AIR COMMODORE NORMAN WALSH HAD made a secret visit to the Middle East, probably in late 1978, to arrange for the purchase of second-hand Bell 205 helicopters. This helicopter had given excellent service to the Americans in Vietnam where it was known as the ‘Huey’.
Seven of these machines arrived at New Sarum in a somewhat dilapidated state. However, our ever- brilliant technical staff stripped the machines completely, removing many kilograms of sand in the process, and in no time had them spick and span and performing well. This was a particularly noteworthy achievement considering that Warrant Officer Johnny Green and his team had no technical manuals from which to work.
Air HQ gave the Bell 205 helicopter the name ‘Cheetah’ and all seven aircraft passed to No 8 Squadron. Although the Cheetahs were sometimes used on Fireforce work, in which they could carry two Alouettes-worth of troops, they became almost exclusively earmarked to support increasing levels of external operations.
Uncomfortable times in COMOPS
FOR SOME TIME IT HAD been clear that ZAPU and ZANU were receiving forewarning of some of our cross-border operations. It was also clear that the warnings were being given very close to the times of attack. Nkomo’s absence from his home was the last straw. We later learned that the warning had reached him from someone in CIO at about the time the attack force was crossing the Kafue Bridge. Nkomo apparently called for a doubling of the guard before he and his wife moved away to the safety of President Kaunda’s State House. He seemed untroubled by leaving his staff to a fate he failed to warn them about.
Probably prompted by Ron Reid-Daly’s opinions, General Walls made it known that he suspected there was a mole in COMOPS. We were all stunned by this accusation, each considering it a personal affront. The entire staff became very angry that such an opinion existed, never mind that it had been aired in an unnecessarily brazen manner. This occurred immediately after Brigadier Peter Rich was posted in to replace General Barnard as Director General Operations. In discussions with Peter Rich, the COMOPS staff suggested that he should ask General Walls to exclude anyone but COMOPS and the operators from any knowledge of the timings of impending externals. General Walls accepted the idea.
Although CIO and appropriate agencies were always kept in the picture on what was being planned, selected operations were launched earlier than these agencies expected. Every time this was done, we gained maximum surprise because no forewarning to the enemy had been possible via the unknown mole; and General Walls’ trust in his staff was restored.
Unrelated to the mole issue, COMOPS had acquired such a bad reputation amongst Army officers that this made being a member of COMOPS staff distinctly uncomfortable. However with Brigadier Peter Rich as DG OPS, the situation soon changed because COMOPS directives, instructions and queries were all processed through the correct military HQ channels. By mid-year many old tensions had fallen away and co-operation improved noticeably.
When I first joined COMOPS, General Barnard had made some snide remarks about the Air Force taking time off work to suit themselves whilst the Army slogged on. Initially I was perplexed because this could not possibly apply to Norman Walsh, Griff, Dag, Terence or me who regularly worked long hours, seven days a week. Then it dawned on me that his remarks had been aimed at Mick McLaren who played golf every Wednesday afternoon.
Mick McLaren seemed to me to have become a very secluded man who worked quietly in his office on specific tasks and only appeared amongst the planning staff for special operations’ briefings. He attended all the NATJOC meetings chaired by General Walls where he showed irritation over general ramblings and recurring deferrals on matters that needed urgent resolution.
Just before lunch one Wednesday, I was alone with the air marshal in his office when he told me that Wednesday afternoon golf was essential to keep him sane in a job where, in spite of his position as Deputy Commander of COMOPS, he was neither fish nor fowl. He lacked the authority and job satisfaction that he had enjoyed as Air Force Commander.
It was obvious to COMOPS staff that Mick’s disposition has changed radically and his frustration ceased whenever, in the absence of General Walls, he was in charge. On these occasions he played no golf and was to be seen everywhere in COMOPS. His style of dealing with staff was friendly but forceful, and his chairing of NAT JOC meetings was completely opposite to that of General Walls.
Invariably Mick was faced with long lists of matters that had been repeatedly deferred; a situation he could not abide. I attended a few of his NATJOC meetings to give briefings on various matters and witnessed the marked difference in atmosphere to meetings chaired by General Walls. In his strong South African accent, Mick opened one meeting by pointing out that the only establishment represented at NATJOC with no outstanding items was the Air Force. He insisted that this had to be equalled by all establishments before the next meeting.
Deferred subject after deferred subject was addressed directly to the appropriate head, giving the length of time that had elapsed since the matter was first raised, together with all the reasons previously given for deferrals. In most cases Mick offered his personal opinions on resolutions then directed that the matter be cleared immediately or, at the latest, before the next meeting. He concluded by saying “Gentlemen, I want action. Let me emphasise, yet again, that a wrong decision can be turned around or modified, but no decision is inexcusable.”
By the time General Walls returned to chair a NATJOC meeting, no pending matters remained. Unfortunately, however, new subjects needing decisions started to pile up; and Mick returned to playing golf every Wednesday afternoon.
So far as I was able to judge from general opinion amongst COMOPS officers and those in Army, Air Force and Police HQs, Rhodesia’s forces would have been better off with Mick McLaren as the supremo and Brigadier Peter Rich as his Director-General of Operations. Under such leadership, COMOPS would have fulfilled the purpose for which it was created, and correctly handled directives and instructions would have been dealt with in a manner that avoided the unnecessary antagonisms and mistrust that had been created.
Black government
THE ADVENT OF CHANGE FROM white government to a black majority government had little effect on the management and execution of military aspects of our war—we continued as before. It seemed strange however to have Bishop Abel Muzorewa attending meetings in COMOPS in place of Ian Smith. This dapper little man wearing a dark suit, dog collar on purple clerical vest and outlandish black and white Mafia-styled shoes was very different to the PM we had all come to know well. In his hand, Muzorewa carried a colourful beaded stick that was to be his personal hallmark in the manner of President Kaunda’s white handkerchief and President Kenyatta’s bull-tail switch. Apart from the PM, I only had personal dealings with one black minister.
Minister Francis Zindonga was thickset and enormously pleased with his newfound authority. He had already proven himself to be the only politician with the guts to go into troubled areas to address the tribal folk and tell them about the principles and thoughts of the new government. He had gained a good reputation at COMOPS before I accompanied him to meet white ranchers in the Nuanetsi District Commissioner’s offices in the southern lowveld.
