Dialogues

when I say right, I mean according to rule. Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And was not the art of which I spoke gymnastic? Alcibiades Certainly. Socrates And I called the excellence in wrestling gymnastic? Alcibiades You did. Socrates And I was right? Alcibiades I think that you were. Socrates Well, now⁠—for you should learn to argue prettily⁠—let me ask you in return to tell me, first, what is that art of which playing and singing, and stepping properly in the dance, are parts⁠—what is the name of the whole? I think that by this time you must be able to tell. Alcibiades Indeed I cannot. Socrates Then let me put the matter in another way: what do you call the Goddesses who are the patronesses of art? Alcibiades The Muses do you mean, Socrates? Socrates Yes, I do; and what is the name of the art which is called after them? Alcibiades I suppose that you mean music. Socrates Yes, that is my meaning; and what is the excellence of the art of music, as I told you truly that the excellence of wrestling was gymnastic⁠—what is the excellence of music⁠—to be what? Alcibiades To be musical, I suppose. Socrates Very good; and now please to tell me what is the excellence of war and peace; as the more musical was the more excellent, or the more gymnastical was the more excellent, tell me, what name do you give to the more excellent in war and peace? Alcibiades But I really cannot tell you. Socrates But if you were offering advice to another and said to him⁠—This food is better than that, at this time and in this quantity, and he said to you⁠—What do you mean, Alcibiades, by the word “better”? you would have no difficulty in replying that you meant “more wholesome,” although you do not profess to be a physician: and when the subject is one of which you profess to have knowledge, and about which you are ready to get up and advise as if you knew, are you not ashamed, when you are asked, not to be able to answer the question? Is it not disgraceful? Alcibiades Very. Socrates Well, then, consider and try to explain what is the meaning of “better,” in the matter of making peace and going to war with those against whom you ought to go to war? To what does the word refer? Alcibiades I am thinking, and I cannot tell. Socrates But you surely know what are the charges which we bring against one another, when we arrive at the point of making war, and what name we give them? Alcibiades Yes, certainly; we say that deceit or violence has been employed, or that we have been defrauded. Socrates And how does this happen? Will you tell me how? For there may be a difference in the manner. Alcibiades Do you mean by “how,” Socrates, whether we suffered these things justly or unjustly? Socrates Exactly. Alcibiades There can be no greater difference than between just and unjust. Socrates And would you advise the Athenians to go to war with the just or with the unjust? Alcibiades That is an awkward question; for certainly, even if a person did intend to go to war with the just, he would not admit that they were just. Socrates He would not go to war, because it would be unlawful? Alcibiades Neither lawful nor honourable. Socrates Then you, too, would address them on principles of justice? Alcibiades Certainly. Socrates What, then, is justice but that better, of which I spoke, in going to war or not going to war with those against whom we ought or ought not, and when we ought or ought not to go to war? Alcibiades Clearly. Socrates But how is this, friend Alcibiades? Have you forgotten that you do not know this, or have you been to the schoolmaster without my knowledge, and has he taught you to discern the just from the unjust? Who is he? I wish you would tell me, that I may go and learn of him⁠—you shall introduce me. Alcibiades You are mocking, Socrates. Socrates No, indeed; I most solemnly declare to you by Zeus, who is the God of our common friendship, and whom I never will forswear, that I am not; tell me, then, who this instructor is, if he exists. Alcibiades But, perhaps, he does not exist; may I not have acquired the knowledge of just and unjust in some other way? Socrates Yes; if you have discovered them. Alcibiades But do you not think that I could discover them? Socrates I am sure that you might, if you enquired about them. Alcibiades And do you not think that I would enquire? Socrates Yes; if you thought that you did not know them. Alcibiades And was there not a time when I did so think? Socrates Very good; and can you tell me how long it is since you thought that you did not know the nature of the just and the unjust? What do you say to a year ago? Were you then in a state of conscious ignorance and enquiry? Or did you think that you knew? And please to answer truly, that our discussion may not be in vain. Alcibiades Well, I thought that I knew. Socrates And two years ago, and three years ago, and four years ago, you knew all the same? Alcibiades I did. Socrates And more than four years ago you were a child⁠—were you not? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And then I am quite sure that you thought you knew. Alcibiades Why are you so sure? Socrates Because I often heard you when a child, in your teacher’s house, or elsewhere, playing at dice or some other game with the boys, not hesitating at all about the nature of the just and unjust; but very confident⁠—crying and shouting that one of the boys was a rogue and a cheat, and had been cheating. Is it not true? Alcibiades But what was I to do, Socrates, when anybody cheated me? Socrates And how can you say, “What was I to do?” if at the time you did not know whether you were wronged or not? Alcibiades To be sure I knew; I was quite aware that I was being cheated. Socrates Then you