corps consisting of the 2d New Zealand Division and the 4th Indian Division moved into the line to take another crack at Cassino.
On 15 February, American bombers struck the Benedictine abbey on Monte Cassino after a soul-searching discussion within the Allied chain of command had concluded that the action was necessary to support the New Zealand Corps offensive. Second Corps artillery added to the destructive bombardment,62 and the M10s of B/636th contributed several concentrations of 3-inch fire into the rubble late in the afternoon.63 The ruins, in the event, provided superb defensive positions to the Germans.
The fighting around Cassino once again demonstrated that tank destroying was a relatively safe occupation as compared with those of the rifleman and tanker. Infantry divisions were ground down to the size of regiments. During February, the 636th Tank Destroyer battalion lost only two men killed and seven wounded, all to German artillery fire. The casualties, however, included much of the command group who were in the battalion CP when it took a direct hit on 12 February.64
On 16 March, a flight of B-25 bombers dropped their load on the positions of C/636th (now attached to CCB/1st Armored Division), which were located behind the front line near Cassino. Thanks to the crews’ now habitual construction of elaborate foxholes and dugouts near their vehicles, only one man was so badly wounded that he required evacuation. At least the American attack provided a break from the frequent German air strikes along the front.65
More than a month after the destruction of the abbey, the Allies were still trying to capture Cassino—the town itself having now been treated to a massive air bombardment, as well. On 15 March, the New Zealanders launched another effort to clear the town. By 21 March, both they and the Indian troops trying to clear the mountainside were exhausted, and Allied commanders were debating whether to abandon the assault.66
That day, Brigadier Burrows, commanding the 5th New Zealand Armored Brigade, asked 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion CO LtCol Van Pyland whether it would be possible to lay fire safely within two hundred yards of friendly troops. The conventional wisdom was that the 3-inch gun had too flat a trajectory to fire close to friendly positions. Pyland, however, said it could be done because his guns were registered on a building very near the spot Burrows wanted to hit. The 636th ran a telephone line to the Kiwi CP and made plans.
The next day, from 1100 to 1245, Pyland personally directed fire into the Continental Hotel in Cassino. An American officer in a tank near the Continental Hotel helped adjust the fire.67
Pyland now discovered the hazards of supporting Allied troops who had even less knowledge of TD doctrine than American commanders. On 23 March, he received orders via CCB to send four M10s into Cassino to “knock down some buildings and drive enemy tanks out.” Pyland objected that this idea ran against every principle of tank destroyer tactics. CCB passed the buck and told Pyland to take the matter up with General Parkinson, CG of the New Zealand Division. Parkinson reiterated his orders, so Pyland and his operations officer (S-3) drove to the Kiwi headquarters, where Pyland met with Brigadier Burrows to coordinate the operation—and in all likelihood repeated his opinions on the matter. Some time later, CCB notified the 636th that the plan had been scrubbed.68
Once again, the Allies failed to capture Cassino. And the rains fell.
An End to Stalemate
In the early hours of 11 May, Capt Richard Danzi, 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion S-3, met with the commanders of the line companies and passed them fire mission orders. Men made ready. Night fell, warm and misty. It was so still that Sgt Tom Sherman could hear dogs barking on the far side of the Liri Valley.69
At 2300 hours, the M10s of the 636th and 804th Tank Destroyer battalions joined the cacophony of 155mm Long Toms, 105mm howitzers, and 75mm tank guns throwing HE rounds at the German defenses of the Gustav Line.
The crews in the 804th had only entered the line in the Cassino sector along the Garigliano River in March and engaged in artillery duels with the enemy. Now, doughs of the 88th Infantry Division advanced with the tank destroyers in close support. The M10s blasted machine gun nests and other strongpoints. Recon men roamed ahead, spotting German positions and clearing mines. The battalion nonetheless had two TDs damaged by mines.70
By 15 May, the Gustav Line had collapsed.
That same day, the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion was pulled from the II Corps line for transfer to the Anzio beachhead, where it arrived on 19 May. Feverish preparations were underway there, and the battalion was immediately broken up. Company B was attached to the 1st Armored Division and further subordinated to the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion. Company A was assigned to the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion in support of the 3d Infantry Division. Each TD company received an extra M10 to use as a command vehicle. On 23 May, Company A of the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion was attached to the depleted 636th.71
At 0545 hours on 23 May, a tremendous artillery preparation rained down on German lines. At 0630 hours, the breakout from Anzio—Operation Buffalo—kicked off.72 The 3d Infantry and 1st Armored divisions made up the main assault force, supported by a limited advance by the 45th Infantry Division and diversionary attacks by the British.
Cracking the prepared German defenses was costly for the 3d Infantry Division, which suffered 1,626 battle casualties on the first day, the highest one-day toll paid by any American division in Europe during the war. But by late on 24 May, the offensive had advanced a dozen miles, and the doughs of the 3d Division had taken their first main objective, Cisterna.73 The first phase was an infantry struggle, although the crews of the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion—working closely with the infantry-support tanks—helped when they could by engaging strongpoints, guns, and tanks.74
Vast minefields resulting from months of siege warfare proved to be the greatest danger to the tank destroyers during the breakout. The 601st lost four M10s destroyed and ten damaged to mines (plus two TDs damaged by shellfire)—half the battalion’s strength. Casualties, particularly among drivers, were unusually heavy as a consequence.75
To the left of the 3d Infantry Division, the 1st Armored Division’s CCA blew holes through the German minefields with snakes—long, explosive-filled tubes—and crashed through the enemy line. A platoon of A/701st Tank Destroyer Battalion TDs and one of engineers accompanied each tank company to provide close support. As the armored force approached its objective—high ground beyond a railroad line—Cpl John Conlin spotted two Tigers rolling along a slope. He got a “lightning draw” on them, and his gunner put a 3-inch round neatly alongside the barrel of each 88mm gun. Both turrets locked because of the damage, and Conlin pounded the panzers with HE rounds until they caught fire. Informed over the radio that a counterattack by twenty-five Tigers was expected, Conlin’s company commander, Capt John Wright, called back, “Make that twenty-three. I’ve just knocked out two.” The company lost five men wounded, two M10s knocked out by mines, and one M10 destroyed by antitank fire.76
Lieutenant Arthur Edson, just transferred to take command of C/701st Tank Destroyer Battalion, had worse luck. CCB/1st Armored Division relied on riflemen instead of snakes to clear the mines. During the long siege, American troops had laid mines on top of mines, and the minesweepers did not discover the lower layers. When the heavy armored vehicles gradually compressed the earth, they detonated the lower layers and suffered the loss of twenty-three tanks and eight M10s from Company C. The command nevertheless reached its objective by nightfall. By then, Company A had KO’d eight panzers, and Company C scored two.77
On 24 May, a German Tiger tank battalion counterattacked the 157th Infantry Regiment, 45th Infantry Division, and all but wiped out one platoon of Company B. An unidentified TD element (possibly M10s from B/894th Tank Destroyer Battalion, which was attached to the 645th in support of the 45th Infantry Division) engaged the
