47 Entry in Jodl’s Diary for March 14, 1940: “Ob.d.M. ist zweifelhaft, ob es jestz noch wichtig ist, in N. das preventive zu spielen. Fraglich ob man nicht Gelb vor Weserübung machen soll.” By hinting at delaying the attack on Norway until after the attack in the West, Raeder was obviously thinking that the very hazardous operation in Norway might not be necessary if the attack in the West was successful. See also Jodl’s Diary entries for March 21 and 28, 1940.
48 See Fuehrer Conferences 1940, “Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy to the Fuehrer on 9 March 1940 at 1200”, vol. 1, pp. 20-21 and “Report of the Commander in Chief, Navy to the Fuehrer in the Afternoon of 26 March 1940”, vol I, pp. 22-24.
49 Earl F. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940-1945. Washington, D.C.: Department of Army Pamphlet 20-271, 1959, p.20.
50 Fuehrer Conferences 1940, March 29, 1940, vol. 1, p. 29.
51 Gruppe XXI Kriegstagesbuch (hereinafter XXIKTB), 1 April 1940 as quoted in Ziemke, German Northern Theater, pp. 21-22.
52 Extract from the Private Diary of Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg, April 9, 1940, p. 17, quoted in Hubatsch, Appendix J, 454.
53 Quoted in Ziemke, 32.
54 Admiral Carls’ assessment of the situation in the evening of April 7, 1940. Quoted in Steen, 1:149.
Chapter 3
1 Ladislas Fargo, The Game of the Foxes (New York: D. McKay Co., 1971), pp. 431-436.
2 David Irving, Hitler’s War (New York: The Viking Press, 1977), p. 94.
3 Harold C. Deutsch, The Conspiracy against Hitler in the Twilight War (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1968), p. 320.
4 Deutsch, The Conspiracy against Hitler, p. 321, and Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, The Canaris Conspiracy. The Secret Resistance to Hitler in the German Army (New York: Pinnacle Books, 1972), pp. 122-123. Stang was not a member of Nasjonal Samling at this time but joined that party after his return to Norway. In the trials following World War 2 Stang was prosecuted for failing to forward Sas’ warning. He claimed that he had not knowingly kept this information from the Norwegian Government and the court found him innocent of this charge. However, he was sentenced to four years of hard labor because of his party membership.
5 This and the other intelligence reports received by the Norwegian Naval Staff and used in this book are copied in Steen, Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945, vol. 1, pp. 199-204.
6 Ottmer, Weserübung, p. 61.
7 “Norge visste, ingen gjorde noe,” Aftenposten, June 14, 2005.
8 Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: HMSO, 1970), p. 114.
9 Admiral Diesen had ordered his forces to the highest state of alert on a couple of occasions during the winter when the situation appeared threatening. He had received a reprimand from the Foreign Minister on the last occasion and this may have contributed to his lack of enthusiasm for taking this step, but his own views of the nature of the threat were probably of equal importance.
10 Bjørnson, Narvik, p. 210.
11 Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 459.
12 PRO, FO 371/24815 N 3602/2/63. Laurence Collier, considered a Norwegian expert, was Dormer’s designated replacement as British representative in Norway.
13 T. K. Derry, The Campaign in Norway (London: HMSO, 1952), p. 26.
14 Harvey, Scandinavian Misadventure, p. 56.
15 The Home Fleet in Scapa Flow consisted of two battleships, one battle cruiser, three cruisers (including one French), and 12 destroyers (including two French). Another battleship and an aircraft carrier (without fighters) were on their way from Clyde to join the fleet. In addition, there was the 2nd Cruiser Squadron at Rosyth with two light cruisers and eight destroyers. One battle cruiser, one heavy cruiser and 16 destroyers were at sea or off Norway’s northern coast. Then there was the 18th Cruiser Squadron consisting of two heavy cruisers and five destroyers in the North Sea along with one large minelayer and four destroyers. The addition of four cruisers and two destroyers (1st Cruiser Squadron) was not a significant augmentation in view of the damage the disembarkation of troops caused to Allied plans for landing troops in Norway.
16 See, for example, Peter Dickens, Narvik: Battles in the Fjords (Naval Institute Press, 1974), pp. 25-26 and Donald MacIntyre, Narvik (London: Evans Brothers Ltd, 1959), pp. 35-36.
17 Quoted in Dickens, Narvik, p. 30.
18 Ibid.
19 The four destroyers that laid the minefield had undergone a conversion. Both torpedo tubes and two guns were removed in order to compensate for the weight of the mines.
20 Quoted in Steen, Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945, vol. 1, pp. 154-155.
21 Renown had a displacement of 32,000 tons, could reach a speed of 29 knots, and carried a crew of 1,200. Her main armament consisted of six 15-inch guns and her secondary armament consisted of 20 4.5-inch guns. The German battleships had a displacement of 31,850 tons, and were capable of a speed of 31.5 knots. Each had a crew of about 1,800, a main armament of 11-inch guns, and 12 6-inch and 14 4-inch guns as secondary armament.
22 Fuehrer Conferences 1940, April 13, 1940, vol. 1, p. 36.
23 Admiral Forbes received several intelligence reports from the Admiralty on April 8, but they were not all timely. The Polish submarine Orzel sank the Rio de Janeiro about 1015 hours GMT on April 8. The Admiralty learned about this in the early afternoon and it was reported by Reuters from Oslo at 1930 GMT. However, Admiral Forbes was not given this information until 2255 GMT.
24 See, for example, Moulton, Study of Warfare, p. 102; MacIntyre, Narvik, pp. 29-33 Dickens, Battles in the Fjords, p. 28. Stephen Wentworth Roskill writes, “Admiral Forbes has stated that by this time (after the Glowworm engagement) he was convinced in his own mind that a German attack on Norway
