Dialogues

to be as follows: Someone says to me, “O Stranger, are all things at rest and nothing in motion, or is the exact opposite of this true, or are some things in motion and others at rest?” To this I shall reply that some things are in motion and others at rest. “And do not things which move move in a place, and are not the things which are at rest at rest in a place?” Certainly. “And some move or rest in one place and some in more places than one?” You mean to say, we shall rejoin, that those things which rest at the centre move in one place, just as the circumference goes round of globes which are said to be at rest? “Yes.” And we observe that, in the revolution, the motion which carries round the larger and the lesser circle at the same time is proportionally distributed to greater and smaller, and is greater and smaller in a certain proportion. Here is a wonder which might be thought an impossibility, that the same motion should impart swiftness and slowness in due proportion to larger and lesser circles. “Very true.” And when you speak of bodies moving in many places, you seem to me to mean those which move from one place to another, and sometimes have one centre of motion and sometimes more than one because they turn upon their axis; and whenever they meet anything, if it be stationary, they are divided by it; but if they get in the midst between bodies which are approaching and moving towards the same spot from opposite directions, they unite with them. “I admit the truth of what you are saying.” Also when they unite they grow, and when they are divided they waste away⁠—that is, supposing the constitution of each to remain, or if that fails, then there is a second reason of their dissolution. “And when are all things created and how?” Clearly, they are created when the first principle receives increase and attains to the second dimension, and from this arrives at the one which is neighbour to this, and after reaching the third becomes perceptible to sense. Everything which is thus changing and moving is in process of generation; only when at rest has it real existence, but when passing into another state it is destroyed utterly. Have we not mentioned all motions that there are, and comprehended them under their kinds and numbered them with the exception, my friends, of two? Cleinias Which are they? Athenian Just the two, with which our present enquiry is concerned. Cleinias Speak plainer. Athenian I suppose that our enquiry has reference to the soul? Cleinias Very true. Athenian Let us assume that there is a motion able to move other things, but not to move itself; that is one kind; and there is another kind which can move itself as well as other things, working in composition and decomposition, by increase and diminution and generation and destruction⁠—that is also one of the many kinds of motion. Cleinias Granted. Athenian And we will assume that which moves other, and is changed by other, to be the ninth, and that which changes itself and others, and is coincident with every action and every passion, and is the true principle of change and motion in all that is⁠—that we shall be inclined to call the tenth. Cleinias Certainly. Athenian And which of these ten motions ought we to prefer as being the mightiest and most efficient? Cleinias I must say that the motion which is able to move itself is ten thousand times superior to all the others.537 Athenian Very good; but may I make one or two corrections in what I have been saying? Cleinias What are they? Athenian When I spoke of the tenth sort of motion, that was not quite correct. Cleinias What was the error? Athenian According to the true order, the tenth was really the first in generation and power; then follows the second, which was strangely enough termed the ninth by us. Cleinias What do you mean? Athenian I mean this: when one thing changes another, and that another, of such will there be any primary changing element? How can a thing which is moved by another ever be the beginning of change? Impossible. But when the self-moved changes other, and that again other, and thus thousands upon tens of thousands of bodies are set in motion, must not the beginning of all this motion be the change of the self-moving principle?538 Cleinias Very true, and I quite agree. Athenian Or, to put the question in another way, making answer to ourselves: If, as most of these philosophers have the audacity to affirm, all things were at rest in one mass, which of the above-mentioned principles of motion would first spring up among them? Cleinias Clearly the self-moving; for there could be no change in them arising out of any external cause; the change must first take place in themselves. Athenian Then we must say that self-motion being the origin of all motions, and the first which arises among things at rest as well as among things in motion, is the eldest and mightiest principle of change, and that which is changed by another and yet moves other is second. Cleinias Quite true. Athenian At this stage of the argument let us put a question. Cleinias What question? Athenian If we were to see this power existing in any earthy, watery, or fiery substance, simple or compound⁠—how should we describe it? Cleinias You mean to ask whether we should call such a self-moving power life? Athenian I do. Cleinias Certainly we should. Athenian And when we see soul in anything, must we not do the same⁠—must we not admit that this is life? Cleinias We must. Athenian And now, I beseech you, reflect⁠—you would admit that we have a threefold knowledge of things? Cleinias What do you mean? Athenian I mean that we know the essence, and that we know the definition of the essence, and the name⁠—these are the three; and there are two questions which may be raised about