commander. Personal liaison between the two has been tried with results that are not entirely satisfactory due to the time element and the distances involved. A possible solution is that the tank destroyer platoon leader be equipped with a 300 series radio on the same frequency as that of the battalion commander…. ”91
Wilber’s view that coordination with the infantry needed improvement was widely held in the TD battalions, and a Fifth Army review of operations during early and mid-1944 pinned the blame mainly on infantry commanders who did not understand the powers and limitations of tank destroyers. Fifth Army also pointed a finger at the frequent reattachment of TD outfits to new divisions, a practice that prevented the two arms from developing ties of mutual understanding and trust through experience operating together. (Similar problems dogged the cooperation between the doughs and the separate tank battalions in Italy.)
The Fifth Army report also noted that the commanders of the 636th and 894th Tank Destroyer battalions complained that, during the breakthrough to Rome, their M10s had been ordered to advance ahead of the infantry to overrun points of resistance—a tank mission for which they were not suited.92 The tank killers’ view was clear: It was imperative that the thinly armored, open-topped TDs have a screen of infantry to prevent enemy infantry from closing for a quick kill. The M10 was not capable of performing the role of a tank within small-arms range of the enemy, they argued.93
One “offending” unit—the 34th Infantry Division—was unapologetic. The attached 191st Tank Battalion had suffered casualties so severe during the breakthrough that it had become combat ineffective, the division asserted, and the infantry had no choice but to use the armor that was available, the 894th’s tank destroyers.94
The Fifth Army review concluded that problems in TD cooperation with tank units evident early in the period had generally been overcome by summer. Surprisingly, the early troubles were attributed to a lack of aggressiveness on the part of TD commanders.
Perhaps this impression resulted from a key lesson learned by the TD crews. The 3-inch gun was able to destroy enemy armor and installations at a greater range than other mounted direct-fire weapons, and the tank killers concluded that M10s should remain to the rear of advancing tanks, from which they could provide effective supporting fire. Tank destroyers, they observed, should operate about four hundred yards behind friendly tanks in typical Italian terrain. Any closer and the TDs would be subject to the same fire hitting the unit supported; any farther and effective support would be impossible.
There were also two sides to the tanker complaints of lagging TDs. The 701st noted in a lessons-learned memo, “Tanks will sometimes storm ahead and seemingly forget about their supporting TDs. However, this need not occasion any worry among the TDs; the tanks will always be glad to send back a guide as soon as the TDs are needed.”95
Poor-to-nonexistent radio communications between the two types of armor continued to plague operations. Several battalion commanders from tank and TD battalions had proposed a new approach to mixed operations: Rather than attach a tank destroyer element to the tank unit, the TD commander should be ordered to support the tanks and be held responsible for executing the mission effectively. They would then have the flexibility to provide close support even when communications broke down.96
The M18 Arrives
The first two Hellcats—still sporting their T70 test designation—arrived in Italy in April and were issued for battle trials to the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion at the Anzio beachhead.97 In June, the 805th—a towed battalion—became the first to re-equip with the M18.
Buick had designed the M18 with much input from the Tank Destroyer Force. The vehicle embodied the doctrine: fast, light, and lethal. At 40,000 pounds, the M18 was little more than half as heavy as the M10, and it could reach the remarkable speed of 50 miles per hour. The tradeoff was that armor was thin—a mere half-inch on the hull front (less than on the M8 armored car). The Hellcat carried a 76mm gun (a lighter version of the 3- inch gun) in a full-traverse open-topped turret, and, like the M10, had no machine guns other than an antiaircraft .50-caliber mounted at the turret rear.98 The turret traverse speed was so high that gunners had to make final aiming corrections manually.99
Lieutenant Colonel Peter K. Kopcsak, CO of the 602d Tank Destroyer Battalion, opined that the Hellcat “was the best vehicle to come out of Detroit during the war.”100
Buick, however, claimed it had designed the Hellcat as the answer to the Tiger which—since its gun could not penetrate the Mark VI front armor—it was not.101 Some, moreover, disliked the Hellcat’s thin armor and thus preferred the M10. One battalion—the 813th—in early 1945 fought conversion from the M10 to the M18 so vigorously that it was moved to the M36 instead. The battalion judged that “the M10 is a superior TD to the M18 in every particular.”102
Much to the dismay of the crews, many American infantrymen thought the M18 resembled a German tank because of its barrel length and suspension. At least some crews responded by painting the white identification stars bigger and brighter.103
Coiling for the Next Strike
Several tank destroyer battalions slipped out of sight during the hot days of mid-summer 1944.
The 636th was typical. It moved to the Salerno area in early July. There, maintenance crews gave the M10s thorough overhauls and replaced worn guns and tracks. Vehicles were painted, camouflaged, and waterproofed. In view of the problems in combined arms operations experienced to date, all companies conducted training problems with the 753d Tank Battalion and the infantry battalions and regiments of the 36th Infantry Division. Recon taught its men to use 81mm mortars. The 636th took the unusual (but not unique) decision to get rid of all of its M20 armored cars and replace them with old M3 halftracks, which the battalion concluded had proved more suitable.104
Veterans of Salerno and Anzio thought, “Here we go again.” The men did not know the destination, but they had learned that amphibious operations could be hazardous to one’s health.105
The U.S. Army allowed that some of the first soldiers had made their contributions at the front and were needed more now at home. Lieutenant Arthur Edson, who had landed at Oran, rotated home in July 1944. The European war was over for him. He took up duties at the Tank Destroyer School at Camp Hood, Texas.
The battalions that remained behind in Italy—the 701st, 804th, 805th, and 894th—would continue to support the infantry and armored divisions as they pushed the Germans back to their last defensive stronghold before the Alps. The Gothic Line ran through the Apennine Mountains from north of Pisa to Rimini. American troops again began the grueling job of attacking pillboxes, concrete emplacements, and other strongpoints supported by tank destroyer fire. Progress would again be measured in yards, and casualties would again spike. This time, however, the Allies would decide to hunker down during the horrible winter weather and attack again in the spring. All they had to do in Italy was tie down German forces while events in northwestern Europe decided the outcome of the war.
Chapter 6
“You are about to embark upon the Great Crusade, toward which we have striven these many months. The
