the 2nd Company of the 1st Battalion
8th Company + Mortar Platoon + 2 or 3 HMG Sections – 3–400 metres south of Klessin road junction with Reichstrasse 112
Battalion HQ – cellar on the north side of Klessin street
Three days later Captain Wiegand was sent off on a General Staff course and Lieutenant Wolfgang Schone, commanding the 8th Company, appointed in his place, being the only officer in the battalion who had done an artillery spotting course, even though he was not the senior subaltern. One of his subsequent letters read: ‘Far right a pontoon bridge, submerged by day and refloated at night when they bring their tanks across cheekily with their headlights full on. We have to count them and report the number to Regiment. That is our main task.’
On his first afternoon in command, the Soviets advanced up the sunken road from the south with the aid of tanks to reach the Klessin-Podelzig road, but a counterattack by the regiment that evening re-opened the route and destroyed a T-34 tank. Again the following afternoon, 11 March, the Soviets in battalion strength attacked the German positions north of the hamlet and were only forced back by committing the last of the regimental reserves. That night the Soviets broke the German lines at the juncture between Grenadier Regiments 1242 and 1235 west of Wuhden and thrust south, cutting off and surrounding Klessin. Those German troops that had been fighting north of Klessin were forced back into it, adding elements of the 2nd and 3rd Companies of the 1st Battalion to the garrison strength. Only a weak and by day untenable line of positions now connected the Klessin garrison with Point 54.2 and the rest of the regiment.
During the night of 12/13 March it was possible to re-supply the garrison once more using tanks and armoured personnel carriers, which were also able to remove the wounded, but came under heavy artillery fire on their return journey.
Temporarily reinforced by the remains of the Replacement Battalion ‘Feldherrnhalle’,[22] Grenadier Regiment 1242 made a bid to re-open the link to Klessin on the evening of the 13th March, but failed with heavy losses attributed mainly to heavy anti-tank gunfire coming from the direction of Wuhden. Only a few Soviet tanks were engaged in this action.
The only well providing water for Klessin was destroyed by shellfire that day and there were to be four waterless days for the garrison before some enterprising individuals managed to re-open the well and discover a second one. The garrison remained under constant artillery and mortar fire with mounting casualties. The wounded were tended by the battalion medical officer, Junior Surgeon Dr. Gehre, who worked untiringly under the most difficult circumstances, not least a lack of medical supplies. The accumulating wounded spread from the neighbouring cellar into the battalion command post itself.
The supply difficulties were partly eased by some calves, several lambs, a quantity of potatoes and a sack of peas left behind by Herr von Albedyll after the evacuation of the property.
Communications were provided by the regimental signals platoon with a radio section under Corporal Hopp, later to be promoted sergeant, whose radiomen fortunately had a faster speed of transmission than those usually encountered with the infantry. Then there was the Armoured Artillery Regiment ‘Kurmark’’s forward observer, Sergeant Hennecke, who was later to be recommended for promotion and the award of the Iron Cross First Class for his brilliant work in directing artillery fire under the most arduous conditions, and the forward observer of the SS-Artillery Battalion 101, Sergeant Hagen, whose radio failed to function throughout. However, there was an acute shortage of batteries for the sets, and expired batteries were supposed to be returned to Regiment for recharging whenever possible. Extracts of Sergeant Major Baier’s radio log at the regimental command post survive and provide a comprehensive background to events.
At 0941 hours on the 13th March, Klessin garrison reported the massing of Soviet anti-tank guns, mortars and infantry northeast of the hamlet and called for a fire concentration. At 1320 hours 5 Company holding the northeastern perimeter came under attack but managed to beat the enemy back. The garrison reported a fighting strength of 196 with six severely wounded awaiting collection.
At 1416 hours the Soviets repeated their attack from the northeast and then minutes later the position came under attack from the southeast as tanks and infantry emerged from the hollow below the Schloss. Because of the steepness of the approach, this latter group could only be countered with mortar fire, but the request for this was closely followed by a call for a complete fire bell around the battalion position. By 1520 hours the garrison was calling urgently and repeatedly for water, which was promised for delivery by tanks that night.
The Soviet attacks continued, causing the garrison to call for heavy machine gunfire over the position, as well as artillery, rocket and mortar fire on specific target areas. Three and a half hours later the garrison was able to report a complete defensive success by 5 and 6 Companies, but tetanus inoculations and bandages were urgently needed.
At 0210 hours next morning, 14 March, Regiment announced the armoured relief attack would commence at 0245 hours assisted by infantry. As soon as the tanks broke through, the 2nd Battalion was to push out on the flanks to re-establish contact with its neighbours on either side. The 2nd Company of the ‘Brandenburg’ provided fire cover for the 3rd Company, but then a Panther hit a mine and the tank in which Matthias Hamedinger was the radio operator was ordered to recover it. He reported: ‘The Russians were firing at our tank with Panzerfausts without hitting it. Then one hit the petrol tank alongside the engine and our tank burst into flames and the ammunition started exploding. I baled out through the radio operator’s hatch without difficulty, but the Russian infantry closed in and started firing at us with their sub-machine guns. The tracks cut by the tank into the meadow provided us with good cover, but our tank commander, Sergeant Rath, was hit and wounded.’
As Helmut Jurisch commented: ‘That first night the enemy put up such a hail of fire that, although it did not penetrate, the closer we got to Klessin, the greater was the danger that they would penetrate the side armour. Eventually the attack was broken off at dawn.’
The attempt at relief had failed and at 1000 hours the Soviets resumed their attacks from the north and south. Again this was eventually checked by artillery fire. That evening Regiment called on the garrison to hold out for one more day. The garrison was now down to 37 officer cadets, 8 senior NCOs, 116 other ranks and 27 wounded, already on their fourth day without water.
At some stage during the siege, the Political Department of the 8th Guards Army produced a special leaflet to try and get the garrison to surrender, which started as follows:
SOLDIERS of the Klessin garrison!
You are now sitting in your pocket waiting for help.
Forget it! Help is not coming any more!
The attempts to break through to you have cost the German command several dozen tanks and armoured personnel carriers.
Tanks and armoured personnel carriers will not get through!
No one will get through!
You may hold on for another day or two, perhaps even a week – that changes nothing.
Sometime during the course of the fighting it was discovered from prisoner of war interrogations that the Soviet attacking division so outnumbered the German defence that, although all their mortar resources were kept in action, they were only fielding one regiment at a time out of three on a three-day exchange system of one in the line, one in reserve and one resting!
During the night of 14/15 March Klessin reported hearing the enemy digging in either side of the Podelzig road and called for heavy artillery fire on that area. The garrison suffered no casualties during the night.
That afternoon Regiment announced the mounting of a second relief operation and in the evening some tense signalling began in which a forward observer with the relief force, ‘M’, reported progress as recorded in the radio log. (I and II denote the 1st and 2nd Battalions respectively.)
To II 1940 Watch out! Our own relief operation. Pull back. Illuminate battlefield.
M 2002 Strong anti-tank fire. Tanks rolling forward. Strong anti-tank fire right of road to KLESSIN.
M 2012 Own tanks rolling forward.
M 2018 Tanks continuing to advance. No sign of own troops at the moment.
M 2033 Tanks 300-400m before position. Remainder on high position.
