To be good at translating the Party's policy into action of the masses, to be good at getting not only the leading cadres but also the broad masses to understand and master every movement and every struggle we launch - this is an art of MarxistLeninist leadership. It is also the dividing line that determines whether or not we make mistakes in our work.
'A Talk to the Editorial Staff of the
However active the leading group may be, its activity will amount to fruitless effort by a handful of people unless combined with the activity of the masses. On the other hand, if the masses alone are active without a strong leading group to organize their activity properly, such activity cannot be sustained for long, or carried forward in the right direction, or raised to a high level.
'Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership' (June 1, 1943),
Production by the masses, the interests of the masses, the experiences and feelings of the masses - to these the leading cadres should pay constant attention.
Inscription for a production exhibition sponsored by organizations directly under the Central Committee of the Party and the General Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army,
We should pay close attention to the well-being of the masses, from the problems of land and labour to those of fuel, rice, cooking oil and salt… All such problems concerning the well-being of the masses should be placed on our agenda. We should discuss them, adopt and carry out decisions and check up on the results. We should help the masses to realize that we represent their interests, that our lives are intimately bound up with theirs. We should help them to proceed from these things to an understanding of the higher tasks which we have put forward, the tasks of the revolutionary war, so that they will support the revolution and spread it throughout the country, respond to our political appeals and fight to the end for victory in the revolution.
'Be Concerned with the Well-Being of the Masses, Pay Attention to Methods of Work' (January 27, 1934),
12. POLITICAL WORK
The system of Party representatives and of political departments, adopted for the first time in China, entirely changed the complexion of these armed forces. [1] The Red Army, which was founded in 1927, and the Eighth Route Army of today have inherited this system and developed it.
'Interview with the British Journalist James Bertram' (October 25, 1937),
The People's Liberation Army has developed its vigorous revolutionary political work, which is an important factor in winning victory over the enemy, on the basis of a people's war and of the principles of unity between army and people, of unity between commanders and fighters and of disintegrating the enemy troops.
'The Present Situation and Our Tasks' (December 25, 1947),
This army has built up a system of political work which is essential for the people's war and is aimed at promoting unity in its own ranks, unity with the friendly armies and unity with the people, and at disintegrating the enemy forces and ensuring victory in battle.
'On Coalition Government' (April 24, 1945),
Political work is the life-blood of all economic work. This is particularly true at a time when the social and economic system is undergoing fundamental change.
Introductory note to 'A Serious Lesson' (1955),
'The Party branch is organized on a company basis'; this is an important reason why the Red Army has been able to carry on such arduous fighting without falling apart.
'The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains ' (November 25, 1928),
The political work of the Eighth Route Army is guided by three basic principles. First, the principle of unity between officers and men, which means eradicating feudal practices in the army, prohibiting beating and abuse, building up a conscious discipline, and sharing weal and woe - as a result of which the entire army is closely united. Second, the principle of unity between the army and the people, which means maintaining a discipline that forbids the slightest violation of the people's interests, conducting propaganda among the masses, organizing and arming them, lightening their economic burdens and suppressing the traitors and collaborators who do harm to the army and the people - as a result of which the army is closely united with the people and welcomed everywhere. Third, the principle of disintegrating the enemy troops and giving lenient treatment to prisoners of war. Our victory depends not only upon our military operations but also upon the disintegration of the enemy troops.
'Interview with the British Journalist James Bertram' (October 25, 1937),
Our troops must observe the correct principles that govern relations between the army and the people, between the army and the government, between the army and the Party, between officers and men, and between military work and political work, and relations among the cadres, and must never commit the errors of warlordism. Officers must cherish their men and must not be indifferent to their well-being or resort to corporal punishment; the army must cherish the people and never encroach upon their interests; the army must respect the government and the Party and never 'assert independence'.
'Get Organized!' (November 29, 1943),
Our policy towards prisoners captured from the Japanese, puppet or anti-Communist troops is to set them all free, except for those who have incurred the bitter hatred of the masses and must receive capital punishment and whose death sentence has been approved by the higher authorities. Among the prisoners, those who were coerced into joining the reactionary forces but who are more or less inclined towards the revolution should be won over in large numbers to work for our army. The rest should be released and, if they fight us and are captured again, should again be set free. We should not insult them, take away their personal effects or try to exact recant tations from them, but without exception should treat them sincerely and kindly. This should be our policy, however reactionary they may be. It is a very effective way of isolating the camp of reaction.
'On Policy' (December 25, 1940),
Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, that are decisive. The contest of strength is not only a contest of military and economic power, but also a contest of human power and morale. Military and economic power is necessarily wielded by people.
'On Protracted War' (May 1958),
