Two more rounds had bounced off the Tiger when its turret began to rotate toward the flank as the panzer commander sought out his tormenters. The tank killers saw their opening and put three quick shots through the less-armored side of the Mark VI’s turret. A hulking derelict now completely blocked the road, and the M10s engaged the panzers strung out in the column behind the Tiger.
When the Germans withdrew from the hopeless fight, they left behind two Tigers and five Mark IVs, all credited to the guns of 2d Platoon.43
In the neighboring British sector, the M10s of the 894th maintained such a high rate of fire that crews worried rounds would begin to “cook off” when shoved in the breech because of the heat. Corporal Arthur Wiest of Company C recalled the Southerners in the battalion whooping rebel yells as they fired machine guns at charging German infantry.44
On the night of 19–20 February, C/701st moved into positions along the Albano–Anzio road to relieve Company A. The last German attack struck the men at the overpass at dawn on 20 February. Seventy-two British 25-pounders—the major commanding had earlier set up a telephone link to Hudson’s positions—delivered a barrage that broke up the attack.45 (Indeed, seventy-five percent of all German casualties during the failed offensive were caused by Allied artillery.)46 Two platoons from Company C joined tanks from the 1st Armored Division in conducting a reconnaissance-in-force against German positions. The TDs engaging German armor in the vicinity of Terre di Padiglione destroyed one Mark IV and one Tiger in exchange for two damaged but salvageable M10s.47 The probe also destroyed two battered German infantry battalions.48
The German offensive was over. On 22 February, Lucas was replaced by MajGen Lucian Truscott Jr.
Anzio became a siege, a violent stalemate differentiated only by occasional offensive jabs by one side or the other. These were at times vigorous: The crews of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion KO’d twenty-five panzers and SP guns during one local thrust in late February.49
The Germans could survey and shell the entire beachhead, so the Allies hid by day and moved by night. (LtCol Harrison King, commanding the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, was critically wounded on 25 March when a shell fired not by the Germans but by the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion struck a branch over the heads of his party, killing or wounding several men.)50 Yet the Allies steadily added to their assets ashore. Over the longer run, the Germans had no hope of matching this build-up.
Tank destroyers by and large reverted to the artillery role. The British now dubbed the men from the 894th who were providing them with indirect-fire support the “house-busters.”51 But a few platoons from each battalion were always at the front to provide antitank defense and close support for tactical operations. One day, Sgt Bill Harper’s platoon from the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion was dug in near some buildings at Isola Bella, while the Germans were dug in a few short yards away on the far side. Ordnance radioed forward and requested the serial number of Harper’s gun. Harper’s radio operator asked whether Ordnance wanted the number on the breech block or the one on the gun barrel, and was told the latter. The radioman replied that the fellow from Ordnance could come forward and get that number himself because it was in enemy territory.52
Reconnaissance Company from the 601st held part of the line at the edge of no-man’s land. The men learned quickly to discern the difference between the
The TD commanders experimented with new ways of doing business in the confined and flat bridgehead. The 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, for example, deployed two gun companies on the line and kept the third in reserve to fire indirect missions. The forward TDs were thus able to call for and receive effective and almost immediate artillery support. The tank killers also learned to position their M10s behind sturdy buildings. Although they had no immediate field of fire (a violation of doctrine!), the destroyers needed to move only a few feet to acquire enemy targets. The Germans adapted, however, and began to zero in their AT guns on the corners of buildings that they suspected of harboring tank destroyers. This, in turn, allowed the Americans to spot and destroy some of the AT guns.54
The tank killers found new ways to use their well liked M10s more effectively. The crews began to add a covering of thick timbers and sandbags to the open turrets of their M10s when they were in positions in or beside a building, which gave them both protection and camouflage. (Later in Western Europe, when engagements with German tanks were more frequent, crews learned to cover the turrets only when in defensive positions. The open turret allowed the men to bail out quickly when the vehicle was hit—a great worry among crewmen in Sherman tank turrets who had to escape through a single hatch.) Some even built custom metal turret tops with hinged doors; the 804th Tank Destroyer Battalion, for example, fashioned covers out of wrecked halftracks and simply discarded them when the TDs had to move.55 The crews learned to run their engines only at night so as not to expose their positions. The men had to start the engines for thirty minutes per day to recharge the battery, which suffered a constant drain from the radio because the M10 lacked the small “Little Joe” generator motor found in tanks. The crews also found that sandbags reduced the radiator’s vulnerability to shrapnel and added to the protection afforded by the frontal armor.56
Some outfits took advantage of the relative inaction to establish schools for various specialties. The 894th put every man in the battalion through a course on laying, detecting, and removing antipersonnel and antitank mines. Some learned to drive M10s, while others took courses on diesel mechanics, mortars, wire communications, and repair of the 3-inch gun.57
Checked at Cassino
The landings at Anzio accomplished, Major General Clark on 23 January visited his three corps commanders and urged them to step up efforts to crack the Gustav Line and link up with the beachhead.58 The Americans needed to drive up the Liri Valley to accomplish this mission. The keys to the German defenses were the Cassino massif, the town of Cassino, and the Benedictine Abbey that brooded over the valley from the mountainside.
The 34th Infantry Division launched the first attack toward the objective the night of 24 January. The rest of II Corps, the French Expeditionary Corps, and British 10 Corps entered the fray over the next several days, but progress was minimal. On 31 January, Company C of the 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion entered battle in support of the tankers of the 756th Tank Battalion, who in turn fought beside the doughs of the 34th Infantry Division still struggling to consolidate the crossing of the Rapido River southeast of Cassino.
The first American troops reached the outskirts of Cassino on 3 February. The Germans fought back skillfully from the thick-walled buildings, and the Americans withdrew. The 34th Infantry Division launched another major attempt to take the town on 7 February. This time, the TDs from the 776th crawled into town to support the tanks and doughs.59 Street fighting was a rare and unwelcome experience for the TD crews in Italy, mainly because the streets in Italian towns were usually so narrow that armor could not operate. The 3-inch gun, as it turned out, was particularly effective against German pillboxes and fortified houses.60
In the northwest corner of Cassino, the infantry asked a TD platoon commander to knock out a 50mm gun the Germans had placed in the third floor of a building. The only catch was that American doughs were already on the first floor. The tank destroyer commander crossed his fingers, put four rounds into the structure, knocked out the gun, and never scratched a doughboy.61
During the day, a Company C M10 destroyed the battalion’s first enemy tank of the Italian campaign. This was four-and-a-half months after battalion had entered the fray—a vignette that underscored the fact that the TD crews were fighting a war that bore little resemblance to the one envisioned in their doctrine.
But the Germans held on. The 34th Infantry Division had been bled white, so a newly created provisional
