90. “The H-bomb Chronology,” 17, no. DLXXXIV, JCAE; minutes, GAC no. 2, Feb. 2–3, 1947, no. 79441, CIC/DOE; and Oppenheimer to Lilienthal, Apr. 3, 1947, GAC no. 3, LANL.
91. Bethe to Frankel and Richtmyer, Apr. 5, 1946, folder 11, box 11, Hans Bethe papers, Special Collections, Cornell University archives, Ithaca, N.Y.
92. A Joint Committee memo noted that Fermi’s H-bomb lectures occurred shortly after the Trinity test and “were attended by almost everyone in the laboratory.” Walker to file, Jan. 13, 1953, no. 3344, JCAE. Fuchs–von Neumann patent: Anderson to Borden, June 30, 1952, no. 2910, JCAE. The secret patent—S-5292X, “Improvements in Methods and Means for Utilizing Nuclear Energy”—was signed by Fuchs on June 5, 1946, just nine days before he returned to England. Four years later, interviewed in prison by FBI agent Robert Lamphere, Fuchs was asked whether he or von Neumann had suggested using implosion to ignite the Super: “[Fuchs] stated laughingly that this was his, Fuchs’, suggestion, and that he did not furnish information concerning the ignition of the super bomb by the implosion process.” Lamphere to Hoover, June 6, 1950, serial 1412, Klaus Fuchs file, no. 65–58805, FBI. The author would like to thank Joe Albright and Marcia Kunstel for a copy of the document that Fuchs gave to the Russians, and Jennifer DeCapua for locating the Lamphere interview in FBI files.
93. Rhodes (1995), 254; Chuck Hansen, “The Apr. 1946 Super Conference” (unpublished manuscript, 2001). My thanks to Chuck Hansen for a copy of his unpublished chapter on the superbomb meeting.
94. Ironically, Teller himself admitted in a 1993 interview that he was the one responsible for initially discouraging the idea of compressing the thermonuclear fuel. Teller interview (1993).
95. Morrison to Serber, Mar. 26, 1946, correspondence, Bethe papers.
96. Carson Mark, “A Short Account of Los Alamos Theoretical Work on Thermonuclear Weapons, 1946–1950,” LA-5647-MS, (LANL, 1974); Rhodes (1995), 254.
97. “We agreed on a text.” Serber interview (1992).
98. Fuchs did not leave Los Alamos, however, until after he had read Teller’s report on the superbomb conference. Rhodes (1995), 259.
99. “Edward went back to the original report. He just forgot about all the changes we had agreed on.” Serber interview (1992); Serber (1998), 150–51.
100. The April conference also revived interest in whether a fusion bomb might ignite Earth’s atmosphere. Teller left the calculations up to his colleague Emil Konopinski. Their joint report concluded that “no self-propagating chain of nuclear reactions is likely to be started.” The same phenomenon that stood in the way of realizing the Super—the loss of heat through radiation—likewise protected the planet from accidental incineration by overreaching scientists. E. J. Konopinski, C. Marvin, and E. Teller, “Ignition of the Atmosphere with Nuclear Bombs,” LA-602 (LANL, 1946).
101. Alarm Clock: Rhodes (1995), 305–6; Mark (1974), 3–5; Hansen (1988), 45–46. Teller noted that the Alarm Clock was born on the same day as his daughter Wendy: Aug. 31, 1946. Walker to file, Jan. 13, 1953, JCAE.
102. Rhodes (1995), 307; Mark (1974), 5.
103. Teller, “Proposed Outline of Laboratory Program,” Oct. 1, 1946, no. 125647, CIC/DOE.
104. Bradbury to AEC, Nov. 14, 1946, no. 125518, CIC/DOE.
105. Bradbury to Nichols, Nov. 16, 1946, no. 71787, CIC/DOE.
106. Teller to Mayer, n.d. [fall 1946], box 3, Mayer papers.
107. ITMOJRO, 35. Oppenheimer spent part of the third week of each month teaching at Caltech. Oppenheimer to Dubridge, Sept. 3, 1946, box 111.3, DuBridge papers, Caltech.
108. Childs (1968), 376.
109. Birge, vol. 5, xvii–11.
110. Oppie had described the institute as a “madhouse”—“its luminaries shining in separate and helpless isolation”—in a 1935 letter to Frank. Smith and Weiner (1980), 327; Childs (1968), 393; Rhodes (1995), 308.
111. San Francisco field report, May 9, 1947, JRO/FBI.
112. Birge, vol. 5, xvii–11.
113. Public announcement of the feat was followed in midmonth by a private reunion of those who had endorsed Lawrence’s original appeal to the Rockefeller Foundation. As before, Loomis picked up the bill.
114. Between January and Apr. 1947, the Rad Lab budget for the coming year had increased by almost $1 million, to $8.85 million. An earlier version had been pegged at $10 million, but Oppenheimer urged restraint. Priestly to Lawrence, Dec. 9, 1946, folder 37, carton 21, EOL; and Peterson to Williams, Apr. 3, 1947, file 121.4, Central Correspondence series, AEC/NARA.
115. Ernest’s encounter with the AEC caused him to miss Groves. Kelly to Lawrence, Mar. 10, 1947, Contract 48 files, SBFRC.
116. “The University of California Case Study,” Report of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, supplemental vol. 2, Sources and Documentation (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 600–630.
117. Fisk postponed a decision on support for the Rad Lab, pending determination of the “extent to which the University of California will continue its functions as somewhat of a national laboratory.”
118. Peterson to Fields, Jan. 20, 1947, file 121.4, Central Correspondence series, AEC/NARA.
119. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 98.
120. Army-university negotiations: Underhill to Nichols, Sept. 20, 1946, series 5, MED/NARA; Underhill to Bradbury, June 24, 1947, Underhill papers, LANL.
121. Originally, the meeting was to have been held at Berkeley. But more pressing concerns—including the still-uncertain status of Los Alamos, and bottlenecks in the production of atomic bombs—forced a postponement.
122. Lilienthal confirmation: Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 48–53.
123. Lilienthal (1964), 234.
124. Lawrence to AEC commissioners et al., June 19, 1947, folder 28, carton 30, EOL.
125. The first night at the Grove was spent developing “a mutual understanding of each other’s problems,” Cooksey wrote. Cooksey to Loomis, Aug. 25, 1947, folder 28, carton 30, EOL.
126. Bohemian Grove meeting: Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 108–9. My thanks to Richard Rhodes for a copy of the AEC’s unofficial minutes of the meeting.
127. “We’ve given our notice and that’s that. It stands,” Neylan claimed he told Strauss. Notes of interview with Neylan, May 6, 1960, box 2, Childs papers.
128. Childs interview with Neylan, box 2, Childs papers.
129. Underhill to file, Sept. 10, 1947, Underhill papers, LANL.
130. Transcript of interview with Arthur Hudgins, n.d., LLNL.
131. Cooksey to Loomis, Aug. 25, 1947, folder 28, carton 30, EOL.
10: Character, Association, and Loyalty
1. Cooksey to Strauss, and Cooksey to Loomis, Aug. 25, 1947, folder 28, carton 30,
