Dialogues

of the other citizens, to excel the rest of mankind, and perfectly to show him who desires to learn and know or whose evil actions require to be punished and reproved, what is the nature of virtue and vice? Or shall some poet who has found his way into the city, or some chance person who pretends to be an instructor of youth, show himself to be better than him who has won the prize for every virtue? And can we wonder that when the guardians are not adequate in speech or action, and have no adequate knowledge of virtue, the city being unguarded should experience the common fate of cities in our day? Cleinias Wonder! no. Athenian Well, then, must we do as we said? Or can we give our guardians a more precise knowledge of virtue in speech and action than the many have? or is there any way in which our city can be made to resemble the head and senses of rational beings because possessing such a guardian power? Cleinias What, Stranger, is the drift of your comparison? Athenian Do we not see that the city is the trunk, and are not the younger guardians, who are chosen for their natural gifts, placed in the head of the state, having their souls all full of eyes, with which they look about the whole city? They keep watch and hand over their perceptions to the memory, and inform the elders of all that happens in the city; and those whom we compared to the mind, because they have many wise thoughts⁠—that is to say, the old men⁠—take counsel, and making use of the younger men as their ministers, and advising with them⁠—in this way both together truly preserve the whole state: Shall this or some other be the order of our state? Are all our citizens to be equal in acquirements, or shall there be special persons among them who have received a more careful training and education? Cleinias That they should be equal, my good sir, is impossible. Athenian Then we ought to proceed to some more exact training than any which has preceded. Cleinias Certainly. Athenian And must not that of which we are in need be the one to which we were just now alluding? Cleinias Very true. Athenian Did we not say that the workman or guardian, if he be perfect in every respect, ought not only to be able to see the many aims, but he should press onward to the one?594 This he should know, and knowing, order all things with a view to it. Cleinias True. Athenian And can anyone have a more exact way of considering or contemplating anything, than the being able to look at one idea gathered from many different things? Cleinias Perhaps not. Athenian Not “Perhaps not,” but “Certainly not,” my good sir, is the right answer. There never has been a truer method than this discovered by any man. Cleinias I bow to your authority, Stranger; let us proceed in the way which you propose. Athenian Then, as would appear, we must compel the guardians of our divine state to perceive, in the first place, what that principle is which is the same in all the four⁠—the same, as we affirm, in courage and in temperance, and in justice and in prudence, and which, being one, we call as we ought, by the single name of virtue. To this, my friends, we will, if you please, hold fast, and not let go until we have sufficiently explained what that is to which we are to look, whether to be regarded as one, or as a whole, or as both, or in whatever way. Are we likely ever to be in a virtuous condition, if we cannot tell whether virtue is many, or four, or one? Certainly, if we take counsel among ourselves, we shall in some way contrive that this principle has a place amongst us; but if you have made up your mind that we should let the matter alone, we will. Cleinias We must not, Stranger, by the God of strangers I swear that we must not, for in our opinion you speak most truly; but we should like to know how you will accomplish your purpose. Athenian Wait a little before you ask; and let us, first of all, be quite agreed with one another that the purpose has to be accomplished. Cleinias Certainly, it ought to be, if it can be. Athenian Well, and about the good and the honourable, are we to take the same view? Are our guardians only to know that each of them is many, or also how and in what way they are one? Cleinias They must consider also in what sense they are one. Athenian And are they to consider only, and to be unable to set forth what they think? Cleinias Certainly not; that would be the state of a slave. Athenian And may not the same be said of all good things⁠—that the true guardians of the laws ought to know the truth about them, and to be able to interpret them in words, and carry them out in action, judging of what is and of what is not well, according to nature? Cleinias Certainly. Athenian Is not the knowledge of the Gods which we have set forth with so much zeal one of the noblest sorts of knowledge⁠—to know that they are, and know how great is their power, as far as in man lies? We do indeed excuse the mass of the citizens, who only follow the voice of the laws, but we refuse to admit as guardians any who do not labour to obtain every possible evidence that there is respecting the Gods; our city is forbidden and not allowed to choose as a guardian of the law, or to place in the select order of virtue, him who is not an inspired man, and has not laboured at these things. Cleinias It is certainly just, as you say, that he who is indolent about such matters or incapable