Dialogues

will listen to me. Alcibiades Your silence, Socrates, was always a surprise to me. I never could understand why you followed me about, and now that you have begun to speak again, I am still more amazed. Whether I think all this or not, is a matter about which you seem to have already made up your mind, and therefore my denial will have no effect upon you. But granting, if I must, that you have perfectly divined my purposes, why is your assistance necessary to the attainment of them? Can you tell me why? Socrates You want to know whether I can make a long speech, such as you are in the habit of hearing; but that is not my way. I think, however, that I can prove to you the truth of what I am saying, if you will grant me one little favour. Alcibiades Yes, if the favour which you mean be not a troublesome one. Socrates Will you be troubled at having questions to answer? Alcibiades Not at all. Socrates Then please to answer. Alcibiades Ask me. Socrates Have you not the intention which I attribute to you? Alcibiades I will grant anything you like, in the hope of hearing what more you have to say. Socrates You do, then, mean, as I was saying, to come forward in a little while in the character of an adviser of the Athenians? And suppose that when you are ascending the bema, I pull you by the sleeve and say, Alcibiades, you are getting up to advise the Athenians⁠—do you know the matter about which they are going to deliberate, better than they?⁠—How would you answer? Alcibiades I should reply, that I was going to advise them about a matter which I do know better than they. Socrates Then you are a good adviser about the things which you know? Alcibiades Certainly. Socrates And do you know anything but what you have learned of others, or found out yourself? Alcibiades That is all. Socrates And would you have ever learned or discovered anything, if you had not been willing either to learn of others or to examine yourself? Alcibiades I should not. Socrates And would you have been willing to learn or to examine what you supposed that you knew? Alcibiades Certainly not. Socrates Then there was a time when you thought that you did not know what you are now supposed to know? Alcibiades Certainly. Socrates I think that I know tolerably well the extent of your acquirements; and you must tell me if I forget any of them: according to my recollection, you learned the arts of writing, of playing on the lyre, and of wrestling; the flute you never would learn; this is the sum of your accomplishments, unless there were some which you acquired in secret; and I think that secrecy was hardly possible, as you could not have come out of your door, either by day or night, without my seeing you. Alcibiades Yes, that was the whole of my schooling. Socrates And are you going to get up in the Athenian assembly, and give them advice about writing? Alcibiades No, indeed. Socrates Or about the touch of the lyre? Alcibiades Certainly not. Socrates And they are not in the habit of deliberating about wrestling, in the assembly? Alcibiades Hardly. Socrates Then what are the deliberations in which you propose to advise them? Surely not about building? Alcibiades No. Socrates For the builder will advise better than you will about that? Alcibiades He will. Socrates Nor about divination? Alcibiades No. Socrates About that again the diviner will advise better than you will? Alcibiades True. Socrates Whether he be little or great, good or ill-looking, noble or ignoble⁠—makes no difference. Alcibiades Certainly not. Socrates A man is a good adviser about anything, not because he has riches, but because he has knowledge? Alcibiades Assuredly. Socrates Whether their counsellor is rich or poor, is not a matter which will make any difference to the Athenians when they are deliberating about the health of the citizens; they only require that he should be a physician. Alcibiades Of course. Socrates Then what will be the subject of deliberation about which you will be justified in getting up and advising them? Alcibiades About their own concerns, Socrates. Socrates You mean about shipbuilding, for example, when the question is what sort of ships they ought to build? Alcibiades No, I should not advise them about that. Socrates I suppose, because you do not understand shipbuilding:⁠—is that the reason? Alcibiades It is. Socrates Then about what concerns of theirs will you advise them? Alcibiades About war, Socrates, or about peace, or about any other concerns of the state. Socrates You mean, when they deliberate with whom they ought to make peace, and with whom they ought to go to war, and in what manner? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And they ought to go to war with those against whom it is better to go to war? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And when it is better? Alcibiades Certainly. Socrates And for as long a time as is better? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates But suppose the Athenians to deliberate with whom they ought to close in wrestling, and whom they should grasp by the hand, would you, or the master of gymnastics, be a better adviser of them? Alcibiades Clearly, the master of gymnastics. Socrates And can you tell me on what grounds the master of gymnastics would decide, with whom they ought or ought not to close, and when and how? To take an instance: Would he not say that they should wrestle with those against whom it is best to wrestle? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And as much as is best? Alcibiades Certainly. Socrates And at such times as are best? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates Again; you sometimes accompany the lyre with the song and dance? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates When it is well to do so? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And as much as is well? Alcibiades Just so. Socrates And as you speak of an excellence or art of the best in wrestling, and of an excellence in playing the lyre, I wish you would tell me what this latter is;⁠—the excellence of wrestling I call gymnastic, and I want to know what you call the other. Alcibiades I do not understand you. Socrates Then try to do as I do; for the answer which I gave is universally right, and