94. Strauss to Lawrence, June 23, 1958, folder 52, carton 15, EOL.
95. Bacher later told Oppenheimer that Lawrence was “extraordinarily devoted” to the U.S. mission. Bethe confirmed that “Lawrence surprised us” with his willingness to accept a ban on testing: “He was entirely in favor of having that meeting with the Russians.” Bethe interview (1996); DuBridge to Cooksey, Sept. 23, 1958, folder 17, carton 6, EOL; Childs (1968), 523–24.
96. Davis (1968), 353.
97. Childs (1968), 521.
98. Ibid.
99. Hansen (1988), 77–79.
100. Hansen, “Announced U.S. Nuclear Detonations…,” 14–15; Bradbury to Starbird, June 3, 1958, no. 101951, CIC/DOE.
101. FRUS: 1958–1960, vol. 3, 612–13.
102. In May, the head of testing in the Pacific wrote to Starbird, “do every thing you can to cancel Pinon shot.” Ogle to Starbird, May 20, 1958, no. 101882, CIC/DOE.
103. Directors to General Manager, June 24, 1958, no. 101883, CIC/DOE.
104. Salisbury to Starbird et al., June 26, 1958, no. 101884, CIC/DOE. Starbird worried that Pinon “might unduly awe rather than mollify the observers.” Starbird to General Manager, Feb. 21, 1958, no. 72447, CIC/DOE.
105. Childs (1968), 524.
106. Dolly Eltenton had been Semenov’s secretary and George Eltenton his colleague when the Russian directed Leningrad’s Institute of Chemical Physics in the 1930s. Holloway (1994), 451.
107. Harold Brown and Hans Bethe confirmed Lawrence’s break statement. Observed Brown: “Lawrence in his grand statement to prevent a break appealed to the spirit of science and the fact that there were Nobel prize winners on each side.” Author interview with Harold Brown, Washington, D.C., June 28, 1996; Bethe interview (1996).
108. Spiers to “Phil and Vince,” July 5, 1958, box 85, Arneson file, USDS/NARA.
109. Tichvinsky, “Impressions…,” Aug. 23, 1958, folder 27, carton 17, EOL.
110. “It was most encouraging—Morse is genuinely worried from the point of view of a vigorous opponent of test suspension that there may be an agreement among the experts of the two sides.” Farley to Spiers, July 17, 1958, box 85, Arneson file, USDS/NARA.
111. Childs (1968), 527.
112. “U.S. Atomic Aide Ill,” New York Times, July 30, 1958.
113. Teller described Juniper as Livermore’s “most radical” Hardtack shot and “an entirely new concept in bomb design.” Strauss to Eisenhower, Jan. 29, 1958, no. 101731, CIC/DOE.
114. Author interview with Carl Haussmann, Livermore, Calif., July 30, 1993; transcript of transcript, “Dr. Teller’s 80th Birthday,” LLNL.
115. The radical design of the W-47 also made it particularly susceptible to accidental detonation—a problem that was reportedly not solved before the test moratorium went into effect. The W-47, writes Hansen, was “an explosion in search of an accident.” Starbird to Mills et al., Mar. 25, 1958, no. 104003, CIC/DOE; Hansen (1995), “W-47,” 19.
116. “Needless to say we are all extremely happy with the results of these two shots.” Teller to Starbird, July 23, 1958, no. 102007, CIC/DOE.
117. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 544.
118. Hardtack-II: Strauss to Eisenhower, June 12, 1958, no. 72692, CIC/DOE.
119. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 545.
120. FRUS: 1958–60, vol. 3, 654–59.
121. Ambrose (1984), 479; AEC press release, Aug. 29, 1958, no. 137262, CIC/DOE.
122. Loper to Durham, Aug. 29, 1958, no. MCCXCVI, JCAE.
123. The fact that the Soviet Union promptly detected the secret Argus tests demonstrated the viability of the Geneva agreement, Killian told Eisenhower. Two weeks after an article in Izvestia attributed a previously undiscovered band of radiation to an unannounced U.S. nuclear test, the New York Times published an account of Argus. Argus: York (1987), 128–32; 149–50.
Epilogue: “As Streams Are…”
1. The French detonated their first nuclear device in the Sahara on Feb. 13, 1960. The Soviets had never made it clear in the test-ban negotiations whether they would consider a French test a violation of the moratorium. Glenn Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban (University of California Press, 1992), 21–22; Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower (Penn State University Press, 2000), 346–48.
2. The Soviets’ last test was Nov. 3, 1958. Steven Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1945–2000 (Smithsonian Institution Press, draft manuscript, 2000), 76–78. Resumption of testing: Khrushchev (2000), 295–302, 466–67; William Taubman et al., eds., Nikita Khrushchev (Yale University Press, 2000), 262–63.
3. Decoupling theory: Killian (1977), 166; Voss (1963), 272; Latter interview (1985); Teller, “Comments on the Geneva Conference on Nuclear Test Detection,” Sept. 13, 1958, Teller folder, LLS/HHPL; Teller (2001), 443.
4. Herken (1992), 115; “Visit with Ed Teller,” Oct. 13, 1958, Teller folder, Murray papers. Murray remained Teller’s steadfast, if unlikely, ally in opposing the test ban until his death from a heart attack in spring 1961.
5. In his memoirs, Killian described decoupling as “a bizarre concept, contrived as part of a campaign to oppose any test ban.” Killian (1977), 166; Herken (1992), 115.
6. Author interview with James Killian, Cambridge, Mass., Jan. 16, 1985; Killian (1977), 168.
7. Pfau (1984), 223.
8. Ibid., 233–35.
9. B. B. to Oppenheimer, May 6, 1959, Robert Brode folder, box 23, JRO.
10. A key test-ban supporter, William Fulbright, described Teller to Kennedy as “John L. Lewis and Billy Sunday all wrapped in one.” Blumberg and Owens (1976), 370; “Winning Senate Support for the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 1963,” belt 26C, Presidential Recording Transcripts, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Mass.
11. Teller and David Griggs had originally proposed underground testing in 1956 as a way of avoiding weather delays and calming public fears over fallout. But the success of the first U.S. underground test in Nevada—Rainier, on Sept. 19, 1957—awakened Teller, and Livermore, to the possibility of moving all subsequent tests underground. Rainier: Teller and Griggs, “Deep Underground Test Shots,” Feb. 1956, UCRL-4659, LLNL; AEC press release, Sept. 20, 1957, no. 71470, and York to Starbird, Oct. 4, 1957, no. 74196, CIC/DOE.
12. Herken (1992), 307–8 fn.
13. Lilienthal’s diary describes the scene at a National Academy of Sciences’ reception which followed the White House ceremony: “Robert Oppenheimer … a figure of stone, gray, rigid, almost lifeless, tragic in his intensity.… Kitty was a study in joy, in exultation almost.” David Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, vol. 5, The Harvest Years, 1959–63 (Harper and Row, 1971), 529–30.
14. Strauss to Donovan, Dec. 31, 1963,
