Dialogues

he ever be able to preserve that of which he does not even know the aim? Cleinias Impossible. Athenian And therefore, if our settlement of the country is to be perfect, we ought to have some institution, which, as I was saying, will tell what is the aim of the state, and will inform us how we are to attain this, and what law or what man will advise us to that end. Any state which has no such institution is likely to be devoid of mind and sense, and in all her actions will proceed by mere chance. Cleinias Very true. Athenian In which, then, of the parts or institutions of the state is any such guardian power to be found? Can we say? Cleinias I am not quite certain, Stranger; but I have a suspicion that you are referring to the assembly which you just now said was to meet at night. Athenian You understand me perfectly, Cleinias; and we must assume, as the argument implies, that this council possesses all virtue; and the beginning of virtue is not to make mistakes by guessing many things, but to look steadily at one thing, and on this to fix all our aims. Cleinias Quite true. Athenian Then now we shall see why there is nothing wonderful in states going astray⁠—the reason is that their legislators have such different aims; nor is there anything wonderful in some laying down as their rule of justice, that certain individuals should bear rule in the state, whether they be good or bad, and others that the citizens should be rich, not caring whether they are the slaves of other men or not. The tendency of others, again, is towards freedom; and some legislate with a view to two things at once⁠—they want to be at the same time free and the lords of other states; but the wisest men, as they deem themselves to be, look to all these and similar aims, and there is no one of them which they exclusively honour, and to which they would have all things look. Cleinias Then, Stranger, our former assertion will hold; for we were saying that laws generally should look to one thing only; and this, as we admitted, was rightly said to be virtue. Athenian Yes. Cleinias And we said that virtue was of four kinds? Athenian Quite true. Cleinias And that mind was the leader of the four, and that to her the three other virtues and all other things ought to have regard? Athenian You follow me capitally, Cleinias, and I would ask you to follow me to the end, for we have already said that the mind of the pilot, the mind of the physician and of the general look to that one thing to which they ought to look; and now we may turn to mind political, of which, as of a human creature, we will ask a question: O wonderful being, and to what are you looking? The physician is able to tell his single aim in life, but you, the superior, as you declare yourself to be, of all intelligent beings, when you are asked are not able to tell. Can you, Megillus, and you, Cleinias, say distinctly what is the aim of mind political, in return for the many explanations of things which I have given you? Cleinias We cannot, Stranger. Athenian Well, but ought we not to desire to see it, and to see where it is to be found? Cleinias For example, where? Athenian For example, we were saying that there are four kinds of virtue, and as there are four of them, each of them must be one. Cleinias Certainly. Athenian And further, all four of them we call one; for we say that courage is virtue, and that prudence is virtue, and the same of the two others, as if they were in reality not many but one, that is, virtue. Cleinias Quite so. Athenian There is no difficulty in seeing in what way the two differ from one another, and have received two names, and so of the rest. But there is more difficulty in explaining why we call these two and the rest of them by the single name of virtue. Cleinias How do you mean? Athenian I have no difficulty in explaining what I mean. Let us distribute the subject into questions and answers. Cleinias Once more, what do you mean? Athenian Ask me what is that one thing which I call virtue, and then again speak of as two, one part being courage and the other wisdom. I will tell you how that occurs: One of them has to do with fear; in this the beasts also participate,593 and quite young children⁠—I mean courage; for a courageous temper is a gift of nature and not of reason. But without reason there never has been, or is, or will be a wise and understanding soul; it is of a different nature. Cleinias That is true. Athenian I have now told you in what way the two are different, and do you in return tell me in what way they are one and the same. Suppose that I ask you in what way the four are one, and when you have answered me, you will have a right to ask of me in return in what way they are four; and then let us proceed to enquire whether in the case of things which have a name and also a definition to them, true knowledge consists in knowing the name only and not the definition. Can he who is good for anything be ignorant of all this without discredit where great and glorious truths are concerned? Cleinias I suppose not. Athenian And is there anything greater to the legislator and the guardian of the law, and to him who thinks that he excels all other men in virtue, and has won the palm of excellence, than these very qualities of which we are now speaking⁠—courage, temperance, wisdom, justice? Cleinias How can there be anything greater? Athenian And ought not the interpreters, the teachers, the lawgivers, the guardians