Mark VIs; 3-inch fire penetrated two of them and exploded their ammo. Artillery fire drove off the rest. The official U.S. Army history makes no mention of the role played by the TDs in beating off this attack, but the doughs said the TDs had saved the day.78
Lieutenant John Hudson, just appointed “Ace” Edson’s exec, was riding in one of his M10s in place of an injured crewman when he spotted a Tiger as it poked its nose out of a barn. As the Mark VI pulled into full view, shaking off loose hay, the Americans could see that bales of hay were wired to the hull to provide very effective camouflage. Hudson told the gunner to fire his newly replaced 3-inch gun—so new that the red Ordnance tag was still on it. But the gun would not fire.
A hasty inspection revealed that there was no firing pin! Hudson ordered the crew to install the replacement pin from the on-board kit and aimed machine-gun fire at the panzer. The tracers set the hay ablaze, and the Mark VI backed slowly through the barn trailing flames and a one-hundred-foot column of smoke. Later in the day, the crew encountered a smoke-charred Tiger with hay around its exploded gas tank, but they could not tell for certain that it was the same vehicle.79
On 25 May, the southern front linked up with the beachhead. The men of the 701st by 26 May had been credited with destroying twenty-one German tanks, three self-propelled guns, and assorted antitank and artillery pieces during the breakout so far.80
The 36th Infantry Division came into the line from reserve positions and by 28 May was knocking at the door of the strategic town of Velletri. Recon men of the 805th Tank Destroyer Battalion—the towed-gun outfit’s companies had been parceled out to reinforce self-propelled TD battalions—were working with the division. During the morning, Lt Arpod Sabo and his 1st Platoon spotted two Tiger tanks that refused to be drawn into the line of fire of nearby TDs. Arpod grabbed three soldiers and a bazooka and went after them. He sidled close to the first huge tank and fired three rockets into the thick frontal armor, but none penetrated. The frustrated lieutenant clambered to the turret top and blazed away with his carbine through a hatch. He killed every man but the driver, who backed the tank to safety—minus Arpod, who jumped free.81
It was 29 May, and one battalion of the 168th Infantry Regiment, 34th Infantry Division, had launched two assaults on German trenches near Villa Crocetta, only to be driven back each time. The infantry battalion S-3, Capt William Galt, volunteered to lead one more attack against the objective. When the sole surviving tank destroyer from a platoon of Company C, 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion, allegedly refused to go forward, Captain Galt jumped on the M10 and ordered it to precede the attack. As the tank destroyer advanced, followed by a company of riflemen, Galt manned the machine gun on the turret, located and directed fire on an enemy 77mm antitank gun, and destroyed it. Nearing the enemy positions, Galt stood fully exposed in the turret, firing his machine gun and tossing hand grenades into the zigzag trenches despite the hail of sniper and machine-gun bullets ricocheting off the tank destroyer. As the tank destroyer moved, Galt so maneuvered it that forty of the enemy were trapped in one trench. When they refused to surrender, the captain pressed the trigger of the machine gun and dispatched every one of them. A few minutes later an 88mm shell struck the tank destroyer and Galt fell mortally wounded across his machine gun. He had personally killed forty Germans and wounded many more.
Captain Galt was awarded the Medal of Honor. Every man in the M10—themselves credited with killing forty German soldiers—died, and they did not even receive mention in their own battalion’s history.82
The informal history of the 601st probably spoke for many other TD outfits at this point: “The 601 that broke out of the Anzio beachhead was a tough, experienced, battle-hardened, confident battalion. The men had “got” forty-three Kraut tanks on the beachhead for the loss of three, and they weren’t afraid of anything the Kraut had, or made, or manned. They’d knocked out his IVs and VIs and his Panthers and his Ferdinands, and they were going to get to Rome if they had to put wings on the M10s and fly ‘em there!”83
Rome!
While all roads may lead to Rome, American troops in Italy cared about only two.
M10s from Company B, 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion, on 4 June were at the point of the 13th Armored Regiment’s column, pressing toward Rome up Highway 6. The column plowed through several German delaying positions and entered Rome at 0715 hours. Company B’s Charles Kessler recalled, “My tank destroyer rolled past a large ‘Roma’ sign marking the city limits and on into the capital. Ahead of me were five Sherman tanks and two TDs. Behind were the entire Fifth and Eighth armies. We had not gone two hundred yards into the city when a monster 170mm German self-propelled gun opened fire. The lead M4 burst into flame, and the rest of us deployed off the road. The enemy gun was well hidden, and it was several hours before we flanked and destroyed the SP gun.”84
Company C/636th, meanwhile, was carrying doughs of the 141st Infantry Regiment, 36th Infantry Division, and spearheaded the advance up Highway 7. The column received orders to cross the Tiber River and establish defensive positions on roads departing Rome for the north. As the M10s rolled into the city, they encountered three Tigers deployed to place overlapping fire on a key intersection. One platoon was sent toward the right to swing around the panzers. While weaving through the maze of streets, the tank killers ran into three Panthers. Guns blazed in both directions. One Mark V took a direct hit, and the other two withdrew.85
Ellis Force, consisting of A/636th; elements of the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron, 143rd Infantry Regiment; and the 751st and 753d Tank battalions, advanced up a secondary road between Highways 6 and 7. Recon Sgt Tom Sherman was ordered to lead a platoon of M10s forward to deal with an SP gun menacing Highway 7 at the entrance to Rome. Sherman was amazed to find the road blocked by a gaggle of rear-echelon types who had raced ahead to grab choice housing for their units. The major in charge did not want to let the TDs get by. He remained obstinate even when M10 crewmen called out suggesting that he and his men take care of the SP gun themselves. Sherman finally suggested he would report this to “Colonel”—normally known as Lieutenant—James Graham, Company A’s acting commander. The major relented, and the task force entered Rome in the early afternoon and linked up with the column headed by Company C.86
Other units rolled into Rome. The men of the 3d Infantry Division and 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion arrived, the latter pleased to observe that Rome was “clean, beautiful, full of lovely girls, and it had hardly been touched by the war.”87 The 1st Armored Division and 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion pulled in by 1500 hours.88 Also late in the day, the M10s of the 804th Tank Destroyer Battalion entered Rome from the south. The difference between the Anzio and main forces had been completely erased, and the 804th joined Ellis Force the next day.89
Groping Toward Better Combined-Arms Solutions
With movement restored to the war, tank destroyer units found themselves at the point of advancing columns as they had been in North Africa. Nevertheless, tank destroyer outfits asserted that reconnaissance elements—not TDs—should lead any advance seeking to reestablish contact with the enemy in order to permit the destroyers to deploy and exploit their fire power when contact occurred. Recon men, it must be said, frowned on situations in which they were ordered to precede armored columns—ranging ahead of the far less vulnerable tanks in their little jeeps by up to fifteen hundred yards.90
After eight months of operations in Italy, basic communications issues between the tank destroyers and infantry units they supported remained unresolved. Major Charles Wilber, by June commanding the 636th Tank Destroyer Battalion, noted in his monthly report: “Tank destroyer companies attached to infantry regimental teams are usually broken down to one platoon with each infantry battalion. Although radios within the tank destroyer battalion are plentiful and no serious communications difficulty exists, there does exist a need for positive communication between the tank destroyer platoon supporting the leading infantry battalion and that battalion’s
