25 See, for example, MacIntyre, Narvik, p. 33.
26 MacIntyre, Narvik, p. 52.
Chapter 4
1 Quoted in Trygve Sandvik, Operasjonene til lands i Nord-Norge 1940 (2 vols; Oslo: Forsvarets Krigshistoriske Avdeling, 1965), vol. 1, p. 65.
2 Carl Gustav Fleischer, Efterlatte papirer (Tønsberg: Tønsbergs aktietrykkeris forlag i kommisjon hos T. Landberg, 1947), p.17.
3 The fact that a number of officers and NCOs in the units undergoing mobilization were in other parts of the country at the time of the German attack caused problems. Few of these individuals were able to reach their units. Some who did manage the long journey did so in fishing vessels or by traveling through Sweden.
4 Odd Lindbäck-Larsen, Rapport om 6. Divisjons-kommandos virksomhet under nøytralitetvakten 1939-40 og felttoget 1940 Section 1, pp. 4-5.
5 Palle Ydstebø, Geostrategi, trusselvurdering og operativ planlegging. Forsvaret av Nord-Norge 1880-1920 (Tromso: University of Tromso, 2000), p. 141.
6 Ydstebø, Geostrategi, p. 154.
7 Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 1, p. 80.
8 Sandvik, Operasjonene,, vol. 1, p. 83.
9 Steen, Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945, vol. 4, p. 44.
10 At the outbreak of World War 2, Foreign Minister Koht suggested that Narvik be declared a restricted military zone. The 6th Division supported this suggestion but it met serious opposition from the permanent undersecretary at the Foreign Office and from the military authorities. Their argument was that to take such action after the outbreak of hostilities might be interpreted as provocative by the belligerents.
11 There were 27 merchant ships in Narvik on April 8. These included ten German iron ore freighters and the German tanker Jan Wellem. In addition, there were four Norwegian, six Swedish, one Dutch, and five British merchant ships in the harbor.
12 Colonel Løken’s report on February 21, 1941 as quoted in Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 1, p. 93.
13 Report by Captain Løken on November 9, 1945 as quoted in Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 1, p. 94 and Colonel Sundlo’s report on December 14, 1941 as quoted in Steen, Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945, vol. 4, p.59.
14 Lindbäck-Larsen,, Rapport Section 4, p. 3.
15 Report by Captain Løken dated November 9, 1945 as quoted in Steen, Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945, vol. 4, p. 59.
16 Steen, Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945, vol. 4, p. 59.
17 In answer to questions from his subordinates about what was going on when he ordered the bunkers occupied, he allegedly told them that he did not know. Some subordinates thought the whole thing was one of the periodic alerts and not the real thing. See letters and reports from two lieutenants and one sergeant in 1940 and 1946 as quoted in Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 1, pp. 100-101. It is doubtful that this apparent lack of information stems from Captain Dalsve failing to brief Captain Langlo. Sundlo briefed Langlo and others on the developing situation at 1700 hours. Langlo spoke with Sundlo on several occasions that night and received orders to reinforce the guard detail at Nordal Bridge, to place his company on alert, to send a snow removal detail to Øyord, and to send an officer or NCO to each of two bunkers. It is very unlikely that the reasons for these orders were not mentioned or that Captain Langlo failed to ask the reasons for these actions.
18 Witness statement by Captain Munthe-Kaas on April 22, 1947 as quoted in Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 1, p. 98.
19 Report by Major Spjeldnæs on August 27, 1940 and report by Major Omdal on May 23, 1940 as quoted in Sandvik, Operasjonene, vol. 1, p. 102.
Chapter 5
1 The actual composition of the various flotillas changed from time to time when ships were attached or detached.
2 XXIKTB, No 3.279/16, reports that the strength and equipment of a mountain infantry battalion on leaving Wesermunde was: 25 officers, 528 non-commissioned officers and enlisted, nine motorcycles, 27 light machineguns, 10 heavy machineguns, nine light mortars, six heavy mortars, and two light infantry guns. Each of the three battalions consisted of a headquarters, a heavy weapons company, and three rifle companies. The heavy weapons company numbered 104 men and the armament consisted of six heavy mortars and two light antitank guns. The infantry companies also had 104 men and their crew-served weapons consisted of nine light machineguns, two heavy machineguns, and three light mortars. The companies in the German mountain divisions were numbered consecutively. That means that the first battalion in a regiment consisted of companies 1-5, the second battalion of companies 6-10, and the third battalion of companies 11-15. The next to the last company in each battalion (4, 9, and 14) were the heavy weapons companies while the last (5, 10, and 15) were headquarters companies.
3 Colonel Alois Windisch (1892–1958) was an Austrian and an exceedingly capable officer who proved to be a tough opponent for the Norwegians and French in the Narvik area. General Hovland calls him the most talented German officer in the Narvik Campaign and a dangerous opponent. He spent all of World War 1 at the front, was wounded three times, and highly decorated. He had a balanced career in troop command, combat, and general staff service. He organized the 139th Mountain Infantry Regiment in 1938 and commanded it during the Polish Campaign. His regiment participated in the attack on the Soviet Union on the arctic front. He was relieved of his command in March 1942 because he had launched a regimental attack without promised air support. For a while, he was in charge of the prisoner of war camp at Bezirk Kirowgrad. He was promoted to major general in 1943 and was later given command of the 285th Security Division in Yugoslavia. He became a Soviet prisoner of war in 1945, was handed over to Yugoslavia, tried, and sentenced to 20 years in prison. He was released in 1953.
4 Gerda-Luise Dietl and Kurt Hermann, General Dietl (Munich, 1951), p. 17.
5 Steen, Norges Sjøkrig 1940-1945, vol. 4,
