Dialogues

our minds be better if they do wrong and make mistakes voluntarily or involuntarily? Hippias O, Socrates, it would be a monstrous thing to say that those who do wrong voluntarily are better than those who do wrong involuntarily! Socrates And yet that appears to be the only inference. Hippias I do not think so. Socrates But I imagined, Hippias, that you did. Please to answer once more: Is not justice a power, or knowledge, or both? Must not justice, at all events, be one of these? Hippias Yes. Socrates But if justice is a power of the soul, then the soul which has the greater power is also the more just; for that which has the greater power, my good friend, has been proved by us to be the better. Hippias Yes, that has been proved. Socrates And if justice is knowledge, then the wiser will be the juster soul, and the more ignorant the more unjust? Hippias Yes. Socrates But if justice be power as well as knowledge⁠—then will not the soul which has both knowledge and power be the more just, and that which is the more ignorant be the more unjust? Must it not be so? Hippias Clearly. Socrates And is not the soul which has the greater power and wisdom also better, and better able to do both good and evil in every action? Hippias Certainly. Socrates The soul, then, which acts ill, acts voluntarily by power and art⁠—and these either one or both of them are elements of justice? Hippias That seems to be true. Socrates And to do injustice is to do ill, and not to do injustice is to do well? Hippias Yes. Socrates And will not the better and abler soul when it does wrong, do wrong voluntarily, and the bad soul involuntarily? Hippias Clearly. Socrates And the good man is he who has the good soul, and the bad man is he who has the bad? Hippias Yes. Socrates Then the good man will voluntarily do wrong, and the bad man involuntarily, if the good man is he who has the good soul? Hippias Which he certainly has. Socrates Then, Hippias, he who voluntarily does wrong and disgraceful things, if there be such a man, will be the good man? Hippias There I cannot agree with you. Socrates Nor can I agree with myself, Hippias; and yet that seems to be the conclusion which, as far as we can see at present, must follow from our argument. As I was saying before, I am all abroad, and being in perplexity am always changing my opinion. Now, that I or any ordinary man should wander in perplexity is not surprising; but if you wise men also wander, and we cannot come to you and rest from our wandering, the matter begins to be serious both to us and to you.

First Alcibiades

Introduction

The “First Alcibiades” is a conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades. Socrates is represented in the character which he attributes to himself in the “Apology” of a know-nothing who detects the conceit of knowledge in others. The two have met already in the “Protagoras” and in the “Symposium”; in the latter dialogue, as in this, the relation between them is that of a lover and his beloved. But the narrative of their loves is told differently in different places; for in the “Symposium” Alcibiades is depicted as the impassioned but rejected lover; here, as coldly receiving the advances of Socrates, who, for the best of purposes, lies in wait for the aspiring and ambitious youth.

Alcibiades, who is described as a very young man, is about to enter on public life, having an inordinate opinion of himself, and an extravagant ambition. Socrates, “who knows what is in man,” astonishes him by a revelation of his designs. But has he the knowledge which is necessary for carrying them out? He is going to persuade the Athenians⁠—about what? Not about any particular art, but about politics⁠—when to fight and when to make peace. Now, men should fight and make peace on just grounds, and therefore the question of justice and injustice must enter into peace and war; and he who advises the Athenians must know the difference between them. Does Alcibiades know? If he does, he must either have been taught by some master, or he must have discovered the nature of them himself. If he has had a master, Socrates would like to be informed who he is, that he may go and learn of him also. Alcibiades admits that he has never learned. Then has he enquired for himself? He may have, if he was ever aware of a time when he was ignorant. But he never was ignorant; for when he played with other boys at dice, he charged them with cheating, and this implied a knowledge of just and unjust. According to his own explanation, he had learned of the multitude. Why, he asks, should he not learn of them the nature of justice, as he has learned the Greek language of them? To this Socrates answers, that they can teach Greek, but they cannot teach justice; for they are agreed about the one, but they are not agreed about the other: and therefore Alcibiades, who has admitted that if he knows he must either have learned from a master or have discovered for himself the nature of justice, is convicted out of his own mouth.

Alcibiades rejoins, that the Athenians debate not about what is just, but about what is expedient; and he asserts that the two principles of justice and expediency are opposed. Socrates, by a series of questions, compels him to admit that the just and the expedient coincide. Alcibiades is thus reduced to the humiliating conclusion that he knows nothing of politics, even if, as he says, they are concerned with the expedient.

However, he is no worse than other Athenian statesmen; and he will not need training, for others are as ignorant as he is. He is reminded that he has to contend, not only with his own countrymen, but with their enemies⁠—with the Spartan kings and with the