Armor and Blood

49 Leibstandarte blamed what it called limited success “16.40 bis 17.00 Uhr. Tagesmeldungen der Divisionen Leibstandarte” and “Auftrag des II. SS-Pz.-Korps fur 12.7,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, pp. 95, 97–98.

50 A long, hard day in the mud Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 292–297.

51 Das Reich spent most of July 11 “16.40 bis 17.00 Uhr. Tagesmeldungen der Divisionen. Das Reich” and “17.30 Uhr. Tagesmeldung an der Armee,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, pp. 96, 97–98.

52 The Russians were explaining defeat Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 231–234.

53 Rotmistrov’s counterattack Rotmistrov’s account in his memoirs is translated in Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 175–176.

54 Revised the details of their tactical plan Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 278–279.

CHAPTER VI: HARD POUNDING

1 Klotzen, nicht kleckern “Auftrag II.SS-Pz.-Korps fur 12.7,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, pp. 97–98; Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 314–316; Rudolf Lehmann, The Leibstandarte, vol. III, trans. Nick Olcott (Winnipeg: J. J. Fedorowicz, 1990), p. 233.

2 Three panzer divisions’ worth of shovels Lodieu, III. Pz. Korps, pp. 74–81; Healy, Zitadelle, pp. 308–309; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 250–252.

3 Manstein … met with Hoth and Kempf General of Infantry Theodor Busse, “Operation Citadel Overview,” in Kursk: The German View , pp. 22–23; Raus, Panzer Operations , pp. 207–208; Manstein, Verlorene Siege, p. 500.

4 Rapid intervention of III Panzer Corps Lodieu, III. Pz. Korps, pp. 92–103; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 252–255.

5 Citadel’s forgotten divisions Lodieu, III. Pz. Korps, pp. 87– 88, 90–91, 96–100.

6 Immer bereit, still zu verbluten im feldgrauen Kleid “Ihr Musstet Marschieren,” Frank Rennicke’s tribute to Germany’s World War II infantry, is one of the signature songs of Germany’s contemporary Far Right. That does not diminish the occasionally powerful effect of its images.

7 “Asians” The “Description of Combat Operations of the 19th Panzer Division Between 5 July and 18 July 1943” is cited in Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, p. 252.

8 Rolled into Olkhovatka Lodieu, III. Pz. Korps, p. 96.

9 The commanding general … concurred Manstein, Verlorene Siege, p. 500; Melvin, Manstein, p. 376.

10 According to Hoth’s chief of staff Fangohr, “Fourth Panzer Army,” in Kursk: The German View, pp. 89–90.

11 Sixty-ninth Army had managed Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, p. 163.

12 A high-risk, high-gain nighttime operation Described eloquently in Carell, Scorched Earth, pp. 84–86 passim, and more soberly in Franz Kurowski, Panzer Aces: Battle Stories of German Tank Commanders of WWII, trans. David Johnston (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2004), pp. 52–54. The Russian side of the story is told in Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 402–407.

13 They mistook the Germans for Russians Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, p. 419; Bergstrom, Kursk: The Air Battle, p. 79. The truck carrying the air liaison officer had broken down during the advance, breaking the division’s air–ground link as well.

14 “Where was everybody else?” “KTB. Tagesmeldung III. Panzer-korps am 12.7.1943,” National Archives, T-314, roll 197; Klink, Gesetz des Handelns, pp. 243–244; Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 314–315; Lodieu, III. Pz. Korps, pp. 103–109 passim; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 407–426 passim; Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 202–204.

15 Unexpectedly successful advance Lodieu, III. Pz. Korps, pp. 115–116; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, p. 406.

16 Stalin … issued orders to Steppe Front Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 409–410.

17 About two hundred tanks Ibid., p. 410.

18 Dispatch a strong force Ibid., p. 413.

19 Trufanov’s fire brigade arrived in increments Ibid., pp. 419–423.

20 “Introduce the strictest discipline” Ibid., pp. 425, 486–487. An English translation of the “Order for the National Commissar for the Defense of the Soviet Union, July 28, 1942” is accessible on the Internet at http://www.stalingrad-info.com and independently under “Order 227.”

21 Vasilevsky informed Stalin Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, p. 426.

22 Providing the muscle for the straight right-hand punch Ibid., pp. 204–205.

23 Grossdeutschland’s sideways shuffle For the confusing events of July 12 in this sector, cf. “KTB: Darstellung der Erignsse XLVIII Panzer-Korps am 12.7.1943,” National Archives, T-314, roll 1170; “XLVIII Panzerkorps Tagesmeldungen an Pz.AOK, 12.7.1943,” National Archives, T-314, roll 1171; the published material in Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, pp. 129–130; Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, 224; Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 202–208; and Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 351–353.

24 The corps commander failed Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 430–431.

25 “Temporarily compelled … to withdraw” Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, p. 130; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 432–434.

26 He could no longer advance Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 430, 434.

27 More cobbler than blacksmith Cf. Armstrong, Red Army Tank Commanders, pp. 94–95.

28 Shifting to a defensive posture Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, p. 130.

29 Manstein appeared at corps headquarters Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, p. 353.

30 Knobelsdorff’s eventual orders Ibid., p. 353; Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, pp. 126–128.

31 Swan song of the panzers Ivan S. Konev, Aufzeichnungen eines Frontoberbefehlshabers 1943/44, trans. Irmgard Zeisler, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Militarverlag der DDR, 1983), p. 43.

32 Leibstandarte and Das Reich were kept awake Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 315–317.

33 Rotmistrov’s tankers were no less nervous Cf. the accounts in Zamulin,