35. Should the Soviets be allowed to continue testing, Rabi told Ike, they “seem certain to discover the feature that they now lack.” Ferrell (1981), 348–49.
36. Gordon Gray—about to replace Cutler as Ike’s national security adviser—was a silent witness to the confrontation in the Oval Office.
37. FRUS: 1955–57, vol. 20, 755–56; Strauss to file, Nov. 6, 1957, Teller file, LLS/HHPL.
38. Ferrell (1981), 348–49; Teller to Fields, May 29, 1957, no. 137190, CIC/DOE; Teller to Strauss, June 4, 1957, Teller folder, LLS/HHPL; Mark interview (1991).
39. Killian and PSAC: Killian (1977), 20–30; Herken (1992), 104–5; Divine (1978), 171.
40. Killian (1977), 37.
41. Stassen: Hewlett and Holl (1989), 384, 469–71; Ambrose (1984), 447.
42. FRUS: 1958–60, vol. 3, 49–51, 567–72.
43. Ibid., 572.
44. Author interview with Hans Bethe, Pasadena, Calif., Jan 1, 1991. FRUS: 1958–60, vol. 3, 551–53.
45. Jeremy Bernstein (1981), 109.
46. FRUS: 1958–60, vol. 3, 575–89.
47. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 479; FRUS: 1958–60, vol. 3, 589–90.
48. FRUS: 1958–60, vol. 3, 597–98; 603–4. “Cessation of testing, in the judgment of the group, would leave the United States in a position of technical advantage for a few years, which will otherwise be lost,” Killian told Ike.
49. At the Ramey meeting, PSAC concluded that a moratorium before Hardtack stood no chance of approval by the AEC and Pentagon. Bethe interview (1991).
50. Teller (2001), 343–44; York (1987), 117–18; York interview (1997).
51. Appleby (1987), 272; Hewlett and Holl (1989), 477.
52. Hewlett and Holl (1989), 302; J. D. Hunley, “Polaris and Minuteman: The Solid-Propellant Breakthrough in Missiles” (unpublished manuscript, 2001).
53. Hansen (1995), “W-47,” 8–9; Strauss to Quarles, Jan. 2, 1958, no. 72458, CIC/DOE.
54. Strauss to Eisenhower, Jan. 29, 1958, no. 101731, CIC/DOE.
55. Agnew to Mills, Mar. 28, 1958, no. 123855, CIC/DOE. Open shot: “Demonstration Shot for Operation Hardtack,” Oct. 17, 1957, no. 72401, and teletype, Dec. 12, 1957, no. 123862, CIC/DOE; “Description of Devices,” n.d., box 99, LLNL.
56. Bradbury to York, Nov. 5, 1957, no. 101852, CIC/DOE.
57. Lawrence was interested in closing a loophole that his task force had identified in the inspection scheme: the possibility that the Russians might hide nuclear tests by exploding their bombs in space. Starbird to Lawrence, July 8, 1956, and Fields to Lawrence, Mar. 7, 1957, box 99, LLNL.
58. Christofilos and Argus: York (1987), 128–32; Beckerley to Thornton, Mar. 2, 1953, folder 10, carton 30, EOL; Loper to Chairman, July 3, 1958, no. MCCLXXXIII, JCAE.
59. Fields to Lawrence, Mar. 7, 1957, no. 137176; Strauss to Eisenhower, Nov. 23, 1957, no. 28933, CIC/DOE. Two of the high-altitude detonations, Teak and Orange, were also weapons-effects tests for a possible antiballistic missile system. Libby to Durham, Apr. 8, 1958, no. 7808, JCAE.
60. Starbird to Bradbury, Feb. 13, 1958, no. 125211, CIC/DOE.
61. Teller interview (July 30, 1993); Teller and Brown (1962), 72; Teller (2001), 434.
62. “The Compelling Need for Nuclear Tests,” Life, Feb. 10, 1958; Edward Teller and Albert Latter, Our Nuclear Future: Facts, Dangers, and Opportunities (Criterion Books, 1958); Hewlett and Holl (1989), 475; author interview with Albert Latter, Los Angeles, Calif., Mar. 11, 1985.
63. “If this goes on we shall just become a factory for making atomic bombs in whatever size or shape the customer wants and will boast, annually like the automobile manufacturers, of our fantastic improvements—although to the jaundiced eye, only the fenders have been changed,” Bradbury wrote. Bradbury to Starbird, Jan. 8, 1958, no. 125654, CIC/DOE.
64. Author interview with Edward Huddleson, San Francisco, Calif., Dec. 17, 1992.
65. Transcript of Don Gow interview, box 1, Childs papers; Childs (1968), 500.
66. Early in 1958, Lawrence feared “a severe reduction in the Berkeley program.” Lawrence to Tammaro, Jan. 15, 1958, folder 15, carton 30, EOL.
67. Neylan to Regents, July 13, 1954, box 171, Neylan papers.
68. Rabi to Strauss, Dec. 22, 1954, GAC file, AEC/NARA.
69. Dec. 14, 1955, GAC file, AEC/NARA.
70. “He saw no connection between higher energies and useful things, and then his enthusiasm dropped.” Lofgren interview (1998).
71. York interview (1997); Davis (1968), 351.
72. Feldman was invited back in 1955 but declined the invitation. David Feldman, Nov. 3, 1993, personal communication.
73. “Luis was telling Lawrence how to run the lab,” observed the Rad Lab’s amazed business manager. Transcript of Wallace Reynolds interview, 82, Bancroft Library; Alvarez (1987), 189, 205.
74. Dec. 9, 1957, confidential memos, box 4, Sproul papers.
75. Aebersold to Hamilton, Feb. 24, 1956, folder 22, carton 32, EOL.
76. Von Neumann had also died of cancer, ten days earlier.
77. Childs (1968), 516.
78. Teletype, Apr. 7, 1958, folder 1751, box 185, LLNL. Teller persuaded Mills’s widow to write to Eisenhower, urging completion of Hardtack. Author interview with Polly Plesset, Woodside, Calif., May 14, 1988.
79. Childs (1968), 518.
80. When Teller announced that he was “extremely unhappy about any agreement which starts with the word ‘don’t,’” Louis Ridenour dryly observed that God and Moses had previously found the formulation convenient. “Discussion on ‘Ban the Missile,’” Oct. 21, 1955; and “Task Force Meeting,” Mar. 1, 1957, box 64, Arneson file, USDS/NARA.
81. “Verbatim Record…,” May 19, 1956, 93, Arneson file, USDS/NARA.
82. “He wasn’t interested in a lot of things except the test ban, because he wanted to talk with the Russians.” Hayward interview (1996).
83. Author interview with James Gaither, San Francisco, Calif. Dec. 17, 1992. The Loomis fund paid for the Russian scientists’ visits to Berkeley.
84. Childs (1968), 511.
85. Waters to Hoover, July 12, 1955, Ernest Lawrence file, no. 116-10798, FBI.
86. “Verbatim Record…,” May 29, 1956, 138, Arneson file, USDS/NARA.
87. Donkin to Strauss, Mar. 4, 1957, “McKay Donkin’s Top Secret Material,” box 8, LLS/NARA.
88. FRUS: 1958–60, vol. 3, 604.
89. Voss (1963), 182; Davis (1968), 352; Killian (1977), 158; “Strauss Defeat on Delegates Is Disclosed,” Washington Evening Star, May 29, 1958; “Dr. Teller’s Influence with Ike Wanes After Error on ‘Clean Bomb,’” Buffalo Evening News, Apr. 12, 1958.
90. Smith interview (1992).
91. Pfau (1984), 215–17.
92. Appearing on a television talk show, Anderson raised doubts about Strauss’s veracity concerning the clean bomb. Transcript, Face the Nation, May 4, 1958, no. 100116; Kline to Anderson, May 8, 1958, no. 100132; AEC press release, May 4, 1958, no. 74322, CIC/DOE.
93. McCone: Hewlett
