Armor and Blood

4, Panzerarmee, Chefnotizen fur, 9.7.1943, National Archives T-313, roll 369.

4 No aircraft could be spared The improving performance of the Soviet air force also drew off German planes. Cf. Hardesty and Grinberg, Red Phoenix Rising, pp. 254–255; Bergstrom, Kursk: The Air Battle, pp. 67–69.

5 Hoth’s original concept Fangohr, “Fourth Panzer Army,” in Kursk: The German View, pp. 77–80.

6 Order No. 4 … was ambiguous “Panzerarmeebefehl Nr. 4, 20.20 Uhr., 8.7.1943,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, pp. 69–70.

7 Breith had to clear his own sector Lodieu, III. Pz. Korps, pp. 58–73; Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 211–212.

8 Knobelsdorff initially responded Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, pp. 125–127; Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 142–144; Healy, Zitadelle, pp. 290–291; Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 216–219.

9 Hausser’s orders “Korps-Befehl fur den Angriff am 9.7.1943,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, p. 71.

10 Leibstandarte advanced Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 192–211, is exhaustive; Healy, Zitadelle, pp. 294–296, is a more economical overview.

11 Confirming major armor movements “Feindlage 9.7.1943, Stand 19.00 Uhr.,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, pp. 79–80.

12 July 9 was a long day Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 138–140.

13 2nd Tank Corps Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 185– 186.

14 Fourth Panzer Army had received a maximum effort Bergstrom, Kursk: The Air Battle, pp. 67–69; Hardesty and Grinberg, Red Phoenix Rising, pp. 247–248, 251–253.

15 Time had come to throw the switch The most detailed analysis of this issue is Newton, “Hoth, von Manstein, and Prokhorovka,” in Kursk: The German View, pp. 358– 369.

16 Sometime between noon and 1:30 Ibid., pp. 368, 452.

17 Army Order No. 5 “Panzerarmeebefehl Nr. 5, 20:30, 9.7.1943,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, p. 79.

18 Loss/recovery/repair figures Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 351–352; Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 117–118.

19 Citadel’s outcome depended on using XXIV Panzer Corps Manstein, Verlorene Siege, p. 501.

20 Came closest to enabling a meaningful breakout Cf. particularly Newton, Kursk: The German View, p. 369.

21 Avoid a simple battle of attrition Robert Forczyk, Sevastopol 1942: Von Manstein’s Triumph (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008), is a solid, brief, accessible overview.

22 Hoth’s trump card Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, pp. 127– 128; Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 153–157; Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 270–275.

23 Visible through binoculars Carell, Scorched Earth, p. 72.

24 The 11th Panzer Division spent July 11 Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 301–303.

25 Guderian … had been recalled See Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 303, and his July 17, 1943, “Report on the Operations of Panzer-Regiment (Panther) von Lauchert,” in Jentz, Panzertruppen, vol. 2, pp. 98–99.

26 Material reason for optimism Guderian, “Operations of PanzerRegiment (Panther) von Lauchert,” p. 99; Zetterling and Frankson, Kursk 1943, p. 123.

27 He did some serious thinking Given the absence of a general written plan, Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 258–263, is the clearest reconstruction of Voronezh Front’s decision-making processes at this juncture.

28 Citadel in reverse Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats, p. 212, and the comprehensive bibliographic analysis on pp. 345–346. For strategic context and operational concept, see Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 227–234.

29 If the Germans broke into Voronezh Front’s rear areas Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, p. 262.

30 Necessary to inform Stavka Ibid., pp. 263–268; Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 159–161.

31 Rotmistrov’s Guardsmen were the key English-language versions of Rotmistrov’s account of the meeting are in Armstrong, Red Army Tank Commanders, pp. 247–348, and Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 268–269.

32 Met with Rotmistrov’s corps commanders Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 269–270.

33 Nearly blitzkrieg-level standard Ibid., pp. 270–278.

34 Hausser’s final orders “Auftrage an die Divisionen fur 10.7.1943,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, pp. 81–82.

35 Leibstandarte’s attack Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 254–291; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 183–187, 192.

36 Checked by a Guards heavy tank regiment Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 192–193.

37 Orders were to force a crossing “Auftraege an die Divisionen fur 10.7.1943,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, p. 83.

38 The weather and the Russians Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 263–268; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 187–189.

39 “Bitter fighting” “18.00 Uhr. von Div. ‘Totenkopf,’” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, p. 88.

40 Holding its positions as ordered Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 260–262.

41 Hausser reported to Hoth “19.25 Uhr. Tagesmeldung an Armee,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, pp. 88–89.

42 Seems to have encouraged Hoth “20:30 Uhr. Tagesmeldung der Armee,” in ibid., pp. 89–90; Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, p. 281.

43 A five-hundred-yard mudflat Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 292–293.

44 Leibstandarte was on its own Ibid., pp. 281–285.

45 Russian situation brightened around dawn Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 167–168.

46 His real message Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 208–209.

47 Leibstandarte had to provide its own flank security Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 285–290; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 214–226.

48 Prokhorovka remained just out of German reach Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 235–241.