Dialogues

is unintentionally dishonest should be pardoned. Eudicus Yes, Hippias, do as he says; and for our sake, and also that you may not belie your profession, answer whatever Socrates asks you. Hippias I will answer, as you request me; and do you ask whatever you like. Socrates I am very desirous, Hippias, of examining this question, as to which are the better⁠—those who err voluntarily or involuntarily? And if you will answer me, I think that I can put you in the way of approaching the subject: You would admit, would you not, that there are good runners? Hippias Yes. Socrates And there are bad runners? Hippias Yes. Socrates And he who runs well is a good runner, and he who runs ill is a bad runner? Hippias Very true. Socrates And he who runs slowly runs ill, and he who runs quickly runs well? Hippias Yes. Socrates Then in a race, and in running, swiftness is a good, and slowness is an evil quality? Hippias To be sure. Socrates Which of the two then is a better runner? He who runs slowly voluntarily, or he who runs slowly involuntarily? Hippias He who runs slowly voluntarily. Socrates And is not running a species of doing? Hippias Certainly. Socrates And if a species of doing, a species of action? Hippias Yes. Socrates Then he who runs badly does a bad and dishonourable action in a race? Hippias Yes; a bad action, certainly. Socrates And he who runs slowly runs badly? Hippias Yes. Socrates Then the good runner does this bad and disgraceful action voluntarily, and the bad involuntarily? Hippias That is to be inferred. Socrates Then he who involuntarily does evil actions, is worse in a race than he who does them voluntarily? Hippias Yes, in a race. Socrates Well, but at a wrestling match⁠—which is the better wrestler, he who falls voluntarily or involuntarily? Hippias He who falls voluntarily, doubtless. Socrates And is it worse or more dishonourable at a wrestling match, to fall, or to throw another? Hippias To fall. Socrates Then, at a wrestling match, he who voluntarily does base and dishonourable actions is a better wrestler than he who does them involuntarily? Hippias That appears to be the truth. Socrates And what would you say of any other bodily exercise⁠—is not he who is better made able to do both that which is strong and that which is weak⁠—that which is fair and that which is foul?⁠—so that when he does bad actions with the body, he who is better made does them voluntarily, and he who is worse made does them involuntarily. Hippias Yes, that appears to be true about strength. Socrates And what do you say about grace, Hippias? Is not he who is better made able to assume evil and disgraceful figures and postures voluntarily, as he who is worse made assumes them involuntarily? Hippias True. Socrates Then voluntary ungracefulness comes from excellence of the bodily frame, and involuntary from the defect of the bodily frame? Hippias True. Socrates And what would you say of an unmusical voice; would you prefer the voice which is voluntarily or involuntarily out of tune? Hippias That which is voluntarily out of tune. Socrates The involuntary is the worse of the two? Hippias Yes. Socrates And would you choose to possess goods or evils? Hippias Goods. Socrates And would you rather have feet which are voluntarily or involuntarily lame? Hippias Feet which are voluntarily lame. Socrates But is not lameness a defect or deformity? Hippias Yes. Socrates And is not blinking a defect in the eyes? Hippias Yes. Socrates And would you rather always have eyes with which you might voluntarily blink and not see, or with which you might involuntarily blink? Hippias I would rather have eyes which voluntarily blink. Socrates Then in your own case you deem that which voluntarily acts ill, better than that which involuntarily acts ill? Hippias Yes, certainly, in cases such as you mention. Socrates And does not the same hold of ears, nostrils, mouth, and of all the senses⁠—those which involuntarily act ill are not to be desired, as being defective; and those which voluntarily act ill are to be desired as being good? Hippias I agree. Socrates And what would you say of instruments;⁠—which are the better sort of instruments to have to do with?⁠—those with which a man acts ill voluntarily or involuntarily? For example, had a man better have a rudder with which he will steer ill, voluntarily or involuntarily? Hippias He had better have a rudder with which he will steer ill voluntarily. Socrates And does not the same hold of the bow and the lyre, the flute and all other things? Hippias Very true. Socrates And would you rather have a horse of such a temper that you may ride him ill voluntarily or involuntarily? Hippias I would rather have a horse which I could ride ill voluntarily. Socrates That would be the better horse? Hippias Yes. Socrates Then with a horse of better temper, vicious actions would be produced voluntarily; and with a horse of bad temper involuntarily? Hippias Certainly. Socrates And that would be true of a dog, or of any other animal? Hippias Yes. Socrates And is it better to possess the mind of an archer who voluntarily or involuntarily misses the mark? Hippias Of him who voluntarily misses. Socrates This would be the better mind for the purposes of archery? Hippias Yes. Socrates Then the mind which involuntarily errs is worse than the mind which errs voluntarily? Hippias Yes, certainly, in the use of the bow. Socrates And what would you say of the art of medicine;⁠—has not the mind which voluntarily works harm to the body, more of the healing art? Hippias Yes. Socrates Then in the art of medicine the voluntary is better than the involuntary? Hippias Yes. Socrates Well, and in lute-playing and in flute-playing, and in all arts and sciences, is not that mind the better which voluntarily does what is evil and dishonourable, and goes wrong, and is not the worse that which does so involuntarily? Hippias That is evident. Socrates And what would you say of the characters of slaves? Should we not prefer to have those who voluntarily do wrong and make mistakes, and are they not better in their mistakes than those who commit them involuntarily? Hippias Yes. Socrates And should we not desire to have our own minds in the best state possible? Hippias Yes. Socrates And will