on the stricken Sabre forced National Stores to be dropped from the target list.
Because of its difficulties, the convoy was running late when it turned onto the main tar road to Kafue Bridge and Lusaka. The bridge was considered to be the greatest threat point of the entire mission. But, as it happened, the large Zambian Army protection force that was expected to be there simply did not exist, much to the relief of all concerned, and the convoy continued on to Lusaka without incident.
Whereas the attack on Nkomo’s home was scheduled for 02:00 it went in almost one hour late. Odd hiccups occurred in breaking through Nkomo’s elaborate security ring but these made no difference to the ultimate outcome. Following the elimination of moderate resistance by ZIPRA security guards and the destruction of the house, a thorough search failed to find the unmistakable fat body of Joshua Nkomo.
Considering the efficiency and completeness of the attack, there was great disappointment, even anger, for the SAS operators and the staff at COMOPS. But it was clear to us in COMOPS that Nkomo had been tipped off. The big question was, ‘by whom?’. This issue will be dealt with later. But one thing needs to be said for the benefit of many people who believe that Ken Flower, Director of Central Intelligence, was the mole who gave early warning to Britain and CT leaders. In the case of Nkomo this was not possible. He was in COMOPS the whole time from launch to return of the SAS group. At no stage did he use a telephone of any signalling equipment. I have to say that I have always considered Ken’s number two in CIO to be the more likely culprit.
Not far away the team assigned to Liberation Centre put in its attack the moment they heard firing from Nkomo’s house. Having completed their noisy work and set explosive charges to blow Liberation Centre’s offices, armoury and many vehicles sky high, the team was preparing to depart when a ZIPRA vehicle came charging towards the SAS men. The vehicle was hit by a hail of bullets but careened on down the street and away into the night. The SAS did not know it at the time but they had come very close to killing ZIPRA’s second commander, Lookout Masuku. I will give Masuku’s account of this incident later.
The two task teams then linked up and the convoy travelled back to the rough bush track without incident. Behind them the President of Zambia was red-faced over such a commotion in peaceful Lusaka because it had disturbed the sleep of 300 guests engaged in the OAU Conference he was hosting.
Long after sunrise, the mission commander called for a helicopter to collect three soldiers who had been wounded during the attack on Nkomo’s house. This was to save them the agony of a very bumpy ride down the final tortuous stretch of track to the lake. By midday, the force was back on Sea Lion and the exhausted expedition commander was debriefing us in the COMOPS Op Room by mid-afternoon.
The next day I was surprised to find General Walls, Air Marshal McLaren and Brian Robinson laughing their heads off in the passageway next to Mick’s office. I took this to be normal because Brian was usually very humorous. He saw me and beckoned me to come over to share the joke. No wonder there was such mirth. Brian had brought the news that Nkomo had told reporters he had been at home when the SAS attacked but managed to escape through his toilet window. Anyone hearing or reading this had to be amused by the thought of the enormously fat Nkomo going through an incredibly small window—but the same picture painted in Brian’s words caused us long-forgotten laughter pains.
Kazungula ferry
AT THE SAME TIME THAT the SAS force was moving towards Lusaka, a smaller SAS team was engaged in another clandestine operation. This was at the point where the borders of Rhodesia, Zambia and Botswana meet at Kazungula. The target was the Kazungula ferry owned by Zambia and serving as a vital road link to Botswana across the Zambezi River. For Zambia, it was one of only two active links to Botswana and South Africa, the other being the Victoria Falls rail and road bridge.
Despite Rhodesia’s repeated warnings to both Botswana and Zambia not to allow the ferry to be used for any activity aimed against Rhodesia, ZIPRA was known to be using it freely. Whereas neither Botswana nor Zambia openly sanctioned ZIPRA’s use of the ferry (in fact these two countries forbade it) there was clear proof that ZIPRA was employing clandestine methods to move large amounts of men and equipment into Botswana via Kazungula.
Sneaking men and materiel onto the ferry for the easy road route to Francistown was a much quicker and safer option than walking the long, slow and dangerous overland routes through northern Matabeleland. From Francistown it was a simple enough matter to move to any location in Botswana to launch small forces across the ill-defined border with Rhodesia. JOC Tangent in Bulawayo had repeatedly urged COMOPS to take any action that would put an end to this state of affairs.
COMOPS had been giving consideration to destroying the Kazungula ferry long before Ian Smith warned neighbouring countries, following the Viscount disaster, that they must face the consequences of supporting ZIPRA and ZANLA. In fact a Danish airline that had been flying ZAPU recruits from Botswana to Zambia took the Rhodesian threat to intercept and shoot down its aircraft seriously. The flights ceased immediately; but the ferry remained available.
Whereas it had been considered a simple enough task for SAS specialists to destroy the ferry, the economic consequences of disrupting the route had been assessed as too damaging to South Africa, Botswana, Malawi and Zaire. This all changed when ZIPRA shot down the second Viscount and its invasion plans had become known.
The SAS team moved to the border fence with Botswana after dark. Part of the force eased its way to the ferry’s landing point on the Botswanan shore where it submerged a large explosive charge directly under the position the ferry would dock. The charge was then rigged for a command detonation by radio when the ferry was docked above it.
Well before sunrise on 13 April 1979, all members of the team were hiding next to the border fence inside Rhodesia to wait for the critical moment. Flying out of hearing distance, a Lynx stood by as back-up to the ground party, just in case the ground party’s radio transmission failed to activate the explosive charge. For technical reasons the ferry did not cross the river at its scheduled time of 08:00. It remained on the Zambian bank of the Zambezi for another two agonising hours before setting off for the Botswanan bank where many vehicles and people awaited its arrival.
Considering that there were people to be dropped off on the south bank and others waiting to get onto the ferry, the SAS had a very small time-window in which to blow the ferry when it was empty. This they achieved with a perfectly timed vertical thrust that broke the huge ferry in two.
It was only when the Selous Scouts objected strongly to COMOPS for having destroyed the ferry that I learned how important it had been to undercover agents moving to and from Zambia. Obviously General Walls and others knew this, but ZIPRA’s invasion plans took priority and the ‘need to know’ principle had been strictly applied.
This eventful week rounded off on 21 April when the country went to the polls to vote for its first black government. For some reason, Josiah Tongogara had instructed ZANLA not to interfere with voters and, for the most part, his instruction was heeded. ZIPRA tried to interfere but with limited success and an amazing turnout of 63% of voters occurred. Six weeks later Bishop Abel Muzorewa became the first black prime minister of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.
Cheetahs
