56. Francis (1996), 105.
57. Ibid., 99.
58. Ibid., 96.
59. Teller to Mayer, Apr. 15, 1945, box 3, Mayer papers. The army program, abbreviated AFAP—artillery-fired atomic projectile—was also said to stand for “as far as possible” at the lab. “Teller … had a remarkable ability to find convergence between his own interests and those of potential sponsors,” Francis writes. AFAP: Francis (1996), 73, 76, 96; Teller to Strauss, May 13, 1954, Teller folder, LLS/HHPT; Gerald Johnson interview (1991); minutes, Oct. 15, 1955, AECP, UC records.
60. Murray (1960), 76. Eisenhower to Strauss and enclosure, Jan. 4, 1954, no. 100815, CIC/DOE.
61. Murray test-ban appeals: Murray (1960), 76; Hewlett and Holl (1989), 222–23.
62. Murray (1960), 48–52; Murray to Strauss, Aug. 30, 1954, no. 72371, CIC/DOE.
63. Hansen (1995), vol. 5, 350.
64. Mar. 15, 1955, TEM diary, Murray papers; Thomas E. Murray, “God Meant Us to Find the Atom!,” Better Homes and Gardens, Apr. 1955.
65. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 274; FRUS: 1952–1954, vol. 2, pt. 2, 1426.
66. Ambrose (1984), 170.
67. Mar. 3, 1955, TEM diary, Murray papers.
68. Cole to Teller with enclosure, Apr. 6, 1954, Edward Teller papers, LLNL.
69. FRUS: 1952–1954, vol. 2, pt. 2, 1387; May 19, 1954, entry, Nichols diary, Nichols papers.
70. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 223–24, 274–75.
71. Test ban: Ibid., 275–76; Charles Appleby, Eisenhower and Arms Control, 1953–1961: A Balance of Risks (University Microfilm, 1987), 162; FRUS: 1952–1954, vol. 2, pt. 2, 1465–70. The author thanks Charles Appleby for a copy of his dissertation.
72. Teller to Strauss, June 16, 1954, Teller folder, LLS/HHPL; York to Fields, Nov. 9, 1954, no. 32159, CIC/DOE.
73. Armstrong to Leahay, Aug. 25, 1954, no. 29988, CIC/DOE.
74. Fields to Bradbury, Sept. 29, 1954, no. 125679, Murray to Strauss, Nov. 3, 1954, no. 74380, and Nichols to Quarles, Jan. 7, 1955, no. 71955, CIC/DOE.
75. Clean and dirty bombs: Hansen (1995), vol. 5, 10–27, 88–89, 231; Mansfield to file, Oct. 26, 1954, JCAE; author interview with Gerald Johnson, La Jolla, Calif., June 6, 1991.
76. Hansen (1995), vol. 5, 87–88.
77. Ibid., 88.
78. Nov. 26, 1954, and Mar. 3, 1955, entries, TEM diary, Murray papers.
79. Herken (1992), 83; Gerard Smith, Sept. 12, 1992, personal communication.
80. Murray to Eisenhower, Mar. 14, 1955, FRUS: 1955–57, vol. 20, 56–57; Rabi to Strauss, May 29, 1954, no. 73407, CIC/DOE.
81. Appleby (1987), 171–72.
82. FRUS: 1955–57, vol. 20, 60; Divine (1978), 60–61.
83. Divine (1978), 11.
84. Open Skies: Appleby (1987), 90–106.
85. Stassen to Matteson, July 13, 1955, records of the U.S. Department of State (USDS/NARA), RG 59, lot file 58D-133, box 20; FRUS: 1955–57, vol. 20, 173–75.
86. Larsen to Stassen, July 29, 1955, box 16, USDS/NARA.
87. FRUS: 1955–57, vol. 20, 60.
88. This time Ike simply ignored Strauss. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 299.
89. The task force eventually expanded to twenty-one members; nine of the original dozen were from Livermore. Donkin to file, Aug. 19, 1955, and Donkin to Odom, Aug. 31, 1955, box 66, USDS/NARA.
90. Donkin to Larsen, Sept. 6, 1955, box 20, USDS/NARA.
91. There was no circumstance under which a test ban could be in our interest,” York later wrote of Teller’s views. York (1987), 82.
92. Matteson to Stassen, Sept. 8, 1955, box 16, USDS/NARA; Panofsky interview (1993).
93. “Agenda,” Oct. 14, 1955, box 64, USDS/NARA.
94. Strauss did not send his letter to Lawrence. Appleby (1987), 148.
95. Just a month later, the Russians demonstrated that they, too, had the radiation-implosion secret, exploding a 1.6-megaton H-bomb at their test site in Semipalatinsk. Soviet H-bomb: Holloway (1994), 314–15. Lawrence plan: Donkin to Stassen, Oct. 13, 1955, box 64, USDS/NARA; Appleby (1987), 145–48.
96. Strauss was so confident that the Russians would reject on-site inspection that he endorsed the AEC study. Appleby (1987), 146–47; FRUS: 1955–57, vol. 20, 229.
97. FRUS: 1955–57, vol. 20, 253.
98. Ibid., 317.
99. Veksler dinner: Holloway (1994), 114–15, 352; Childs (1968), 487–88.
100. “Admiral Strauss felt that it was still something of a mystery as to why the Soviets had built it. It could have no military significance and was only useful for developments in the realm of pure basic science.” FRUS: 1955–57, vol. 20, 213.
101. Childs (1968), 495.
102. “The greatest possibility of practical value of the machine lies in uses not yet discovered,” Ernest argued. Lawrence to Johnson, Jan. 12, 1955, MTA folder, LBL.
103. Cosmotron: Research Division to GAC, July 16, 1956, “Research Div. Activities, 1952–57” file, AEC/NARA.
104. Childs (1968), 492–93; Davis (1968), 352.
105. Pfau (1984), 188.
106. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 288–91. Privately, Strauss was more forthright. Minutes, AEC Meeting no. 1062, Feb. 23, 1955, AEC/NARA.
107. Strauss and Libby: Hewlett and Holl (1989), 287–88, 293–95.
108. Dixon-Yates: Pfau (1984), 183–85; Hewlett and Holl (1989), 247–49.
109. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 243.
110. FRUS: 1955–57, vol. 20, 119.
111. Ironically, Murray’s views on tactical nuclear weapons were nearly identical to Oppenheimer’s in Vista. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 336–38.
112. Ibid., 338.
113. Ibid., 338–40. After Strauss failed in his efforts to have Murray’s Q clearance lifted, he ordered all copies of the commissioner’s letters and memos on the test ban recalled at the AEC. Earl Voss, Nuclear Ambush: The Test-Ban Trap (Regnery, 1963), 78; Jack Crawford, Aug. 15, 2001, personal communication.
114. Because of the distinctions that Murray made concerning what he called “rational nuclear armament,” he and Strauss agreed on the need to continue testing in order to develop the clean bomb.
115. Francis (1996), 107–8. ICBM and von Neumann report: Mansfield to file, Mar. 5, 1955, no. DCCCLXII, JCAE; York (1987), 91; Borden to Jackson, June 27, 1955, folder 37, box 18, Henry Jackson papers, Special Collections, University of Washington, Seattle, Wash.
116. Bradbury wrote: “Everyone will ultimately have all the weapons in all the variety wanted, and the number will probably be more than the world can safely tolerate being used.” But he would come to regret his “frankness.” Bradbury to Johnson, Nov. 21, 1955, folder 12, carton 32, EOL; Libby to Strauss, Nov. 14, 1955, Murray papers; Bradbury to Strauss, Feb. 7, 1956, no. 125634, CIC/DOE.
117. “Airborne H-bomb Exploded by U.S. over Pacific Isle,” New York Times, May 21, 1956.
118. York (1987), 75; Francis (1996), 97.
119. Zuni: Hansen (1995), vol. 5, 192–95.
120. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 345–47.
121. Murray to Strauss,
