lessen the burden on No 7 Squadron. Initially 8 Squadron operated Alouette IIIs, though none of us knew then that the true purpose of creating this new unit was to prepare for the on-take of larger helicopters.
We moved to FAF 4 at Mtoko and commenced work right away. The Alouette with the Katoog system was referred to as ‘K-Car Alpha’ to distinguish it from the 20mm K-Car gunships. The plan was for Ted to position at a safe place that was nearest to the area I was searching and wait for my call. In this way, and acting entirely on his own, he could respond very quickly.
We struck luck immediately when I called him to a large CT camp near an abandoned farmstead southeast of Mtoko. As Ted arrived, over thirty CTs broke cover and started running and splitting into small groups. I called for Fireforce as Corporal Thompson’s first long burst downed six CTs. Five stayed where they fell.
Ted’s specific instruction was to remain at 1,200 feet above ground so that the Katoog aiming system and the four-gun mount could be compared directly with the established 20mm cannon performance. Whereas the first burst had been made from the correct height I could see that Ted was progressively dropping height to get at small groups now scattered and snivelling from cover to cover. So far as I could see CTs were dropping every time the guns fired but some rose again, staggering noticeably.
K-Car Alpha had run out of ammunition before the Fireforce took over. Most of the seventeen CT’s accounted for had either been killed by Katoog or were so severely wounded that they were unable to escape the attention of the troops. Katoog had proven itself on its first live outing.
Ted was directed onto a number of unoccupied places before I put him onto a group of fourteen terrorists. Corporal Thompson knocked hell out of these guys who attempted to fire back at the helicopter until they realised they came short every time they stopped running in zigzag fashion. By the end of the action Ted had dropped right down to about 300 feet to get at three remaining survivors who made the mistake of going into cover under a small clump of bushes. They did not stand a chance. The whole group lay dead before troops arrived to sweep the area.
At this stage I brought in Hamie Dax, our successful PRAW recce pilot, to help cover more ground in an endeavour to locate a particular CT gang that was giving Centenary farmers a bad time. Squadron Leader Ted Lunt with Corporal Thompson responded to a call from Hamie.
This is what Ted wrote in his ASR of 23 June 78:
Gun trials on the Alpha fit continued daily with K-Car prepositioning in areas as required in support of air recce.
PRAW crew (Dax and McCay) reported a likely camp at US400294 and requested a check out. No movement or signs of occupation were visible to the PRAW but in view of the pattern of camps found thus far, Dax indicated good possibilities. Run was made from NNE at tree top height in view of wind and terrain with last few hundred meters under direction of PRAW.
As the camp central complex was approached, K-Car Alpha observed an armed CT at very close range and opened fire. Immediately 8-10 CTs broke from the area scattering in all directions.
Targets were engaged with great difficulty and of necessity from close quarters at slow speed in view of the thick vegetation and rapid departure of CTs.
There being no Fireforce immediately available and PRAW not having seen CT’s from height, many CTs unfortunately made good their escape. Several CTs were observed hiding in bushes and these were engaged and killed with very little trouble—indeed of those killed only two managed to get off a few rounds.
Upon initiation of the contact FF (from Mtoko) was called for and arrived within 30 mins or so. By this time no more CTs could be found and, having briefed K-Car 1 on the set-up and indicated the whereabouts of the 6 dead, K-Car Alpha withdrew to carry on with recce reactions, there being other camps to check in the area.
Under direction of FF Mtoko, paras were dropped to the East (1.5 km) then carried in by G-Car. A sweep line was formed consisting of 4 sticks (16 men) which moved from E to W towards a stop-line of 4 men. The camp was searched but only 6 dead located. No blood spoor was found and stops were uplifted and FF returned to Mtoko at last light.
ENEMY ACTION:
Nothing unusual—CTs remained within camp and only broke once engaged by K-Car Alpha. No attempt made to fire upon PRAW it seems, even though he was circling for some time prior to heli arrival.
DETAILS NOT FORMING AND INTEGRAL PART OF NARRATIVE:
4 of the 6 killed were fleeting targets—Alpha fit proved amazingly effective against these. This weapon proved itself to be far superior to the 20mm in this respect. 3 guns only were used, the 4th having jammed in the initial firing period.
Superb handling of the situation by the gunner Cpl Thompson.
I was asked to insert comments for the field commander and wrote this:
a. This report is written on behalf of OC FAF 5 at his request.
b. I was operating an area with PRAW pilot Dax. The Alpha K–Car was close at hand at Madziwa Mine with Lynx at immediate readiness at Mtoko.
c. This was another trial at air recce with immediate response, made possible by the need to test Katoog. Previously, recce information would be checked out the day after its attainment. This was failing as terrorists were obviously moving off after recce aircraft cleared the area. The plan on this day was to recce until a suitably fresh camp was located. Upon location the aircraft would remain overhead to keep CTs static and call for K-Car Alpha and the Lynx.
d. When Hamie Dax called, I moved over to him arriving some 4 minutes after K-Car Alpha. I then descended to 400 ft over the helicopter. All six terrorists had been accounted for before arrival of the Lynx, which was only 9 minutes after K-Car Alpha’s first strike.
e. This action by an unsupported helicopter was not intended as the plan was for Lynx to link up with K-Car Alpha before moving to target. However, Squadron Leader Lunt moved quickly and being satisfied with my presence and the closeness of Lynx he proceeded to do battle. This type of action must be avoided in the future by adoption of a more flexible approach by the Fireforce. I am responsible for this situation, as I could have held K- Car Alpha back until the Lynx reached him.
f. Initial representation has been made to COMOPS (Gp Capt Walsh) requesting a follow-up by providing recce with immediate support. However, the potency of the Alpha K-Car is an essential ingredient if good opening results are to be achieved by a small element responding immediately to recce calls.
g. The stereotype employment of Fireforces has not produced acceptable results for over four months, making an altogether more aggressive approach essential. Recce will provide good results if Fireforces are positioned close to an area being covered by one or more recce aircraft; for instance Benecke and Dax. In turn, recce must work on the best intelligence available—as happened in today’s work. Full Fireforce should not be used to make the initial checkout as this is cumbersome and slows down the whole procedure. One K-Car, a G-Car and a Lynx are all that is needed. If an action breaks, the remainder can be brought in at short notice. This system would also allow simultaneous check out on two camps, should the situation arise.
h. Another aspect that bears consideration is identifying specific terrorist leaders or terror groups requiring elimination. In today’s strike we identified the terrorist group we wished to locate. The group was responsible for many actions against Centenary farms and this was having an adverse effect on farmers, their families and workers. The group contacted proved to be the very one we sought. Its leader, with size 10 boots and a frame to match, was amongst those killed.
j. Cost of ammunition expended—a mere $172.80.
