18. Belmont to Ladd, Feb. 19, 1954, sec. 21, JRO/FBI.
19. Exculpatory evidence, on the other hand, was buried. Rolander to file, Mar. 18 and Apr. 2, 1954; and Branigan to Belmont, Apr. 15, 1954, sec. 25, JRO/FBI.
20. Rolander to Nichols (1987), Jan. 21, 1954, AEC/NARA; Mitchell to file, Feb. 23, 1954, AEC/NARA. On May 4, at the end of the hearing, Nichols wrote in his diary: “I told LaPlante I don’t want anything in the files saying we determined Garrison doesn’t require clearance.” Mar. 29, 1954, and May 4, 1954, Nichols diary, Nichols papers.
21. Nichols (1987), “Memo for Record,” Jan. 19, 1954, Nichols papers. Samuel Silverman, Garrison’s legal partner, recalled that Marks “was the most opposed to getting a clearance—on principle.” Author interview with Samuel Silverman, New York, N.Y., Nov. 14, 2000.
22. Hoover to Strauss, Feb. 18, 1954, sec. 19, JRO/FBI.
23. Newark SAC telex, Mar. 25, 1954, sec. 23, JRO/FBI.
24. “I don’t really remember that the Chevalier incident came up at all in my conversation with Frank.” Silverman interview (2000).
25. Ibid.
26. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 86.
27. Hoover to Strauss, Jan. 22, 1954, file C, vol. 2, box 2, JRO/AEC. The log of Strauss’s telephone calls indicates that he talked to Allardice on Feb. 15, 17, and 18, 1954. Telephone log, Jan.–Mar. 1954, box 6, LLS/NARA.
28. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 86.
29. Rolander to file, Mar. 15, 1954, file C, vol. 2, box 2, JRO/AEC.
30. Ibid. Lawrence also accused Oppenheimer of trying to “plant a man from Princeton on me” who had later been turned down by AEC security. The Princeton physicist—David Feldman—was a former fellow at the institute whom Oppie had recommended that Ernest hire at the Rad Lab in 1950. Rolander to file, Mar. 18, 1954, box 3, AEC/JRO; David Feldman, Aug. 25, 1993, personal communication.
31. Rolander to file, Mar. 15, 1954, file C, vol. 2, box 2, JRO/AEC; Cotter to Allardice, Sept. 7, 1954, no. 4888, JCAE.
32. Rolander to file, Mar. 15, 1954, file C, vol. 2, box 2, JRO/AEC.
33. Pfau (1984), 162.
34. Goodchild (1980), 231.
35. Hoover to Strauss, Jan. 4, 1954, sec. 17, JRO/FBI.
36. Gray: Stern (1969), 241; Hewlett and Holl (1989), 83. Although praised as “a man with no ax to grind,” Gray, a week before the hearing began, was already passing derogatory information on Oppenheimer to Robb. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 90.
37. Bravo: Hansen (1988), 62–68.
38. Bravo and Lucky Dragon: Minutes, May 29, 1954, GAC no. 40, no. 73405, CIC/DOE; Rhodes (1995), 542–43; Hansen (1988), 65–66.
39. Strauss told Eisenhower’s press secretary that the Lucky Dragon was probably a “Red spy ship” and the crew’s injuries faked. At Strauss’s request, CIA agents boarded the Lucky Dragon while it was in port in Japan. Robert Divine, Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954–1960 (Oxford University Press, 1978), 6–9; Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower, vol. 2, The President (Simon and Schuster, 1984), 168. Spy ship charge: Mar. 18, 1954, Nichols diary, Nichols papers; Hewlett and Holl (1989), 177; Herken (1992), 80; Pfau (1984), 166.
40. Two Livermore H-bomb tests were scheduled for Castle. The device to be tested first was a lithium-fueled, or “dry,” version of Ramrod dubbed “Morgenstern” (Morning Star) at the lab. The second device, called “Ramrod,” was a “wet,” or cryogenically cooled, version of the same device. Interviews.
41. Like Ruth, Livermore’s second hydride test, Ray, on Apr. 11, 1953, had also fizzled. The explosion, however, managed to level the bomb’s 100-tower. Hansen (1988), 67–68; interviews: York (1997) and Decker (1997).
42. Beset by last-minute doubts about the design of the radiation case, Livermore physicists surrounded the railroad car–sized Morgenstern with water-filled jerry cans. York interview (1997).
43. Interviews: LLNL (1997).
44. Strauss to LeBaron, Apr. 26, 1954, no. 72323, CIC/DOE. Both the Morgenstern device tested in Koon and Echo’s Ramrod were based upon Teller’s concept of a two-stage thermonuclear trigger for his original Super. Chuck Hansen, “Operation Castle,” unpublished manuscript, 57. The author would like to thank Chuck Hansen for a copy of his unpublished update to U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History.
45. Francis (1996), 69.
46. Rhodes (1995), 543; Stern (1969), 260–61.
47. Apr. 12, 1954, Nichols diary, Nichols papers.
48. ITMOJRO, 103.
49. Bates found the recording in the boxes of army CIC files that Groves turned over to the FBI at the end of the war. Nichols (1987), 315.
50. As Hoover and Strauss were aware, by sticking to the story that he told the FBI in 1946, Oppenheimer avoided a possible perjury indictment; the statute of limitation had already run out on any lie told to Pash in 1943. Branigan to Belmont, Apr. 19, 1954, sec. 31, JRO/FBI; Pfau (1984), 171.
51. Stern (1969), 280. Nichols told Strauss that he believed the reason Oppenheimer was taken by surprise at the 1954 hearing was that Oppie assumed the commission knew little of his prewar past. Strauss to file, Nov. 12, 1969, LLS/HHPL.
52. ITMOJRO, 137.
53. “How can any individual report a treasonable act on the part of another man and then go and stay at his home for several days? It just doesn’t make any sense to me,” Ike told his press secretary, James Hagerty. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 104.
54. ITMOJRO, 153. Wrote Nichols in his memoirs, published in 1987: “I certainly do not believe that Oppenheimer told Groves that it all was a ‘cock and bull story’ in the autumn of 1943.” Nichols (1987), 319.
55. ITMOJRO, 153.
56. Apr. 13, 1954, Nichols diary, Nichols papers.
57. ITMOJRO, 170–79. Robb did not ask Groves whether he considered Oppenheimer a security risk, but instead—quoting the May 1950 letter that the general had written for the physicist—asked whether “the expressions of confidence in him contained in this letter you wrote hold?” Groves answered, “you can draw your own conclusions as to what I feel today.”
58.
