to his wife on November 16, “We carry on, but nothing ever happens… except fiascos.” The same day he met with his immediate superior, General Kurt von Tippelskirch, who had at­tended a briefing in Brauchitsch’s office concerning fresh atrocities in Poland. Tippelskirch commented with a sigh, “We’ll just have to get through the valley of the shadow of death.”⁴³

Hitler’s apparent sixth sense, which he often followed, now induced him to summon the officers once again and rally support for his plans. He knew enough about psychology to employ not only his own oratorical powers but also a measure of spectacle; on November 23, the extended leadership of all three services, the commanders and general staff officers, were invited to a glittering gathering in the Marble Hall of the Chancellery. For the first time since the victory over Poland, the army leadership came together, and the whirl of uniforms, gold braid, epaulets, and red trouser stripes seemed to cast an enchanting spell over the assemblage, so that much of their fear and concern had already evaporated when Goring and Goebbels made rousing appeals to the group. Then Hitler himself appeared, looking rather somber, and spoke at length with portentous solemnity about the thinking that underlay his convictions.

He opened with a historical and strategic overview, assuring the assembled throng that the Great War had never ended-the second act was only just beginning-and that he had not rebuilt the Wehrmacht in order not to use it. “The determination to strike has always lain within me,” he said. Anyone who opposed him would therefore be