To II 2035 What is the situation?
M 2036 Fire from big mortars could be laid down in front of tanks.
M 2038 Infantry right of road advancing well.
From I What is the situation?
To I Head of advance has reached KLESSIN. Wing companies advancing.
M 2041 Own troops left of road advancing.
M 2047 Heavy artillery fire on own troops right of road.
M 2051 Lieutenant Wilken wounded. Coming back.
M 2055 Sounds of fighting quieter.
To I 2100 An officer to immediately go forward and clarify situation.
M 2100 Groups of our own troops are coming back right of road 200m from the position.
M 2105 Tanks still advancing. No sign of own troops.
From I 2107 Some tanks now behind village. No infantry companies to be seen. Where is artillery fire?
M 2110 Tanks now in hollow 400m from own positions. 3 tanks going further forward on right.
M 2120 Have some elements gone back?
To I Second Lieutenant Lehner to take over 3 Company and attack.
M 2118 Since last report at 2054 hours no returning troops seen.
From I 2125 KLESSIN reports via 8 Company: We are free.
M 2126 One tank returning.
M 2130 KLESSIN reports: We are free.
M 2137 Up to 8 men seen returning.
To I 2215 Breakthrough must be forced with tanks under all circumstances. Tanks have orders to this effect.
To I 2220 Has an officer gone forward from 1st Battalion to clarify situation?
From I 2223 Attack on the hollow stalled. Tanks partly ahead of own infantry companies without contact to the platoons. Partly covered by considerable mortar fire.
From II 2236 Contact to right re-established, to the left still unclear. Still enemy on the road.
From I 2238 Remove 7 wounded from 8 Company Command Post. 4 stretcher cases.
To II 2250 Urgently need to know whether contact to southern front has been completed.
From II If 1 Company/1242 left PODELZIG-KLESSIN road is not going to advance, fire on DROSSEL[23] from all artillery resources requested.
To II Report immediately when armoured personnel carriers arrive.
From I 7 Company has contact with KLESSIN. If a frontal advance not possible, 3 Company is to drive forward to the Russian trenches that 7 Company has blocked off and roll them up to north. Brief the tanks and let them support us from you.
From I 7 Company has contact with KLESSIN. If a frontal advance not possible, 3 Company is to drive forward to the Russian trenches that 7 Company has blocked off and roll them up to north. Brief the tanks and let them support us from you. Report immediately whether attack frontal or from south.
From II 6 Company has contact with left platoon 7 Company, not with right of 7 Company. Armoured personnel carriers not yet arrived.
To I 0025 Prepare Engineer Platoon immediately. Platoon to roll up trenches from south to north. Lieutenant Rossmann to command platoon.
From II 0045 What is the situation?
To II 0105 Frontal thrust along the road now stalled. Engineer Platoon tasked with clearing enemy trenches from south to north. 2nd Battalion is to send an assault troop along 7 Company’s front from 6 Company to re- establish firm contact with 7 Company. Armoured personnel carriers are on their way.
From I 0125 Engineer Platoon briefed and already under way.
To I 0135 As soon as the Engineer Platoon is there, roll up the position from south to north. Also commit 3 and 1 Companies. The enemy must be chased out of these trenches.
M 0135 Wounded transport to here.
From I 0135 Wounded transport to 8 Company. Numerous wounded there.
From II 0150 2 Company on right at the moment including No. 1 Platoon of 7 Company at Grid Reference 69660/14000. Request closure of still open gap by rest of Feldherrnhalle or 7 Company. Note coordinates.
From II 0045 What is the situation?
To II 0158 Query: have the armoured personnel carriers arrived yet?
To II Request Hopp to establish:
a) How many pack radios in KLESSIN?
b) How many of these intact?
Reply immediately. Baier.
From II From Feldherrnhalle: One armoured personnel carrier and 2 heavy armoured personnel carriers driven on mines in renewed attack, also strong infantry fire.
To II 0745 Lieutenant Schone: Undertaking failed due to enemy anti-tank mines. Recognition of your steadfastness and that of your men. I will personally not rest until we are reunited.
From II 0732 Request yet today another drop of ammunition, Verey lights, hand grenades, water, food, lead and nickel batteries, anodes, tetanus, bandages.
From II 0920 Situation Report: Battalion is holding KLESSIN in old positions. One platoon 7 Company in battalion reserve broke back through to us after a short fight after being cut off. Right wing of battalion about 150m north of shot-up Russian tank. Gap to 7 Company about 500m. Also possible to close the gap with specific bombardment of the intervening hollow without putting tanks on stand-by.
From Div For Combat Team Klessin: Report approximate casualties immediately. Have you a doctor in KLESSIN?
To II 1153 Report immediately for Division: fighting strength, casualties and whether you have a doctor in KLESSIN.
From II 1230 In KLESSIN there are in all five pack radios and one unreliable Sender/Receiver. Four of the sets are on their last batteries. Regimental set has still duration of 24 hours in receiving mode. 2 Company cannot communicate with 1st Battalion, but I have secured their batteries. We will only transmit when we need you. Please note.
From II 1327 Fighting strength 5/182. Casualties: 15 (6 dead, 9 wounded). Doctor best possible.
To II 1740 Expected supply drop 1745-1815 hrs. Shoot white and green. Mark drop zone SCHLOSS yard.
From II 1902 To Commander: Re your message of 1730 hours. Messages that through encoding cannot be acted on in time are pointless and endanger confidence in the leadership. Drop zone not SCHLOSS but village street.
To II 1940 Supply bombs coming tomorrow morning. Timing will be passed on to you.
Thus another attempt at relieving Klessin had failed. Helmut Jurisch with the Panthers reported that, although two of their tanks managed to break through the Soviet lines, they were both soon brought to a standstill in a hail of fire. Attempts to recover them and their baled-out crews were equally unsuccessful because of the volume of fire. Even though there were some dead and wounded among the crews, the majority were captured alive.
However, two Panthers commanded by Second Lieutenant Eimer and Sergeant Stephen had got through to the garrison, although they were not included in the strength return until the 19th. Most importantly, they brought with them a useful addition to the radio link for directing artillery fire.
Early next day, 17 March, Klessin reported visible signs of deterioration in the state of the men as a result of the failure to resupply. The supply drop by Luftwaffe aircraft at 1600 hours coming in from the direction of Podelzig in the face of considerable anti-aircraft fire from the ample Soviet resources resulted in all the supply containers falling east of the Schloss into the Soviet positions. That evening Klessin reported: ‘Visible drop in physical capacity of men after six days without resupply. Already two men have collapsed from physical exhaustion
