122. “Statement by the President,” July 8, 1956, no. 107756; Murray to Strauss, Aug. 3, 1956, no. 74359; Strauss to Murray, Aug. 6, 1956, no. 74358; Murray to Strauss, Sept. 11, 1956, no. 74356, CIC/DOE.
123. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 301, 360.
124. Pfau (1984), 201.
125. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 349; FRUS: 1955–57, vol. 20, 419.
126. Task force report: “Disarmament Study,” Jan. 1956; “Personnel Requirements for Nuclear Inspection,” June 1, 1956; Stassen to Twining, Feb. 2, 1956, box 66, USDS/NARA; Arnold Kramish, personal communication; Starbird to Strauss, Dec. 26, 1956, no. 72441, CIC/DOE.
127. Griggs suggested that inspection stations in Russia could also be used to secretly eavesdrop on Soviet radio communications. “Verbatim Record,” 97; Odom to Stassen, May 22, 1956, box 64, USDS/NARA.
128. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 367–69; Divine (1978), 84–104; Ambrose (1984), 349.
129. Divine (1978), 105; “The Nuclear Test Issue,” Washington Post, Oct. 17, 1956. Lawrence complained to the university’s president when two Rad Lab veterans joined Stevenson’s campaign. “He seemed to be very much upset by this but not very clear as to what he thought I could do about it,” wrote Sproul in his office diary. Nov. 2, 1957, memos, Sproul papers.
130. Divine (1978), 105.
131. “[Strauss] encouraged his friends Edward Teller and Ernest Lawrence to tell the public that ‘we are never sure a device will work until it is tested.’” Pfau (1984), 199.
132. Childs (1968), 474.
133. Wilkes subsequently wrote of the incident: “My recollection is that Ernest made it clear that AEC Chairman Strauss encouraged such a statement.” Wilkes, “Notes for discussion…,” Nov. 9, 1986, Wilkes folder, box 2, John Lawrence papers, LBL; Wilkes to Lawrence, n.d., folder 9, carton 17, EOL; Childs (1968), 498–99.
134. The final version deleted Teller’s pitch for the clean bomb and did not mention Ernest’s role on Stassen’s task force. Press release, Nov. 4, 1956, folder 9, carton 17, EOL; “2 Scientists Back Tests of H-bomb,” New York Times, Nov. 6, 1956.
19: A Cross of Atoms
1. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 380.
2. Notes on Oct. 10, 1958, memo, Murray papers; Murray to Strauss, Mar. 28, 1957, no. 72358, and McGruder to Strauss, Apr. 3, 1957, no. 108370, CIC/DOE.
3. Clinton Anderson made Murray a special consultant to the Joint Committee. “Dear Mr. President,” n.d., Murray papers; Hewlett and Holl (1989), 331, 408; Hansen (1995), vol. 5, 276–77.
4. Appleby (1987), 252; Pfau (1984), 204.
5. Murray feared that Henry Luce might spike the piece, or that Strauss would blackmail the magazine’s advertisers into stopping publication. Personal communication, Jack Crawford, Mar. 11, 1993. Three weeks after Murray’s article appeared, Luce wrote to Strauss with an apology. Luce to Strauss, May 23, 1957, H. Luce folder, LLS/HHPL.
6. “The civilized tradition has always declared that an unlimited and indiscriminate use of force in warfare is unjust,” Murray wrote.
7. Livermore received the contract for a subsequent ICBM, the Titan. Francis (1996), 112–13.
8. Nobska: Ibid., 119–21; Project Nobska: The Implications of Advanced Design on Undersea Warfare, final report, Dec. 1, 1956, Committee on Undersea Warfare, “Physical Sciences, 1956” file, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C.
9. Just a few days earlier, York had notified the AEC that Livermore was on the verge of developing a small, lightweight H-bomb, based upon two ideas that had shown promise in the last Nevada tests. Hansen, “Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Warheads” (unpublished manuscript); Teller (2001), 421.
10. Murray to Strauss, Dec. 20, 1956, no. 74345, CIC/DOE.
11. Appleby (1987), 248.
12. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 398; Divine (1978), 146.
13. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 399.
14. Bryan to Strauss, June 20, 1957, Cole folder, and Strauss to Lawrence, July 1, 1957, LLS/HHPL; Strauss to Gerard Smith, Sept. 12, 1957, no. 108301, CIC/DOE.
15. Childs (1968), 504.
16. Teller and Strauss had previously talked, for example, of using nuclear explosions to change the dust content of the atmosphere or to clear away Los Angeles’s famous smog by blowing a hole in the city’s surrounding mountains.
17. Stassen had raised the idea of an “open” test in a previous memo to Lawrence’s task force. Stassen to Lawrence, box 66, Arneson file, USDS/NARA.
18. June 24 meeting: Childs (1968), 504; Hewlett and Holl (1989), 400–401; Divine (1978), 148–50; Ambrose (1984), 399–400; Gerard Smith to Stassen, July 1, 1957, box 127, Arneson file, USDS/NARA; FRUS: 1955–57. vol. 20, 638–40.
19. After also listening to the scientists’ appeal, Dulles had written to Eisenhower, urging the president not to reverse his position on the test ban. Appleby (1987), 212; 249.
20. In their own press conference, immediately following the White House visit, Teller and Lawrence had spoken of weapons that were 96 percent “pure.” Transcript of press conference, June 26, 1957, Public Papers of the Presidents: Dwight Eisenhower, 1957, 497–501; Dulles to Stassen, July 1, 1957, FRUS: 1955–57, vol. 20, 649–50.
21. Lilienthal (1969), 232.
22. Strauss to Mills, July 3, 1957, Mills folder, LLS/HHPL; Hansen (1995), vol. 5, 321.
23. Morse to Teller, July 3, 1957, Morse folder, LLS/HHPL; Hansen (1995), vol. 5, 321.
24. York calculated that the weight of a clean bomb would be three to five times that of a “standard” H-bomb. York to Starbird, Oct. 24, 1956, no. 74348, and York to Starbird, July 11, 1957, no. 103901, CIC/DOE. Clean-bomb limitations: Livermore interviews; Hansen (1995), vol. 5, 89; York to Huston, Apr. 25, 1955, no. 74365, CIC/DOE.
25. Murray to Strauss, May 29, 1957, no. 74336, and Starbird to Fields, June 4, 1957, no. 103903, CIC/DOE.
26. Hansen (1995), vol. 5, 328.
27. Ibid., 274–75.
28. “Conference with the President,” Aug. 9, 1957, no. 33078, CIC/DOE; Ambrose (1984), 344.
29. Rabi interview (1983).
30. Rabi’s influence upon Eisenhower was already subtly evident. When Strauss urged Ike to approve additional high-yield H-bomb tests, the president replied that a 40-megaton weapon would only cause about half again the damage of a 10-megaton bomb because “the scaling laws apply on a cube route [sic] basis.”
31. Pfau (1984), 208; Killian, Sputniks, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (MIT Press, 1977), 8.
32. Sputnik reaction: Killian (1977), 6–12; Pfau (1984), 209.
33. FRUS: 1955–57, vol. 20, 607–10.
34. Rabi proposal: Ibid., vol.
