Dialogues

anything. Cleinias How two? Athenian Sometimes a person may give the name and ask the definition; or he may give the definition and ask the name. I may illustrate what I mean in this way. Cleinias How? Athenian Number like some other things is capable of being divided into equal parts; when thus divided, number is named “even,” and the definition of the name “even” is “number divisible into two equal parts”? Cleinias True. Athenian I mean, that when we are asked about the definition and give the name, or when we are asked about the name and give the definition⁠—in either case, whether we give name or definition, we speak of the same thing, calling “even” the number which is divided into two equal parts. Cleinias Quite true. Athenian And what is the definition of that which is named “soul”? Can we conceive of any other than that which has been already given⁠—the motion which can move itself? Cleinias You mean to say that the essence which is defined as the self-moved is the same with that which has the name soul? Athenian Yes; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there is anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin and moving power of all that is, or has become, or will be, and their contraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the source of change and motion in all things? Cleinias Certainly not; the soul as being the source of motion, has been most satisfactorily shown to be the oldest of all things. Athenian And is not that motion which is produced in another, by reason of another, but never has any self-moving power at all, being in truth the change of an inanimate body, to be reckoned second, or by any lower number which you may prefer? Cleinias Exactly. Athenian Then we are right, and speak the most perfect and absolute truth, when we say that the soul is prior to the body, and that the body is second and comes afterwards, and is born to obey the soul, which is the ruler? Cleinias Nothing can be more true. Athenian Do you remember our old admission, that if the soul was prior to the body the things of the soul were also prior to those of the body? Cleinias Certainly. Athenian Then characters and manners, and wishes and reasonings, and true opinions, and reflections, and recollections are prior to length and breadth and depth and strength of bodies, if the soul is prior to the body. Cleinias To be sure. Athenian In the next place, we must not of necessity admit that the soul is the cause of good and evil, base and honourable, just and unjust, and of all other opposites, if we suppose her to be the cause of all things? Cleinias We must. Athenian And as the soul orders and inhabits all things that move, however moving, must we not say that she orders also the heavens? Cleinias Of course. Athenian One soul or more? More than one⁠—I will answer for you; at any rate, we must not suppose that there are less than two⁠—one the author of good, and the other of evil. Cleinias Very true. Athenian Yes, very true; the soul then directs all things in heaven, and earth, and sea by her movements, and these are described by the terms⁠—will, consideration, attention, deliberation, opinion true and false, joy and sorrow, confidence, fear, hatred, love, and other primary motions akin to these; which again receive the secondary motions of corporeal substances, and guide all things to growth and decay, to composition and decomposition, and to the qualities which accompany them, such as heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, hardness and softness, blackness and whiteness, bitterness and sweetness, and all those other qualities which the soul uses, herself a goddess, when truly receiving the divine mind she disciplines all things rightly to their happiness; but when she is the companion of folly, she does the very contrary of all this. Shall we assume so much, or do we still entertain doubts? Cleinias There is no room at all for doubt. Athenian Shall we say then that it is the soul which controls heaven and earth, and the whole world? that it is a principle of wisdom and virtue, or a principle which has neither wisdom nor virtue? Suppose that we make answer as follows: Cleinias How would you answer? Athenian If, my friend, we say that the whole path and movement of heaven, and of all that is therein, is by nature akin to the movement and revolution and calculation of mind, and proceeds by kindred laws, then, as is plain, we must say that the best soul takes care of the world and guides it along the good path. Cleinias True. Athenian But if the world moves wildly and irregularly, then the evil soul guides it. Cleinias True again. Athenian Of what nature is the movement of mind? To this question it is not easy to give an intelligent answer; and therefore I ought to assist you in framing one. Cleinias Very good. Athenian Then let us not answer as if we would look straight at the sun, making ourselves darkness at midday539⁠—I mean as if we were under the impression that we could see with mortal eyes, or know adequately the nature of mind⁠—it will be safer to look at the image only. Cleinias What do you mean? Athenian Let us select of the ten motions the one which mind chiefly resembles; this I will bring to your recollection, and will then make the answer on behalf of us all. Cleinias That will be excellent. Athenian You will surely remember our saying that all things were either at rest or in motion? Cleinias I do. Athenian And that of things in motion some were moving in one place, and others in more than one? Cleinias Yes. Athenian Of these two kinds of motion, that which moves in one place must move about a centre like globes made in a lathe, and is most entirely akin and similar to the circular movement of mind. Cleinias What do you mean? Athenian In