stands out. For analysis, David Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East, 1941 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), is balanced and reader-friendly. Most detailed, albeit principally from a German perspective, is Horst Boog et al., Germany and the Second World War, vol. 4, The Attack on the Soviet Union, trans. Ewald Osers et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). David M. Glantz, Barbarossa Derailed: The Battle for Smolensk, 10 July–10 September 1941, 2 vols. (Solihull, UK: Helion & Co., 2011–12), is exhaustingly superlative on the tactical/operational dynamics of combat in a crucial sector and time frame. Alex J. Kay et al., eds., Nazi Policy on the Eastern Front: Total War, Genocide, and Radicalization (Rochester, NY: Rochester University Press, 2012), is an anthology of well-executed case studies.
2 Hitler issued Directive 41 The basic outline of Operation Blue is reprinted in Walther Hubatsch, ed., Hitlers Weisungen fur die Kriegfuhrung (Frankfurt: Bernard & Graefe, 1962), pp. 183–191.
3 A secondary objective was Stalingrad For a strategic/operational overview of the Stalingrad campaign, the best combination of narrative and analysis is Robert M. Citino, Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007). Joel S. A. Hayward, Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler’s Defeat in the East, 1942–1943 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), complements Citino’s ground-oriented presentation. Bernd Wegner, “The War Against the Soviet Union,” in Horst Boog et al., Germany and the Second World War, vol. 6, The Global War, trans. Ewald Osers et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 853–1158, is also essential.
4 Expected the Germans to attack For the general background of Soviet strategic planning, see most recently Peter Mezhiritsky, On the Precipice: Stalin, the Red Army Leadership and the Road to Stalingrad, 1931–1942, trans. Stuart Britton (Solihull, UK: Helion & Co., 2012).
5 A major offensive to recapture the city of Kharkov For Kharkov’s genesis and outcome, David M. Glantz, Kharkov 1942: Anatomy of a Military Disaster Through Soviet Eyes (Shepperton, UK: Ian Allan Publishing, 1998), synergizes a Soviet staff study with the editor’s consistently perceptive comments. Hans Doerr, “Der Ausgang der Schlacht um Charkow im Fruhjahr 1942,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 4, no. 1 (January 1954): 9–18, much more cursory, is by the then chief of staff of a corps heavily involved in the battle.
6 Ivan was still no match for Hitler’s panzers The persistent and often cited German pattern of underrating its Soviet opponent is highlighted in this context by Christian Hartmann, Halder: Generalstabschef Hitlers, 1938–1942 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 1991), pp. 318–319.
7 Not mere counterattacks David M. Glantz offers the best account in any language: “Forgotten Battles of the German-Soviet War (1941–1945),” part 7, “The Summer Campaign, 12 May–8 November 1942: Voronezh, July 1942,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 14, no. 3 (2001): 150– 220.
8 Increasing division and diversion For a relatively brief overview of the development of the Stalingrad operation, see Wegner, “War Against the Soviet Union,” in The Global War, pp. 958–990. David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, To the Gates of Stalingrad: Soviet-German Combat Operations, April–August 1942 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009), and Armageddon in Stalingrad: September–November 1942 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009), go deeper into the details. Antony Beevor, Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, 1942– 1943 (London: Penguin Books, 1998), antedates the academic titans but is no less intellectually worthy—and a less demanding introduction for general readers.
9 Operation Mars David M. Glantz is definitive on this little-known operation, analyzing Rzhev in Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat: The Red Army’s Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999).
10 First step in restoring the maneuver warfare For Manstein’s decision making, see his memoir Lost Victories: The War Memoirs of Hitler’s Most Brilliant General (London: Methuen & Co., 1958), pp. 297–303. Mungo Melvin, Manstein: Hitler’s Greatest General (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2010), pp. 287–307, is the most balanced analysis. The best critical treatment is Heinz Magenheimer, Stalingrad (Selent, Germany: Pour le Merite– Verlag fur Militargeschichte, 2007).
11 Encouraged Stavka to go a stage further David M. Glantz, After Stalingrad: The Red Army’s Winter Offensive, 1942–43 (Solihull, UK: Helion & Co., 2009), presents the Soviet perspective. Dana V. Sadarananda, Beyond Stalingrad: Manstein and the Operations of Army Group Don (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1990), is economical for the other side of the front. Eberhard Schwarz, Die Stabilisierung der Ostfront nach Stalingrad: Mansteins Gegenschlag zwischen Donez und Dnjeper im Fruhjahr 1943 (Gottingen: Muster-Schmidt, 1985), is based on the records of Manstein’s army group. Robert M. Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats: Fighting a Lost War, 1943 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2012), pp. 41–74, is excellent on “the limits of command” in the context of Manstein’s counterstroke.
12 “Miracle” … “genius” Melvin, Manstein, pp. 344–346, summarizes Manstein’s performance from the perspective of a general officer and an accomplished historian.
13 Process of recovering from two disconnects For the Red Army’s internal dynamic, see Roger R. Reese, Stalin’s Reluctant Soldiers: A Social History of the Red Army, 1925–1941 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996), and Red Commanders: A Social History of the Soviet Army Officer Corps, 1918–1991 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), pp. 12–134. Mark von Hagen, Soldiers in the Proletarian Dictatorship: The Red Army and the Soviet Socialist State, 1917–1930 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), covers the ideological aspects; David R. Stone, Hammer and Rifle: The Militarization of the Soviet Union, 1926–1933 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), is excellent on the nearly disastrous distorting effects of excessive military production.
14 Ripple effects David M. Glantz, Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), is once again the best beginning for these developments.
15 War was not a contingency Richard W. Harrison, The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904–1940 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), is the best presentation of this process. Mary R. Habeck, Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919–1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), is an excellent comparative analysis from a technical perspective. Sally W. Stoecker, Forging Stalin’s Army: Marshal Tukhachevsky and the Politics of Military Innovation (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), addresses the high-level infighting when the stakes were literally mortal.
16 Rebuilding virtually from the ground up Steven J. Zaloga and Leland S. Ness, Red Army Handbook 1939–1945 (Stroud, UK: Sutton, 1998), is good for the details of reorganization and rearmament.
17 Depended on perspective Boris Gorbachevsky, Through the Maelstrom: A Red Army Soldier’s War on the Eastern Front, 1942–1945, trans. and ed. Stuart Britton (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), pp. 108–113.
18 “Into the chopping machine” Ibid., p. 130.
19 Eviscerated in a matter of weeks On this point, cf. David Porter, Soviet Tank Units, 1939–45 (London: Amber Books, 2009), and Steven J. Zaloga and James Grandsen, Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War Two (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1984).
20 Unpleasant tactical surprises See, for example, the reports from this period abstracted in Thomas L. Jentz, ed., Panzertruppen: The Complete Guide to the Creation & Combat Employment of Germany’s Tank Force, 1933–1942, vol. 2 (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1996), pp. 21–46.
